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1PREFACE
The present research report “Explaining and Understanding the Role of
Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism—An Integrative
Quantitative and Qualitative Approach” is the result of a cooperative
research project between two research teams (Institute for Urban
Security & Policing Studies, Ghent University, and Department of
Criminology, Louvain La Neuve) aimed at empirically exploring the
relationship between exposure to extremist content through New Social
Media (henceforth NSM) and violent extremism among Belgian youth
in two of Belgium’s major cities: Antwerp and Liege.
Violent extremism is a widely discussed topic in both widespread
journals and academia. This research report came about in a period
when violent extremism was high on the international political agenda
giving rise to a need to understand the phenomenon. The case of lone
wolf Anders Behring Breivik shocked the world as did numerous
terrorist attacks mostly by Islamic extremist movements worldwide.
During the project also the case of youth going to Syria to fight for the
“good cause” was highly mediatized. Media and policy makers alike
pointed in the direction of the calling of people to fight for an extremist
version of Islam through the internet as the main cause of this new
trend.
However, theorizing on the causes of violent extremism and in-depth
exploration of the insider’s view remain extremely scarce within the
field of criminology. This was (and is) also the case for theories and
efforts trying to disentangle the effects of exposure to extremist content
on violent extremism, even when the role of the internet is one of the
most debated topics of the early 21st century. The public opinion is
basically one that “fears” sudden unexpected violent radicalization
through the immediate availability of extremist content on the internet,
especially while using NSM.
The debate can be compared to earlier discussions governed by the fear
that exposure to violence through traditional media such as television
and movies, and more recently, violent video gaming will lead to
violent behavior among children and youth. Research on the relation
between exposure to violence through traditional media has yielded
inconsistent results, varying from a small effect to the absence of
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effects. In order to address this question for the relationship between
exposure to extremist content through NSM and violent extremism,
this research project has been called into life.
While most studies exclusively rely on either quantitative analysis or
qualitative data, this research project enables organization of a large-
scale survey of 6020 respondents, allowing us to test an integrated
model that captures recurrent findings reported in the research
literature, such as grievances, perceived personal and group level
discrimination, procedural justice, and addresses the role of exposure
to extremist content by using NSM.
The present study builds upon insights from a previous exploratory
study (Noppe et al, 2010) on radicalization. The study starts with a
literature review and synthesizes the findings from the literature. The
quantitative study also explores the role of NSM on individual
differences in political and religiously motivated violence. The third
part is an in-depth exploration of the motives of radical extremist
youth. Finally, the implications of our findings are discussed.
This project was commissioned by the Belgian Science Policy Office
(Belspo) together with the Belgian Ministry of Interior (Biza) and is part
of the Society and Future research program of Belspo. The research
started in February 2012 and was terminated by April 2014.
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Worldwide, both policy and research pay a lot of attention to violent
extremism, and violent radicalization as the process leading to violent
extremism (Van de Linde & Rademaker, 2010). The recent exponential
increase in concern about violent extremism and radicalization can
partially be attributed to the events of and those since 9/11 but also to
the realization that technological progress, such as the use of new social
media and globalization have made our society vulnerable (Arts &
Butter, 2009). Scholars and policy makers increasingly focus on unrave-
ling the processes of radicalization, hoping to prevent the violent radi-
calization of their own youth and in the end political violence (Van de
Line & Rademaker, 2010). In particular, the internet and its constant
technological developments are cause of concern (Conway, 2012). Since
the 1990s, the internet has become an indispensable part of daily life, is
widespread among the general population, and is used in an increas-
ingly professional way (AIVD, 2012). This means, an increasing
number of individuals and groups are capable of hiding their identity,
location, and content of communication while using the internet and
display a large virtual adaptability.
Recently, we have seen a boom in NSM and other web 2.0 applications,
bearing a large potential for communication and networking (Conway,
2012). These developments have transformed the world in an online
village, with every offline actor being represented online. So it is to no
surprise that criminals, radicals, extremists, and terrorists also use this
medium to their advantage (Benschop, 2006; Stevens & Neuhmann,
2009; Weimann, 2004). Using the internet and NSM, extremist
organizations and individuals can easily reach each other and address
a broad, global, audience, using an extensive and dynamic set of
narratives. Further, for reasons of security, safety, accessibility, and
anonymity, terrorist and extremist movements have shifted many of
their activities from public spaces to private places and personal
computers (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013).
Therefore, there is a growing concern that the process of extremist
recruitment and violent radicalization will continue to rise under the
influence of the internet (Thompson, 2011). Indeed, some recent national
and international extremist attacks seemed to be inspired, planned, and
organized through the internet, by using NSM. According to the AIVD1
1 The AIVD is the Dutch General Intelligence and Information Office and falls under the Dutch
Ministry of Internal Affairs.
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(2006), the internet can even be seen as the turbo of contemporary violent
Jihad and one of the principal instigators of bottom up processes of
violent radicalization and “Jihadization.” This has caused policy makers
to increasingly worry about what governments can do to prevent
(online) violent radicalization and recruitment.
Nonetheless, there is no consensus on the question of whether changes
in the use and possibilities of the internet provoked by web 2.0 applica-
tions have caused the internet to become a central explanatory factor in
the process of (violent) radicalization. In this regard, it is problematic
that there is hardly any empirical evidence confirming the relationship
between exposure to extremist messages and attitudes that are
supportive of violent extremism (Conway, 2012). The assumption that
the internet plays an important role in the process of (violent) radicali-
zation is mostly based on secondary sources and anecdotic evidence,
with no empirical studies to back this up or to measure the strength of a
possible influence. Silke (2008), for example, states that only 1% of all
research on (Islamic) radicalization in general is based on systematic
interviews with radicalized individuals. The few available empirical
studies that do tackle the topic of internet exposure and violent
extremism are limited to content analysis of extremist forums and
websites, focus on the practical usage of the internet and NSM by
extremist groups or analyze virtual communication2. These studies
have demonstrated that the internet provides political and religious
extremists with incredibly valuable instruments for propaganda and
recruitment, practical organization, knowledge transfer and commu-
nity building, but the actual role and possible (causal) influence of
exposure to extremist content through NSM on violent extremism
remains unclear. This kind of studies cannot and do not provide empir-
ical evidence for such a relationship. Although the influence of the
internet seems logical and inevitable, it is difficult to make a distinction
between a real causal connection between the internet and violent
extremism and just a simple co-existence of the two (Morris, 2000).
It is, nevertheless, important to not only understand how the internet
and web 2.0 applications are used by extremist groups and individuals
but also to increase our understanding of the relationship between
2 Some exceptions can be found (De Koster & Houtman, 2006; Lee & Leets, 2002; Simi & Futrell,
2006; Wojcieszak, 2010b).
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NSM and violent radicalization. This is necessary to come to a better
understanding of contemporary violent extremism and subsequently
successfully tackle processes of racialization and recruitment, online
and offline (Zhou, Reid, Qin, Chen, & Lai, 2005). “Government and
academic community have focused on the general phenomenon of the internet
and radicalisation, rather than on a persons’ individual experience online.
Many studies focus on online content and attempt to describe how it
influences people by describing the aims and successes of media strategies and
media presence, suggesting a degree of causality between online content and
its influence on the person exposed to it. This provides insights into narratives,
marketing strategies, organization, community building, etc., but this is only
one side of the market of online radicalisation, namely the supply side of
content. On the demand side, i.e., how individuals choose to engage with
material and interact online with like-minded individuals, there remains a gap
in policy making and academic understanding (von Behr et al., 2013).” The
present study3 assesses the impact of exposure to extremist content
through NSM on the processes of violent radicalization and
recruitment among Belgian adolescents.
The central research question focusses on the role of NSM in the
process of violent radicalization. The following key research questions
will be addressed.
1. Is exposure to extremist content through NSM related to offline violent
extremist activities and how strong is this relationship?
2. What is the relationship between NSM and offline (risk) factors of violent
extremism?
3. What is the relationship between exposure to extremist content through
NSM and individual extremist propensity?
In order to answer these question, first, quantitative research is
conducted based on a web survey in the general population, and
second, in-depth interviews with radicalized individuals are conducted.
3 This project is conducted on demand of the Federal Science Policy (Belspo) and the Federal
Ministry of Interior (FOD BIZA). The project is embedded in the research line “radicalization”
within the Institute for Urban Security and Policy Studies, Ghent University. The institute has
built some expertise on radicalization during the research project “Polarisering en radicaliser-
ing: een integrale preventieve aanpak” on demand of BIZA. During this research, as the first
empirical research on radicalization in Belgium, a first model of radicalization was developed.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 9  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
10
The structure outline is as follows: Chapter 1 discusses the process of
(violent) radicalization. Why and how do individuals radicalize? What
causes bring about this process and what stages does an individual go
through once he/she is a member of an extremist group? Chapter 2
addresses the relationship between youth and NSM. Why is NSM so
popular among youth and how does it affect their political participa-
tion? Chapter 3 provides an overview of the way the internet is used by
extremist groups and/or individuals. Chapter 4 reviews what is known
about the influence of media exposure on violent behavior and atti-
tudes and whether these findings can be generalized to the explanation
of violent extremism. Chapter 5 summarizes key arguments in the
debate on the influence of NSM on violent extremism. Chapter 6 gives a
short overview of the literature and highlights it most important
elements. Chapter 7 explains why a risk factor approach, as discussed
in chapter 1, is problematic, and it introduces an integrated model for
the explanation of violent extremism. This model is based on the situa-
tional action theory as developed by Wikström (2014) and integrates
key concepts as the causes of the causes of offending. More specific
insights from procedural justice theory (Tyler, 2006), social control
theory (Hirschi, 1969), social learning theory (Sutherland, 1947), and
general strain theory (Agnew, 2006) are integrated. Chapters 8 and 9
discuss the results of the quantitative and the qualitative research,
respectively. Finally, chapter 10 presents a general conclusion and
chapter 11 outlines some general recommendations.
First, it has to be pointed out that the current debate focusses one-
dimensionally on (political) Islam, Islamic radicalization, Salafism, and
Jihadism (Van de Linde & Rademaker, 2010). This is not entirely
justified. Violent radicalization can also occur among political right,
political left, and single-issue movements such as animal activism. This
project attempts to give a general overview of (violent) radicalization
and NSM and to describe the general mechanisms of influence that are
observed within all forms of violent extremism. Even so, the literature
mainly covers right-wing and Islamic extremism, and this is reflected in
this report. On the contrary, this does not imply that left-wing
extremism or animal rights extremism are of less importance.
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1. RADICALIZATION: CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
1.1. Introduction
“The attempt to find a unique explanation for political violence is the
same chance that you succeed in the attempt to find an explanation for
holes” (Della Porta, 2009, p. 23).
This contribution has not the intention to be complete or
comprehensive but rather to form a starting point, summarizing the
current knowledge on (violent) radicalization, in order to reach a
verifiable theoretical model for the explanation of radicalization into
violent extremism. An overview of the current state of the art makes it
clear that there is no definite or straight-forward answer to the question
of why and how (violent) radicalization occurs. The available literature
gives a long and diverse list of possible causes, lined up in the form of
risk factors. It is remarkable that the same risk factors can be found
when talking about radicalization out of different ideological
perspectives. This can be explained by the fact that the reason most
young people radicalize is almost never based purely on ideology but
more often on social considerations (desires, beliefs, perceived
opportunities, and perceived constraints (Elster, 1989)).
Radicalization can best be described as a process (Kundnani, 2012), but
it is hard to determine with certainty the phases involved in this
process and what makes an individual progress from one phase to
another. Researchers are not able to reach an agreement on the subject,
and consequently, several competing explanatory models are on the
market trying to unravel the process of radicalization; for example, the
cognitive opening model (Wiktorowicz, 2004), the staircase model
(Moghaddam, 2005), and the pyramid model (Mc Cauley &
Moskalenko, 2008).
Despite this diversity, most researchers agree that radicalization is
preceded by what can be described as a prephase (Bjørgo, 2002;
Koomen & Van der Pligt, 2009; Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009; Van der
Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). In this prephase, the seed for further, possibly
violent, radicalization is planted. Whether this seed develops into a full
grown tree depends on the interaction of contributing risk factors.
According to most studies, a special role is reserved for perceived rela-
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tive deprivation, identity, certain personality traits, and the social
context as contributing factors (King & Taylor, 2011). After the
prephase, group processes become important and radical support from
the environment, friends, and family could cause further radicalization
(Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). The following section will provide an
overview of different risk factors that may be of importance in the
prephase. First, a short description of the most important concepts is
given.
1.2. Definition of concepts
Radicalization is a highly contested and politicized container concept
(Schmid, 2013). So far, there is no universally accepted definition of
what exactly constitutes radicalization. This can partially be explained
by the fact that the perception of radicalization is context dependent
and as such based on social, political, and economic factors. This
implies that radicalization has different meanings for different actors.
Furthermore, the concept of radicalization is used interchangeably with
the concepts of violent extremism and terrorism, although radicaliza-
tion need not necessarily lead to violence and terrorism can take place
without radicalization (Schmid, 2013). Unfortunately, governments and
researchers tend to cling to vague, politicized, and one-sided defini-
tions. So for clarity and practicability, first, some essential concepts
need to be defined and outlined.
Radicalization
In general radicalization can be seen as a complex and dynamic process
that is subjected to differential influences and can have different,
multiple goals (Geeraerts, 2012; Van de Linde & Rademaker, 2010). This
characterization of radicalization as a process is essential because it
implies different stages and gradations. Further, the formation of
alternative political ideas, goals, and ideals can take place within any
religion, belief system and/or ideology (Corens, 2008). Despite the lack
of consensus, a number of elements are consistent among different
definitions: 1) alienation from society and the political system (Slootman &
Tillie, 2006a, p24), 2) increasing willingness to use violence for political goals
(Van den Bos, Loseman, & Doosje, 2009, p. 1), and 3) the importance of the
group (Olesen, 2009).
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Radicalization refers principally to the development of extremist
convictions and ideologies (Borum, 2011). The transfer to engagement
in violent extremism or terrorism is not inevitable and can follow
different pathways, radicalization being only one of them. Therefore,
radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence or other unwanted
acts. Most individuals holding radical ideas never get involved in
violent extremism or terrorism (Borum, 2011). Radicals can adhere to
an ideology that promotes political and physical distance between
themselves and other social/political groups without ever resorting to
violence. On the other hand, (political) violence can take place without
(ideological) radicalization. Many terrorist are not ideologically
motivated but commit terrorist acts because of other more individual
and often practical reasons. For example, Gavray, Fournier and Born
(2012) found in their research that unconventional/illegal political
participation was strongly related to other positive and legitimate types
of civic and political participation, but that violence and illegal actions
where considered more effective in attracting attention to the cause.
Radicalization can, besides violence, also have disruptive effects by
giving rise to parallel societal structures, severe political polarization
and/or tensions between societal population groups that hold different
positions in the social structure (Van den Bos et al., 2009).
Based on an extensive literature review, Schmid (2013) gives a nuanced
definition of radicalization, incorporating all the above elements.
“Radicalisation is an individual or collective (group) process whereby,
usually in a situation of political polarization, normal practices of
dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups
with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict
dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational
tactics of conflict-waging. These can include (i) the use of (non-violent)
pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than
terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and
war crimes. The process is, on the side of the rebel factions, generally
accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or
status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist posi-
tions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an
alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant
political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appro-
priate or legitimate.” (Schmid, 2013, p. 18)
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According to Schmid, we must make sure to
“1. See radicalisation as a process that can affect conflict parties on both
sides in a confrontation;
2. Remain aware of the fact that radical opinions do not necessarily lead
to political violence or terrorism
3. Detach radicalisation to some extent from radicalism and link it more
to the process of growing commitment to and engagement with (violent)
extremism
4. Apply it not only to individuals and small groups but also to larger
collectivities
5. Analyse radicalisation not only on the micro- but also on the meso-
and macro-levels.” (Schmid, 2013, p. 39)
For reasons of clarity we will henceforth use the term violent
radicalization when referring to radicalization into violent extremism.
Radicalism
Radicalism is a relative construct, and what is considered to be radical
depends on who we are and when and where we come from. Radi-
calism is not negative per definition. Radical ideas can sometimes even
be necessary to promote social change and emancipation of minorities.
In the course of history, “radicals” have fought for and changed a lot of
things that are now considered as normal and necessary. Still they were
considered as dangerous; for example, the French revolution, feminism
and the Suffragette movement, the anti-apartheid movement with
Nelson Mandela, the civil rights movements with Martin Luther etc.
Their demands were warded from the political sphere, automatically
channeling them into the extra political system (Van de Linde & Rade-
maker, 2010). Still, when defining radicalism, usually negative and
vague definitions are involved (Corens, 2008).
To resolve the confusion and end the endless debates, a benchmark is
needed to determine what is radical and what is not. In the context of
Western democratic societies, what is radical can best be defined in
relation to mainstream political activities and Western (liberal, demo-
cratic, and secular) core values (Segwick in Schmid, 2013). With this in
mind, Schmidt describes radicalism based on attitudes and behavior.
“Radicalism might […] usefully be described [as] 1. The advocating of
sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the status quo is
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unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally different alterna-
tive appears to be available to the radical 2. The means advocated to
bring about the system-transforming radical solution for government
and society [which] can be non-violent and democratic (through persua-
sion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through coercion and
revolution.” (Schmid, 2013, p. 8)
So radicals are not violent and anti-democratic by default. In other
words, radicalism has to be distinguished from violent extremism that
is anti-democratic by default.
Violent extremism
With respect to the content, extremism may best be defined against the
same benchmark as radicalism, since it also revolves around political
views that oppose mainstream political positions and core values of
(Western) society (see also Neumann & Rogers, 2007). However,
compared with radicalism, extremism takes one step further and fully
denounces pluralism, strongly emphasizes (dogmatic) ideology, and
uses violent and oppressive methods to achieve the political goals
(Schmid, 2013). Defined this way, extremism leaves no place for
diversity or compromise. Violence is always accepted as a legitimate
means to obtain and hold on to political power, which manifests itself
either in violent attitudes or violent actions or both. This means that the
distinction between extremism and violent extremism is not useful and
redundant. Although violence is not always used by every extremists, a
positive identification with violent methods is always present.
However, some might argue that the single concept “extremism”
deprived of “violent” also can be used in other context than radicaliza-
tion, and thus refer to extreme behavior or extreme interests in general.
So when addressing this interdisciplinary phenomenon, the term
violent extremism is always used to avoid confusion. Therefore, for
clarity and avoiding confusion, in the rest of the report, the term violent
extremism will be used. It should be kept in mind, however, that in the
context of radicalization and according to our definition, non-violent
extremism does not exist.
“While radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not,
extremists are never democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diver-
sity. They are also positively in favour of the use of force to obtain and
exposure.social.media.book  Page 17  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
18
maintain political power. Extremists generally tend to have inflexible
‘closed minds’ adhering to a simplified mono-causal interpretation of the
world where you are either with them or against them, part of the
problem or part of the solution. Radicals, on the other hand, have histor-
ically tended to be more open to rationality and pragmatic compromise,
without abandoning their search for getting to the root of the problem.”
(Schmid, 2013, p. 10)
Terrorism
Terrorism is, even more than radicalization or violent extremism, a
politicized term (Coolsaet, 2005b). Terrorism and violent extremism are
often interchangeably used and governments have the tendency to
quickly condemn every form of political protest or violence as
terrorism. Still, not every form of political violence is terrorism, nor is
political violence always illegitimate. The question of whether one can
speak of terrorism is always intertwined with a question of power
(Deflem, 2004b). Dominant actors have the power to define what is
legitimate and not, and the capacity to act upon this definition (Corens,
2008). For example, the bombing of Afghanistan is legitimate in the
eyes of the USA, contrary to the attacks of 9/11 that are defined as
terrorism.
According to Schmid (2013), terrorism has to be situated in a broader
spectrum of political action in which “it makes sense to differentiate
normless and criminal terrorism from illegal but sometimes (more) legitimate
forms of political violence (p. 13).” In this spectrum, terrorism is the kind
of violence that can never, under any circumstance, be legitimized and
thus falls in the same category as torture, genocide, and war crimes.
Terrorism does not necessarily refer to physical violence, but can also
mean “society disrupting damage” (AIVD, 2007, p. 18). Note that this
definition still leaves room for interpretation and is only useable when
kept in mind that the same benchmark as for radicalism and violent
extremism is used.
Schmid (2013) refers to the academic consensus definition4 that states
that terrorism is a tactic that can be used in three different contexts:
“a) illegal state repression, b) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in
times of peace or outside zones of conflict and c) as an illicit tactic of irregular
4 Without an academic consensus definition, empirical studies become highly problematic.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 18  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
PART 2 • THEORETICAL REVIEW
19
warfare employed by state-and non-state actors (p. 16).” Terrorism is
defined as follows: “terrorism is on the one hand a doctrine about the
presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear generating coercive
political violence and, on the other hand, a conspiratorial practice of calculated
demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints,
targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagan-
distic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.”
Note that the current study is limited to the explanation of violent
extremism and does not answer any questions regarding the origins of
terrorism.
1.3. Prephase
Clearly, multiple complex risk factors alternate in facilitating the
radicalization process (Van den Bos et al., 2009). No single factor can be
indicated as causal5 and the extent to which certain factors are decisive
varies from case to case (Van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). A (changing)
combination of risk factors is always required to explain radicalization
(Precht, 2007).
First, the context has to be taken into account. Second, similarities can
be found in the form of push factors (characteristics of individual or life
course that enhance the chance of radicalization), pull factors (charac-
teristics of the extremist group or context that make radicalization
attractive), and catalyst factors (Säkerhetspolisen, 2010). Push, pull, and
catalyst factors form a breeding ground for radicalization and can be
found on different levels of aggregation, from personal feelings to
events in wider society (see figure 1).
These risk factors are typical for many individuals, but only a very
small percentage of them will eventually radicalize (Precht, 2007).
Likewise, there is no deterministic relationship between certain risk
5 In social sciences, a cause can be defined as a causal factor that increases the probability of
action or, put differently, a causal factor that has the characteristics to bring about action. This
definition makes it clear that although causes are more than simple correlation, in social
sciences, they are not perceived as deterministic. Dealing with social phenomena, it is very
unlikely to find a causal factor that is both necessary and sufficient (Mackie, 1980). Such a factor
would, when present, always lead to the phenomenon under study. So far, in social science in
general and in the study of extremism more specifically, such a factor has not yet been identi-
fied and is very unlikely to exist. The complexity of the social world demands several causal
factors in interaction with each other to explain social phenomena.
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factors and violent extremism. Risk factors affect the probability of
violent extremism, but on their own they do not explain why some
individuals radicalize and others, in similar situations, do not. In what
follows, the most important risk factors are grouped and discussed. An
overview can be found in table 1.
1.3.1. Contextual risk factors
1.3.1.1. Broad (global) contextual factors
In the model developed by the Dutch IVA6 (Moors & Van den Reek
Vermeulen, 2010), “context” is described as broad long-term societal
processes that can be at the foundation of the development of a
breeding ground for (violent) radicalization. It mostly constitutes
structural demographic, socio-economic, and/or (geo-)political
processes and trends at an international level, beyond the scope of
individuals or even individual states. Examples are segregation,
overpopulation, and economic recessions. The position of the context in
Table 1: Overview of risk factors for violent extremism identified in the literature
Contextual risk 
factors
Broad (global) contextual factors Structural global processes
Local societal circumstances Socio-economic situation
Push factors Personal characteristics and traits NO psychopathology
NO socio-demographic profile
Personality traits
Social-psychological mechanisms Perceived injustice
Perceived group threat
Perceived insecurity
Social mechanisms Search for social inclusion
Search for identity and meaning
Emotions Fear, anger, hatred, contempt…
Pull factors Extremist group Fulfil social and psychological needs
Radical belief system Ideological recognition
Catalysts Trigger events Altering personal or social events
Violence Need for excitement and kicks
Biographical availability Lack of social ties
Significant others Persuasion from friends, family,…
6 The “IVA beleidsonderzoek en advies” is a Dutch research bureau that conducts policy-orien-
tated research in different domains for the government, institutions, and private companies.
The IVA is affiliated with the University of Tilburg.
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relation to radicalization is displayed in figure 1. There is no linear
connection between certain (global) trends and (violent) radicalization
(Van de Linde & Rademaker, 2010). Some trends can facilitate (violent)
radicalization but processes of radicalization emerge from a broad
spectrum of factors, and the way these global processes are locally
perceived and translated is crucial. The influences of all environmental
characteristics are dependent of individual perception.
One has to be careful not to align and limit the understanding of the
context to foreign political influences (Harchaoui, 2006). That would be
a holistic approach, very deterministic, and leaves no room for the
perception-based choice processes of individuals. An example is the
presentation of global political Islam as the main cause and explanation
for extremist Muslims in the Netherlands and Belgium. This perspec-
tive of a “catastrophic terrorism” that strikes Western society from
outside its borders reduces the capability to be self-critical and recog-
nize the own shortcomings, making the actual problems and social
issues invisible. Violent extremism and terrorism are inextricably
linked to the society they emerged from (Sunier, 2006). By placing
perpetrators as it were opposite to society, Western society itself stays
out of the picture. This way, the context is not included but rather
excluded from the analysis.
1.3.1.2. Local societal circumstances
The global context can give rise to certain local societal circumstances.
These are mostly comprised of socio-economic factors such as political
inequality, poverty, and unemployment. For example, a period of
economic recession (context) can lead to an increase in poverty, rising
income inequality, unemployment, and structural discrimination. This
kind of societal circumstances can provoke feelings of dissatisfaction
and distrust with society and/or certain groups (Van der Valk &
Wagenaar, 2010). Coolsaet (2005a) argues that such structural factors
lead to perceived and actual marginalization and thus can cause violent
extremism (see section 1.3.2.2).
1.3.2. Push factors at the individual level
Push factors render individuals susceptible to (violent) radicalization.
Especially, identity seems to be a central factor. Both the search for a
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positive personal identity and the need to protect a “threatened”
cultural identity can be powerful push factors toward (violent)
radicalization. Although push factors can each have an independent
influence on (violent) radicalization, individually they barely explain
anything and there is no necessary consequence.
1.3.2.1. Personal characteristics and traits
An intuitive first reaction to violent extremism and terrorism is that the
perpetrators have to be mentally disturbed or at least psychologically
abnormal (Silke, 2008). Still, the majority of extremists and even
terrorist are perfectly sane. Furthermore, in general, they are mentally
more stable than other violent offenders or even members of the
general population. After all, the execution of a terrorist attack
demands a high level of self-control, discipline, and rationality.
Psychotic behavior, trauma, or personality disorders make individuals
less suitable to function in a high-demanding organization (Sageman,
2008; see also Horgan, 2004; 2008). This does not mean that such
individuals are never part of extremist movements, but rather
exceptionally and they are usually denied central positions in the
organization. Only for lone wolves and loners the picture might be
different (Pantucci, 2011)7. Especially the latter are supposed to suffer
from psychological and social problems.
Second, certain personality traits can make individuals susceptible for
particular experiences (King & Taylor, 2011; Victoroff, 2005). Some
individuals display high levels of sensationalism and/or thrill seeking
behavior, which can make them susceptible to the seemingly exciting
lifestyle of extremists (Bjørgo, 2002; King & Taylor, 2011). Having an
authoritarian personality is also linked to susceptibility to violent
extremism, especially in case of right-wing extremism (Van der Pligt &
Koomen, 2009; Victoroff, 2005, De Waele & Pauwels, 2014; De Waele
2013; Pauwels & De Waele, in press). Still, it is unlikely that one
personality trait can account for all activists in all different extremist
fractions (Fermin, 2009).
Further, with prevention in mind, a lot of attention has been given to
socio-demographical profiles of extremists and terrorists (Fermin,
2009). Researchers tried to determine age, gender, origin, class, etc., of
7 See paragraph 1.5.2.
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typical extremists and potential terrorists. However, extremists and
terrorists generally form a very diverse group. Needless to say, this
kind of profiles is dependent on the nature and background of both the
individual and movement (Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006; Silke, 2008).
A starting legal movement in the United States will attract different
individuals than an underground organization in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, within each group, different functions are possible, each
demanding additional skills (Fermin, 2009). In addition, radicalization
is a gradual process that can change the individual drastically over
time. Put differently, it is not possible to link demographic characteris-
tics and (violent) radicalization. There is no demographic profile of the
individual likely to radicalize (Van den Bos et al., 2009). Moreover,
attributes can never be causes! This still is a mistake often made by
practitioners. Certain behaviors may possibly be grouped among
individuals with similar demographic background characteristics
(Doosje, Loseman, & Van den Bos, 2009; Fermin, 2009). These character-
istics by themselves do not account for violent extremism but can be an
indication of underlying causes explaining why members of these
groups are more likely to radicalize.
1.3.2.2. Socio-psychological mechanisms
As already discussed, a combination of societal circumstances can
make individuals susceptible to extremist ideas. However, individuals
differ in the extent to which they are sensitive to these circumstances
(King & Taylor, 2011; Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). Thoughts and
actions of individuals are strongly determined by the interpretation of
the situation they are in (Doosje et al., 2009). This means that in order to
understand (violent) radicalization, sufficient attention must be paid to
the way individuals perceive and define a situation (Buijs et al., 2006).
This is possible by taking socio-psychological cognitions/beliefs and
mechanisms8 into account. According to Van den Bos et al. (2009), the
following three socio-psychological factors play a crucial role in the
explanation of radicalization by linking the individual to its environ-
ment: perceived injustice, perceived group threat, and perceived inse-
8 Mechanisms explain how something works by linking cause and consequence. They explain
the link between a certain event (cause) and the reaction of the individual (action). In doing so,
they provide insight into the relation between social structure and offending. In other words,
mechanisms are the intervening processes that link causal risk factors and action outcomes, in
this case, political violence (Hedström, 2005).
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curity. These factors relate to the assessment and perception the indi-
vidual has of his/her own situation. It is important to keep in mind that
not the objective situation but rather personal experience and percep-
tion are decisive.
Perceived injustice entails the perception that one’s own group is
unjustly disadvantaged compared to other groups and/or the feeling of
being treated unfairly by society. Objective discrimination and depriva-
tion are not of importance but rather the experience and perception of
being disadvantaged9. Especially relative group deprivation seems to
be a strong predictor of positive attitudes toward extremist ideas. It
also appears that even when one acquires a better position within a
deprived group, the probability of (violent) radicalization rises if one’s
own situation does not improve despite newly acquired accomplish-
ments (Koomen & Van der Pligt, 2009)10.
Second, a strong feeling of (group) threat can enhance negative feelings
toward other groups, especially if the own identity is strongly based on
the own social group (see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006 for an
overview). The perceived treat can not only be real (e.g., announced
attacks) but also, and more often, be symbolic and based on conflicting
norms and values (e.g., headscarves at work) (see also Koomen & Van
der Pligt, 2009; Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). In this case, one is afraid
to lose the own cultural identity. Bartlett, Birdwell, and Littler (2011)
and Bartlett and Littler (2011) showed, for instance, that the majority of
online sympathizers of a populist movement had joined the movement
out of concern for the preservation of Western values under threat of
9 “Perceived” does not automatically mean “not real.” It refers to the way an individual experi-
ences a certain situation. It is possible, although not necessary, that this perception is objectively
grounded.
10 This idea follows more are less the classical strain theories that are developed in criminology to
explain crime (Agnew, 2010). Strain theory has roots in Merton’s anomy theory. The idea is that
there exists a discrepancy between 1) the common cultural goals for everybody and 2) the struc-
tural reality of unequal possibilities to reach these goals. This leads to tension or strain. Accord-
ing to Merton, different reactions to the experience of strain are possible: conformism,
innovation, ritualism, rebellion, or retreatism. To explain general crime, strain theories usually
refer to innovation or the use of alternative (illegal) means to obtain the traditional goals. Rad-
icalization seems to be more a case of rebellion, as the values of mainstream society are
denounced and replaced by other values and goals, the means to reach them included (van
Gemert, 2008). Religion or ideology can be used as a source of inspiration for the creation of a
new system of norms and values, addressing and relieving feelings of strain. Failure according
to the old values (e.g., being unemployed) can now be transformed into victory in light of the
new ones (e.g., breaking free from capitalism).
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Islam and uncontrolled migration. Van San (2013) showed, in turn, that
numerous Muslim youth support the notion that a war is being waged
against Islam by the West. For them this means not only that their
entire group and their way of life are threatened but also that they are
personally under attack. This creates a strong feeling of indignation,
which can easily turn into anger. Experienced group threat is strongly
related to relative (group) deprivation.
Finally, perceived group threat can also lead to general feelings of
insecurity about the future existence of the group but also about the
individual future. This leads to actions aiming at reducing the
perceived insecurity and regaining control of one’s own life. This can,
for example, be done by voting for a certain political party but also by
joining a radical or even an extremist movement. Extremist groups
offer a strictly defined worldview and clear rules about what is
expected from a group member. In other words, they offer anchor
points in life, providing feelings of security and safety11.
In this regard, Coolsaet (2005a) argues that when addressing the root
causes of violent extremism, attention should be diverted from
ideology and relative deprivation. Instead, the focus should be on
structural problems and the feelings of injustice and marginalization
they cause. “Terrorism is not born out of poverty, nor out of religion. The
particular brand of terrorism we witness today is bred by marginalization—as
was the case in the past with similar waves of terrorism. This terrorism is a
symptom of a society gone awry. When a world changes too rapidly in too
many dimensions at once, it makes—rightly or wrongly—large groups of
people, nations, or countries feel excluded. And it is precisely this which
constitutes the breeding ground for small extremist splinter groups searching
for a way to justify their acts of terror. As self-appointed vanguards, they are
thus seeking to present themselves as champions of justice. That is how it was a
hundred years ago. That is how it is today.” (Coolsaet, 2005, p. vii)
11 Especially adolescents and ethnic minorities are at risk of being disappointed about the oppor-
tunities they get and/or of experiencing stigmatization and discrimination (Buijs et al., 2006;
Slootman & Tillie, 2006a; Van den Bos et al., 2009). They have to find their way in a society
marked by polarization on ethnic and religious lines. Because of this, some of them easily expe-
rience feelings of insecurity that go hand in hand with the need for rebellion and action in order
to rectify the situation.
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1.3.2.3. Social mechanisms
Social mechanisms refer to the social situation of the individual in
relation to others in the same group. Especially “searching”
individuals are susceptible to (violent) radicalization. Poor social ties
can lead to individual feelings of rejection and loneliness that can
provoke strong reactions12. In case traditional leaders, social
institutions and/or parents are not able to sufficiently fulfill this need,
radical and extremist groups can take over this role and provide
structure, meaning, and significance (Corens, 2008)
First, individuals have a strong need for social inclusion, acceptance, and a
sense of security (Bjørgo, 2002). Often individuals are attracted to
extremist groups in light of their search for friendship, social
protection, and a communal feeling, especially when these things are
absent in their daily lives. Second, aspects of meaning and identity are
also of importance (Slootman & Tillie, 2006a). In particular, individuals
in search of their own identity often struggle with questions such as
“who am I?” “what am I doing here?” and “what is the meaning of
life?” (see also Van den Bos et al., 2009; Veldhuis & Bakker, 2007).
12 In the dominant discourse, this is often reduced to a problem of integration for youths of for-
eign descent (Sunier, 2006). The dominant idea is that (violent) radicalization is mainly a psy-
cho-pathological problem related to cultural marginalization. Radicalization is seen as an
irrational reaction to the incapacity (or incompetence) to find a valuable place in society. In this
view, these youngsters are not capable of closing the gap between the different cultures that
they are a part of. This results in weak ties with both cultures, leaving them confused about the
right way to act (Buijs et al., 2006; Precht, 2007; Slootman & Tillie, 2006a). Still, the described
process does not automatically imply that (violent) radicalization is a consequence of a lack of
integration (Sunier, 2006; Van der Valk, 2010). If one is well integrated, social acceptance by the
rest of society is expected. This makes it harder to accept discrimination and exclusion (e.g.,
Schiffauer, 1999). In other words, it is a lack of acknowledgement rather than a lack of integra-
tion that can lead to radicalization (see e.g., Moors & Van den Reek Vermeulen, 2010). A second
critique on this dominant discourse is that the existence of an “unbridgeable gap between cul-
tures” presumes the existence of significant and identifiable difference between these two cul-
tures. However, culture is not something fixed or static. On the contrary, youngsters are active
agents in the creation of their own, ever changing, cultural environment (Sunier, 2006). Further-
more, cultural change can be an opportunity for creativity, instead of something negative.
Third, questions can be raised by the equation of radicalization and culture (Geelhoed, 2012).
Members of both current and former extremist movements have the same cultural background
as their non-extremist peers. This implicates that explanations for the rise of these groups can-
not be found in cultural but rather in social and political processes and conflicts. This has been
widely accepted for the explanation of left- and right-wing extremism and there is no apparent
reason why this should be different for extremist Muslims in the West. Granted these young-
sters indeed have a partially non-western cultural background, this argument falls short
because it does not account for 1) radical converts, 2) non-extremist Salafists, and 3) the only
marginal position of Islamic fundamentalism among western Muslims.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 26  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
PART 2 • THEORETICAL REVIEW
27
Moreover, a lack of self-esteem can lead to a hunkering for stabilizing
securities. In other words, extremist groups are eager to act upon an
“unfulfilled need to define themselves” (Venhaus, 2010). By joining a
group, individuals always obtain something positive they want (Opp,
2009). The fact that this search for identity and meaning is crucial is
confirmed by several (auto)biographical histories of former extremists
(De Stoop, 2010; Nawaz, 2012).
1.3.2.4. Emotions
Often, diffuse feelings of frustration and hatred toward other popula-
tion segments are present. Although these feelings can be associated
with specific negative experiences, it is equally possible that they are
the consequence of perceived group threat and linked to this perceived
injustice (Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). From these negative percep-
tions, feelings of aversion and contempt as well as fear and anger can
arise. These are strong emotions that can possibly influence behavior
and action readiness. Especially hatred, which builds on all mentioned
emotions, can pave the way for (violent) radicalization because it is
linked to the conviction that the others are inherently evil and/or infe-
rior13. Based on these feelings, the group held responsible for the expe-
rienced injustice will trigger a want for revenge (Silke, 2008). Revenge is
seen as a key motivation for violent extremism because it contains a
powerful and aggressive intention to restore feelings of self-worth and
end the experienced injustice.
Next to emotions, rationality is also of importance; for example, the
knowledge someone has about the political and economic situation
(Veldhuis & Bakker, 2007).
1.3.3. Pull factors
1.3.3.1. The extremist group
Extremist groups often fulfill certain fundamental social and
psychological needs (Bjørgo, 2002, 2012). First, it is not very likely that
somebody will join an extremist group when they are satisfied about
the current personal and/of political situation and when the social
13 See Sternberg (2003) for an overview on “hate.”
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status quo does not provoke any frustration. Something has to be off.
Second, it is necessary that extremist groups offer something that is
wanted by, at least part of, their target audience. This is made visible in
the supply–demand chain in figure 1. Perceived grievances, such as
insecurity, group threat, and lack of social integration, form a breeding
ground from which a demand, more specifically a need for friendship,
meaning, significance, and/or action and change, emerges. Sometimes
these demands can be so urgent that the personal resilience against
violent extremism starts to fall apart, creating cognitive openings
(Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 7). This suggests that individuals become
susceptible to new ideas and perspectives, including extremist views
that otherwise would have been immediately rejected. If the nature of
the (perceived) grievances matches with what a certain extremist
groups has to offer, radicalization can occur (Mellis, 2007; Moors & Van
den Reek Vermeulen, 2010)14.
Most extremist groups actively try to match supply and demand by
framing their message based on grievances that can be found among
their target audience (Thompson, 2011; Wiktorowicz, 2004). By using
language and symbols, they place radical claims within a certain
interpretative framework. In doing so, they strive for frame alignment,
or the alignment of their own narratives with the perceptions and
grievances that are already present among the target population (see
also, Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Neumann & Rogers, 2007). Successful
extremist frames offer alternative and simple ideological explanations
for the perceived grievances, point out causes and consequences, and
emphasize the own political and social efficiency (Adams & Roscigno,
2005). Extremist groups are very well aware of the grievances of
potential members and offer them a purposeful answer by placing
these feelings within a bigger extremist picture. A positive, collective
identity is created by using a frame that offers a clear us versus them
logic, the ideology to explain the distinction between the two, and the
grievances to prove and legitimize the distinction. “You are not the only
one going through this, we are all in the same battle and it is all because
of that enemy.” Slootman and Tillie say the following about this:
14 This need not necessarily be true. Answers and solutions to problems can also be found among
other social and political actors, oneself and/or the environment. In the case of radicalization,
the individual has difficulties connecting to one of those more mainstream groups and/or does
not succeed in obtaining a positive status in society by legitimate means. (Bjørgo, 2002).
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“The radical division of the world into friend and enemy and good and
evil gives clarity and simplicity. This world view of the unequal struggle
between friend and enemy provides an explanation of the unjust situa-
tion which many experience in their daily lives. This explanation of the
world offers a simple manner to justify the complex emotions of anger
and frustration, while the emphasis on solidarity and brotherhood […]
provides a feeling of belonging. A feeling of superiority […] contributes
to an increase in self-worth. The distinct rules […] also provide the clear
framework which so many individuals need.”(Slootman & Tillie,
2006b, p. 59)
“[…] radical ideology has some advantages compared to what the demo-
cratically active Muslims have to offer. Although the premise of the
democratically active, participating in dealing with the excesses of the
inherently beneficial society, is powerful and emancipatory, it has less to
offer on the socio-cultural level and in the search for meaning. It has no
ready answers to difficult questions about subjects such as individual
liberty, the position of religion, the role of the family and the bond with
the community.[…] In contrast, the radical ideology offers certainty,
stability, and acceptance. It is made up of clear prescriptions of what to
do and what not to do; it offers an identity to be proud of and affiliation
with brothers and sisters in the world-wide community of Muslims.”
(Slootman & Tillie, 2006b, p. 59)
In other words, extremist groups are attractive to searching and
frustrated individuals because they seem to offer an answer on all their
questions and problems. Extremist groups often seem the place to be in
order to accomplish something and get rid of frustrations (Van der Valk
& Wagenaar, 2010). Vulnerable and searching youth are furthermore
susceptible to an easily accessible, clear and simple worldview and a
clear definition of their role and place within this world. Even more
important is the social appeal of these groups (Bjørgo, 2012). This can
include friendship, a community or family feeling, the presence of a
father figure, a chance to rebel against parents, protection, social status,
identity, etc. (see also Murer, 2011).
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1.3.3.2. Ideology
Although ideological considerations are the most common justification
given for being a member of an extremist movement, the specific
ideology of an extremist group is usually not the central factor leading
to violent extremism. The real reasons for joining an extremist group
are principally social in nature (Bjørgo, 1997, 2012). In fact, most
individuals joining an extremist group are not ideologically or religious
schooled at the moment of entering the group (Buijs et al., 2006;
Sageman, 2004; Van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). According to Roy
(2008), the success of organizations such as Al Qaeda is not based on
their development as a political organization grounded in a certain
ideology but rather on the creation of “a narrative that could allow rebels
without a cause to connect with a cause” (p. 1). The complete ideology,
with all its details, is only learned and adopted after one becomes a
member of the group (Bjørgo, 2002). Once active in the group, different
Figure 1: Radicalization: supply and demand
Only when supply and demand are congruent the process of radicalization can possibly take place. 
If supply and demand find each other because (i) there is a breeding ground for both supply and 
demand and (ii) there is a weakened resilience against violent extremism, this can, but does not 
necessarily has to, lead to violent radicalization (Mellis, 2007; Moors & Van den Reek Vermeulen, 
2010, p. 21).
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group processes are responsible for further radicalization and
polarization, until the individual identifies himself completely with the
group and has internalized its goal and ideology15 (Bjørgo, 2002; Rogers
et al., 2007).
On the other hand, individuals do not join just any group. Individual
opinions are always shaped within a normative framework, causing
certain paradigms to be present from a very early stage, even before the
development of an ideological consciousness. According to Doosje,
Loseman and Van den Bos (Doosje et al., 2009; Doosje, Van den Bos,
Loseman, Feddes, & Mann, 2012), what is attractive to individuals in
the prephase of (violent) radicalization is not a specific, detailed, and
complex ideology, but the nature of the offered “radical belief system,”
which consists of four components that each, to some degree, can be
found in all (extremist) ideologies: 1) The perception of the own social
group as superior, 2) the perception of the authorities as illegitimate, 3)
an encouraged distance regarding other social groups, and 4) a feeling
of alienation from the rest of society. These aspects of the radical belief
system can be found, in different shapes, among all extremist groups.
The choice for a specific extremist groups is subsequently determined
by “ideological recognition” or the recognition of the own general
viewpoints in the radical belief system of the group (Silke, 2008; Van
der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). In general, people tend to connect with
others similar to themselves, the so called mirror effect or selection
process. Individuals usually enter a group holding some general and
diffuse ideas, resembling those of the group, that have been shaped by
different experiences. The extremist group then places these ideas
within their own interpretative framework.
1.3.4. Catalysts
Sometimes, certain events or circumstances can have an accelerating
influence on (violent) radicalization. Veldhuis and Bakker (2007)
describe these as catalysts. Mostly they contribute to (violent) radicali-
zation by confirming already existing convictions. Compared to push
and pull factors that work on the long term, catalysts can start and
accelerate the radicalization process on a very short term.
15 See also paragraph 1.5.3.
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1.3.4.1. Trigger events (Veldhuis & Bakker, 2007)
Certain events can have a recruiting effect. Trigger events instigate the
impression of intense injustice and can provoke great anger and a
strong longing for revenge and retaliation (Silke, 2008). Some events
can be so compelling that the individuals involved have to reassess
their place in society, political and religious attitudes, and even their
own identity. Such a crisis can be cultural, political, economic, or
personal and shakes existing convictions, creating cognitive openings
(see supra). These trigger events can be related to personal issues
(Olesen, 2009); however, events that do not involve personal victimiza-
tion but are related to other members of the same social group can also
have the same effect, especially if there is a strong identification with
the group in question (Silke, 2008). In addition, symbolic actions that
are considered hurtful or sacrilege can act as trigger events (e.g., the
burning of the Koran by American soldiers in Kabul) (Van der Pligt &
Koomen, 2009). Likewise, the foreign policy of certain states can trigger
similar feelings of discontent (Precht, 2007). Finally, a direct confronta-
tion with the opponent group or an event where one was treated in an
unjust manner can also act as triggers.
1.3.4.2. Violence
Violence holds a special position because there is a strong, but no
necessary, connection with (violent) radicalization. Violence can act as
both a push and a pull factor (Van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). On the
one hand, violence can be part of what makes extremist groups
attractive. Some individuals have a strong interest and fascination for
violence and adventure or a strong need for excitement and kicks
(Bjørgo, 2002). Others are attracted to the violent and military character
of extremist groups and the accompanying guns, uniforms, cult of
masculinity, etc. On the other hand, violence by third parties can also be
a trigger to join extremist groups. This can be about violence in society
in general or the personal experiences of violence.
Some researchers think that non-violent extremist movements form a
gateway into violent extremism. However, in a British report on the
difference between violent and non-violent radicalization, no direct
linear connection was established between holding extremist
convictions and the actual use of violence. Political violence was rather
the result of a process of violent radicalization imbedded in a culture of
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violence, peer pressure, and the existence of an honor code where
violence was an important way to gain status (Bartlett, Birdwell, &
King, 2010). In this sense, extremist movements can be regarded and
analyzed as youth movements that place violence in the core of their
existence (Roy, 2008). It seems that in places where youngsters have
access to organized crime, extremist groups are a lot less represented.
1.3.4.3. Biographical availability
Biographical availability is defined as 1) the absence of engagement to
the wider society and 2) a lack of feelings of guild. Social and
institutional ties that can be lacking are full-time employment, conjugal
obligations, children, etc. In general, young men are the most at risk of
a high biographical availability (Olesen, 2009)
1.3.4.4. Significant others
Researchers point out that violent radicalization in Western countries is
often a horizontal phenomenon that spreads through networks of
friends, rather than a hierarchical and vertical phenomenon where new
participants are recruited by leaders at the top (Atran, 2010). The factor
identified by most researchers as central and crucial in the explanation
of political activism, in general, (Olesen, 2009) and the joining of
extremist groups, more specifically, (Sageman, 2004), is the presence of
social ties with others that are already active. Extremist groups grow
principally through social networks16 (Sageman, 2004) and the fact that
an extremist message is delivered by a significant other or a person of
confidence is of detrimental importance in this process. It is social ties
with peers, family, or colleagues that convince individuals to join
extremist groups (see e.g., Bartlett et al., 2010; Sageman, 2004; SOU,
16 It is not completely clear how criminal networks arise, through selection or through socializa-
tion. The selection principle states that people choose each other as friends based on character-
istics they have in common, such as their criminal or extremist behavior. The socialization
principle, on the other hand, states that criminal or extremist behavior is the consequence of
processes of influence and socialization during the friendship. In the classic criminological the-
ories explaining crime, the selection principle can be found in control theory (Gottfredson &
Hirschi, 1990; Völker, Baerveldt, & Driessen, 2008). Social learning theory is based on the prin-
ciple of socialization (Akers, 1998; Sutherland, 1947). In the current research, it is assumed that
both processes are of importance and simultaneously play a role during different stages of the
development of criminal or extremist behavior. For instance, it is possible that friends and fam-
ily introduce extremist thinking to an individual (socialization) but that in later phases, like-
minded individuals are actively sought out (selection).
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2010). Commitment and feelings of obligation toward the group are
initially founded upon these social ties and not on ideological
considerations (Atran, 2010; Fermin, 2009). Especially, an extremist peer
group seems to be of importance. During adolescence, social networks
expand and become more diverse by the incorporation of new friends
(Völker et al., 2008). These friends and acquaintances are crucial in the
lives of youngsters, while family bonds start losing their importance.
1.4. Recruitment
The concept of recruitment has the implicit connotation, especially in
the context of radicalization, to refer to a passive process of
brainwashing and manipulation of innocent individuals by third
parties (Neumann & Rogers, 2007). However, this is not necessarily
true. This is a top-down description that does not capture the
phenomenon in its totality. The recruited individual always plays more
or less an active role in his/her own recruitment. Recruitment is a
process of identifying oneself with a social and/or political movement
(Opp, 2009). This can take place within any social or political
movement, including extremist ones. In some circumstances,
individuals actively look for the possibility to be recruited into the
movement. Olesen summarizes the definition of recruitment as follows:
“Recruitment is the process through which individuals become part of a
collective and come to share the views and goals of this collective. […]
Recruitment to activism is a voluntary decision on the part of the indi-
vidual. The individual, however, can be more or less proactive in the
process. At least three ideal-typical pathways to recruitment can be spec-
ified: 1) individuals identify an organization they sympathize with and
approach it; 2) organizations actively seek out potential recruits; 3) indi-
viduals are recruited through friendship and family networks. […]
Recruitment is a general process occurring in all forms of collective
activism.” (Olesen, 2009, p. 8)
The place of recruitment is of lesser importance compared to the
present social relationships (Neumann & Rogers, 2007). In fact,
recruitment can take place following different pathways. these can be
described on the basis of the position on two axes as shown in figure 2.
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The first axis represents the difference between active and passive
recruitment. In case of passive recruitment, individuals are noted by a
third party and brought into the movement without this being the
individual’s deliberate choice. In case of active recruitment, individuals
actively search for a group or something the group has to offer, such as
friendship. The second axis displays the difference between intentional
and unintentional recruitment. In case of intentional recruitment, the
individual is aware of the fact that he is joining a certain movement and
of what the movement entails. In contrast, in case of unintentional
recruitment, the individual more or less “accidently” joins the
movement.
This typology is created from the standpoint of the individual;
however, the extremist group can also similarly play an active or a
passive role (King & Taylor, 2011). Active extremist groups are external
actors that wait along the sidelines for the right moment to convince
searching individuals of their ideas and convictions. These groups
Figure 2: Ideal types of recruitment
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intentionally for like-
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strive to be as effective and efficient as possible, and therefore first
identify those most likely to agree to join/act before starting their
recruitment efforts (Brady, Schlozman, & Verba, 1999). Other extremist
groups are formed bottom-up, through the grouping of some like-
minded extremist individuals. These groups do not necessarily have
official ties with formal extremist organizations but are usually
inspired by them. In this case, formal organizations are not responsible
for the formation and recruitment of the members of these groups.
They do make already existing autonomous groups more dangerous by
supplying them with training, inspiration, and ideological justification.
There are different ways to get into contact with an extremist group. A
distinction can be made between recruitment by third parties, peer
pressure and family, and self-recruitment (Murer, 2011). Recruitment
by third parties is usually aimed at youth who already placed
themselves outside the mainstream political sphere and as such are
recruited and pulled into more organized political or social groups by
active recruiters. Peer pressure refers to individuals that join a certain
group because of family and/or friends. Either they join a group by
following friends and family, usually older brothers and sisters, who
are already active in the group or they join a certain group to rebel
against family expectations, traditions, and values. Self-recruitment
involves searching individuals, including those who do not exactly
know what they are searching for. More often than not it is about
finding social inclusion and acceptance. These individuals, deliberately
or unintentionally, go searching for a group that can provide in these
needs17.
There are different actors that can take on the role of active recruiter.
Rogers and Neuhman (2007) identified, among others, radical preachers,
gateway organizations, activists and the community. The community must
be seen as part of the breeding ground of radicalization and as such can
push individuals in the direction of violent extremism. It is not so much
about what the community does as about what it does not do, more
specifically failing to provide in social inclusion, social identity, and
sufficient opportunities and appreciation for all its members. Finally,
the presence of a charismatic leader seems to be essential (Cilluffo,
17 This is not the same as self-radicalization that implies a complete individual radicalization
without any connection to an extremist group or movement.
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Cozzens, & Ranstorp, 2010; Precht, 2007). Such leaders can easily
influence individuals on the basis of the position of authority that they
hold within the group or movement. However, since (violent) radicali-
zation increasingly takes place through bottom-up processes instead of
within hierarchical organization, the role of personal mentors and
group leaders gains importance. Mostly, one specific member of the
group influences and inspires the others. (e.g., Atta for the 9/11
attackers and Khan for the London Bombers).
1.5. Process of Radicalization
The previous section discussed the prephase of (violent) radicalization
and more specifically those factors that make individuals more
susceptible to violent extremism. The prephase is followed by the
actual process of radicalization, which will be discussed in the
following sections (Van Leeuwen, 2005; Olesen, 2009).
1.5.1. Stages
Slootman and Tillie (2006a) and Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006) link
violent radicalization to an increasing loss of legitimacy of the
democratic society. They identify three general stages of development
that are characterized by a diminishing level of confidence in the
system and an increasing folding back on the own group. According to
Van de Linde and Rademaker (2010), every stage is accompanied by a
growing readiness for action. This trajectory can be found among all
ideological forms of radicalization.
First, a crisis of confidence develops during the prephase. Usually this
is a consequence of discontent with certain authorities and the
conducted policy. The existing confidence in the government is
undermined but does not yet lead to an ideological break. A militant
attitude is adopted but actions stay within the law and rely mostly on
political arguments and debate. Next, a crisis of legitimacy develops.
Not only policy is debated but the legitimacy of the system itself is
questioned (radicalism). This means a break with the existing political
order and the development of an alternative ideological and cultural
system. Political actions intensify and disturb the public order, but in a
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relatively harmless way. Finally, the crisis develops into a conflict of
legitimacy. Not only is the entire system denounced but also everyone
who is part of this system (violent extremism). A new moral develops
that gives the individual the responsibility to fight “evil.” In general,
the movement becomes isolated of the outside world, focused on its
own reality, and enforces the new developed moral codes on its
members. Political actions become increasingly violent, in extreme
cases leading to terrorism. Noppe, Ponsaers, Verhage, De Ruyver &
Easton (2011) developed a dynamic model of violent radicalization that
encompasses all of these stages. The model is shown in figure 3.
It is important to emphasize that the pyramid shape does not imply a
linear deterministic development from bottom to top (Van de Linde &
Rademaker, 2010). An individual finding himself at the base of the
pyramid does not necessarily has to progress to the top. The higher in
the pyramid the smaller and more isolated the group. The process can
stop, speed up, slow down, turn around, or skip steps. There is no
deterministic relation or logic progression, nor does this take place
within a fixed time frame (Precht, 2007). Individuals can radicalize in
just a few weeks, but this can also take several years. In other words,
Figure 3: Dynamic model of violent radicalization (Noppe et al., 2011, based on 
McCauley & Moscalenco, 2008)
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there is not one default pathway into further radicalization. The
development of the process is unique for every person and does not
necessarily lead to violence.18 Moreover, each step does not necessarily
imply a conscious decision of the individual (Buijs et al., 2006). Often, it
comprises a gliding and insidious process that guides the individual
through a seemingly logical sequence of events. Although it is of course
possible for an individual to make a deliberate decision about the
group he wants to join and the role he wants to play. Keeping this in
mind, it is more accurate to visualize the process of radicalization using
concentric circles, rather than a pyramid, as is shown on figure 4.
This model starts from the idea that after the prephase a moment of
entry into an extremist groups takes place (initial recruitment), and
radicalization and recruitment further develop together and mutually
influence each other.19 20 It is possible for an individual to find himself
in an advanced stage of radicalization prior to joining an extremist
18 It is important to keep in mind that violent radicalization and adopting extremist beliefs is only
one possible pathway into terrorism and most certainly not the only one (Borum, 2011).
Figure 4: Circular model of radicalization (Säkerhetpolisen, 2009)
19 This is confirmed by the fact that within one movement individuals can hold different attitudes
and take on different roles. The core members of an extremist movement, or those the most
often actively involved in the group, show stronger and more extremist attitudes compared to
regular sympathizers and supporters. See for example the research of Goodwin and Evans
(2012) on the right wing (extremist) political parties BNP and UKIP in the UK.
20 This doesn’t necessarily has to entail a formal membership. It can also entail the formation of a
group with some friends and/or the identification with a specific extremist group or movement.
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group but is not very likely that one is already fully integrated into the
ideology of the extremist group at the moment of joining. Specific
ideological frameworks are gradually incorporated after joining. Once
part of the group, individuals will gradually practice a more active role
and take on more responsibilities.
For extremist movements, it is often a pragmatic choice to only
gradually allow new members in the organization (Van der Valk &
Wagenaar, 2010). Reliability and devotion are assessed through low
profile activities that cannot cause much harm to the movement. Only if
loyalty is sufficiently proven, a recruit will be granted access to the core
of the movement. This implies a constant assessment and recruitment,
both internal and external. In particular, members for terrorist cells will
be carefully selected (King & Taylor, 2011). For the recruits, this means
that they are only gradually exposed to more extreme activities and
viewpoints. This process goes hand in hand with an increasing
radicalization.
According to Van der Valk & Wagenaar (2010), the process of joining an
extremist group generally progresses in four stages. In the first two
stages, the emphasis is on social factors and activities. Only in the third
and fourth stage ideology becomes decisive. In the fourth stage,
violence is introduced. These stages more or less correspond to stages
identified by other authors (Precht, 2007; Van den Bos et al., 2009;
Wiktorowicz, 2004).
1. Getting acquainted and joining
This can take place in different ways but mostly by looking to join a
group oneself, through active recruitment, or through friends and family.
2. Walking along and exploration
This is about “spotting” or the exploration of the group (Noppe et al.,
2011). Contact is made with the other members of the group, new
friendships arise, and one gets involved into the extremist social net-
work. Especially the social context is of importance (Precht, 2007; Van der
Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). The social life and associating with friends and
like-minded individuals are central to the experience. However, social
gatherings often have a political goal as well, such as recruitment, fund
raising, and ideological education. The most important change in the
individual is the altering of identity, attitudes, and behavior.
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3. Ideological development and identification
This stage entails a growing involvement in and commitment to the
movement. From this stage onward, ideology plays a key role and
political views harden more and more. This can take place under the
influence of the group or out of an own intrinsic motivation. By
interacting with other members, one learns what is expected of an
accepted member of the movement. New, extremist norms and values
are internalized. In fact, a process of re-socialization is taking place
(Bjørgo, 2002; Fermin, 2009). Eventually, the full extremist worldview of
the movement will be completely internalized until the point of full
identification with the group and its goals (Precht, 2007). This process is
reinforced by exclusively associating with like-minded others and
banning all other social contacts. Noppe et al. (2011) describe this stage
as “indoctrination and isolation.”
The idea of being surrounded by enemies is central to this
resocialization. It not only creates solidarity and loyalty but also
paranoia and distrust of both the outside world and the other members
of the group. A distance is created with the rest of society, and friends
and family are pushed further away. Confrontations with “enemies”
reinforce the group feeling and push members further into the group.
From hereon, the individual will take on more important roles such as
those of a recruiter, a leader, and/or an organizer (Bartlett et al., 2010;
Wiktorowicz, 2004). The ideological development and proficiency
reached by each individual member can vary.
4. Isolation and violence
Sometimes even further violent radicalization is possible. First,
violence becomes central to the extremist experience and former
attitudes about violence fundamentally change. Increasingly more and
extreme violence is used as the moral and social barriers to do so
disappear and violent situations are deliberately sought after. Second,
the extremist ideology is now completely internalized. The personal
goals coincide completely with the goals of the movement (Precht,
2007). Counter arguments are completely filtered out. Group ties and
loyalty become more intense and remaining bonds with family and
friends are broken. The individual is now completely isolated. Noppe
et al. (2011) label this “completion.”
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1.5.1.1. Self-radicalization
Radicalization is usually a product of social interaction. However, what
worries policy makers and some researchers the most is the process of
so-called self-radicalization (Neumann & Rogers, 2007). For some
researchers, self-radicalization and internet radicalization are the same
thing (see von Behr et al., 2013). In their view, some processes of radi-
calization take place almost exclusively through the internet, without
any physical, offline contact with extremist groups or individuals. They
can thus be seen as self-radicalization although online contacts and
communication remain possible. For other scholars, these are two
different phenomena. Here self-radicalization differs from online radi-
calization because the former takes place in total isolation, without any
contact with other people, whether offline or online. Following this
view, self-radicalization is actually very rare, if not non-existent.
Pantucci (2011) makes a distinction between loners and lone wolves. Lone
wolves are individuals that almost exclusively radicalize through the
internet before the use of political violence. They have no contacts with
other extremists in real life, but do so through the internet. This
resembles more to virtual radicalization than to self-radicalization.
Note that they do not rely on virtual or offline networks in the actual
preparation and execution of violent attacks. These actors always have
contacts among members of extremist movements, but it is unclear
whether they are part of organized networks and/or have offline ties
with known extremist groups. Violence is always committed out of
political consideration.
Loners differ from lone wolves because they not only act alone but also
do not have any contact with other extremists, online or offline. They
gather information about extremist ideologies form passive sources on
the internet and use this ideology as justification and explanation for
their actions. Often, the extent to which they actually adhere to this
ideology is unclear21.
21 A further distinction has to be made with lone attackers (Pantucci, 2011). Lone attackers operate
alone but have clear connections with established extremist groups instead of loose online con-
nections. They act under clear “command and control chains.” The networks they are part of sup-
ply them with the needed knowledge and material. See Pantucci (2011) for examples of lone
wolves, loners, and lone attackers.
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Although in most cases, the process of self-radicalization starts out
lonely, there are only a few that stay alone. In most cases, like-minded
individuals are quickly searched for and found, opening the door to a
more established extremist environment that accounts for further radi-
calization and socialization. Another possibility is that a group of like-
minded individuals starts an own (isolated) movement. Whatever the
case, physical gatherings are almost always part of the radicalization
process. Especially in situations where violent expressions start to
become more serious and specific, these physical encounters are essen-
tial (Ätran 2010:3).
1.5.2. Group processes
Most researcher are of the opinion that (violent) radicalization occurs
within a “collective.” These are (usually) small and informal groups of
peers that intensively interact with each other during an extensive
period of time and share the same school, recreation center, work place,
gym, or other social spaces (including web forums) (Silke, 2008). This
allows for the creation of a shared social identity, as a result of which
the ideas of the more extremist members are adopted by the rest of the
group after some time. This implies that the decision to support or
participate in violence is not easily reduced to an individual choice.
This is even more the case when the new formed friendships are action
oriented from the start, as is clearly shown in some scientific studies
(Atran, 2010; Della Porta, 2009; Horgan, 2004).
Individuals derive their self-worth not only from their own actions but
also membership of social groups and the social identity of this group
(Rogers et al., 2007; Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). To maintain a
positive identity, one strives to positively distinguish the own group
from other groups. This tendency becomes stronger when the self-
worth of the individual is under pressure and/or when the group is
under threat. This triggers strong feelings of group cohesion and
increasingly negative and stereotypical opinions about the opposing
group. Within this kind of homogenous groups, group processes take
place that can enhance polarization and radicalization. First is group
polarization. The group as a whole is in general more extremist than the
individual, and the opinion of the majority will receive the most
attention within the group. This causes the information exchange in the
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group to lead to increasing polarization. Second, groupthink occurs
when unity and consensus are more important than the quality of
judgment. Only information confirming the own ideas is taken in and
any other information is ignored. A feeling of treat can make a group
close their ranks and become isolated, lowering the chances of coming
into contact with different views (see also Bartlett & Miller, 2010).
Finally, the risky shift phenomenon causes groups to take more risky
and extreme decisions than the individual.
Individuals actively involved in violent extremist groups tend to refer
to the other members of the group in terms of a “brotherhood,”
comparing their friendship to the bonds that are formed between war
comrades fighting a common battle (Olesen, 2009, p. 16). It can be very
difficult to resist the social pressure that arises from this kind of
comradeship, especially for those members who would be socially
isolated without the group. According to Sageman (2004), the strong
bonds between members of the same extremist group can even be an
alternative explanation for the use of political violence. After all, most
people are prepared to cross boundaries for love and/or friendship.
The same feelings of loyalty and proximity also form strong forces
preventing disengagement from the group (Sageman, 2004). After
joining an extremist group, most members find themselves alienated
from their prior lives outside the group and living in complete
isolation, without any social bonds to outsiders. This creates a mutual
dependency and inhibits disengagement (Olesen, 2009). Sometimes an
analogy is made between drug use and violent radicalization, since
both are equally difficult to let go (Beski-Chafiq, 2010; Sou, 2010).
1.6. Summary
In general, it can be stated that (violent) radicalization usually develops
out of a prephase that is characterized by a number of diverse risk
factors, creating a breeding ground for (violent) radicalization and
enhancing the probability of (violent) radicalization. Individuals in this
prephase usually experience feelings of frustration and discontent with
certain aspects of their lives, society in general, and/or the political
policy. Especially, socio-psychological mechanisms such as insecurity,
perceived injustice, and group threat are of importance, next to the
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search for social inclusion, meaning, and identity. These individuals
typically meet (intentionally or unintentionally) other like-minded
individuals and go through the further process of radicalization
together. This further process entails a number of stages of (violent)
radicalization and recruitment that eventually can lead to violent
extremism and in extreme cases terrorism. Only a few will reach this
stage, others will drop out of the radicalization process sooner or later.
It is important to note that these risk factors continue to influence the
individual, even when no longer in the prephase but already in the
process of radicalization. Moreover, they are manipulated by extremist
groups not only for recruitment purposes but also to ensure further
radicalization and loyalty.
Still there is no single triggering factor that can be pointed out as the
cause of (violent) radicalization. A combination of factors always seems
to be required (Precht, 2007). In general, (violent) radicalization can be
described as a social phenomenon in which factors such as belonging,
identity, group dynamics, and social values are important elements.
Ideological arguments are often given as a post hoc justification for
membership of an extremist groups, but the real explanatory factors are
most of the time social in nature (Bjørgo, 2012). Ideology does play an
important role, but usually as a justification to reach other goals.
Ideological recognition can inform the choice of extremist groups but
the specific ideological framework of an extremist group is only
adopted after recruitment.
What radicalizing individuals have in common is that they seem to be
at a crossing point in their lives and “searching.” In general, extremist
movements offer these individuals three things (Fermin, 2009): (1) an
answer to existential life questions, (2) a political activist answer to
injustice, and (3) a warm home and sense of belonging. This
corresponds to the three most important grounds for (violent)
radicalization: (1) the need of meaning and significance, (2) a reaction
to (experienced) injustice, and (3) the need for social inclusion (Buijs et
al., 2006). If these things are missing in the lives of individuals and they
cannot be found in regular society, extremist groups can become very
appealing and attractive. At the first sight, very different movements,
including the white-power movement, autonomous networks, violent
Islamic movements, troublesome youth groups, hooliganism, and in
some extent, religious sexts, have common traits of providing a sense of
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acknowledgment, protection (Adams & Roscigno, 2005), identity, and
belonging to their members (Odén, 2008). The difference between
violent radicalizing and not radicalizing is often dependent on the
presence of extremist networks and social ties that can pull the
individual into an extremist group.
Based on this, two preconditions for violent radicalization can be
derived: (1) Extremist viewpoints providing an answer to experienced
grievances have to be present and accessible, and (2) Social bonds,
networks, and/or extremist groups that can pull individuals further
into violent extremism have to be present and accessible. Further, poor
access to alternative information on social reality and the absence of
distraction form violent extremism, such as social activities linked to
participation in civic society, are of importance (Bartlett et al., 2010).
These factors make it less likely that the extremist arguments will be
questioned.
With this in mind, it is worrying that the internet and especially NSM
make the fulfillment of these preconditions possible in just a few clicks.
Through the internet, unlimited access to a vast amount of extremist
content is possible. Furthermore, NSM have made it possible to make
contact and communicate with extremists regardless of time and place.
Moreover, it is very easy to become isolated from the rest of society
through the internet. It is not necessarily that the internet will provide
the two preconditions for radicalization but if so, it will be done in a
fast, safe, and easy accessible way. In other words, the question remains
whether the internet and, more specifically, NSM are another risk factor
(cause22) related to radicalization and violent extremism. To find some
first indications for answering this question, in the next chapters, we
review how NSM are used by youth (Chapter 2), how extremist groups
use the internet (Chapter 3), what influences exposure to violent media
content has on behavior (Chapter 4) and how the risks of NSM
exposure to extremist content is assessed in the literature (Chapter 5).
22 See also footnote 5.
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2. NSM AND YOUTH
2.1. Introduction
The modern internet was originated in the 1960’s (Livingstone, 2005).
The relatively short period between then and now is characterized by a
swift and significant social change. Since the end of 1990, the internet
has become indispensable at home, school, and work place, to the point
that daily life can no longer be imagined without it. The implications of
this fast rise are the subject of both social, political, cultural, and
economic debates on the influence, significance, and consequences of
the internet on society. This analysis has not been made easier by the
continuous and fast change of the internet, constantly creating new
possibilities. Some of the current trends comprise the popularity of
social network sites, the popularity of blogs, and the fading popularity
of traditional newsgroups even online. Especially, NSM are popular
among youth. First, a short description is given of the internet on the
one hand and of NSM on the other. Next, the influence of internet
usage in the political participation of youth is assessed.
2.2. Definition of concepts
A distinction has to be made between what can be described as the
regular internet, websites etc., and web 2.0 applications. The latter
facilitate the interaction between internet users through social media.
This is done by allowing the creation of user-generated content in a
virtual community. This means that virtual content and applications
are no longer top down created and put online in a finished form, but
are constantly changed and modified by all internet users in a
participatory way (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). A good example is
Wikipedia. Examples of web 2.0 applications are social network sites,
blogs, wikis, video sharing, hosted services, web applications, digital
mashups, and social tagging.
(New) social media are online platforms where users, with minimal or
no intervention of professionals, deliver the content. The principal
characteristics of NSM are interaction and dialogue among its users.
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Communication is altered into an active dialogue. Kaplan and
Haenlein (2010) define NSM as
“a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and
exchange of user-generated content.” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61)
Social network sites (SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, and
Linked In are part of the web 2.0 and a specific kind of NSM. Since their
creation, they have attracted millions of users worldwide, mostly
youth, adolescents and young adults, of which most have integrated
SNSs in their daily lives (Boyd & Ellison, 2008; Subrahmanyam, Reich,
Waechter, & Espinoza, 2008). Most SNSs support existing social
networks, while others aim at connecting strangers based on shared
interests, political conviction, or shared activities. Some SNSs appeal to
a diverse audience, others target a specific group based on certain
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and religion.
2.3. Why are NSM popular among adolescents
The popularity of NSM among youth is based on the possibility to
share content and to express one-self (Klein, 2009b). Using NSM, it is
possible to show interests, share opinions, and contribute to the
formation of a community. This is in strong contrast to traditional
media, which are controlled by (commercial) gatekeepers and allow no
personal input. The driving force behind NSM is the wish of youth to
independently shape their own culture and identity. Identity is the
main theme of virtually all use of NSM by youth.
Regan & Steeves (2010) state that NSM offer an answer to the structural
and social barriers that limit and even inhibit youngster to participate
in (offline) public life (see also Boyd, 2008; Raynes-Goldie & Walker,
2008). Youth and adolescents live in a strictly regulated environment
and the social spaces where they gather are mostly controlled by adults
(e.g., school) (Jewkes, 2010). The objective and social nature of NSM
allow for the creation of own “spaces and places that young people can and
do use to empower themselves” (Regan & Steeves, 2010, p. 161). In other
words, NSM allow for an own public space where young people are
free to develop their own identity, interact with each other, and express
themselves, independent of established authorities (see also De Koning,
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2008; Jewkes, 2010; Van Manen, 2010). At the same time, NSM can act as
a public forum that allows youth to organize themselves and react
against attempts of top-down control and surveillance (Regan &
Steeves, 2010).
Especially, SNSs (like Facebook) are popular because they form
complete functioning communities aimed at the exposition of social
networks and in doing so identity (Boyd, 2008). Through the creation of
a profile on an SNS, it is possible to highlight the most important
aspects of one’s identity, for friends and peers to view, interpret and
judge. This can result in new contacts but the main goal is to be valued
by the already existing peer group (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). Research
suggests that there is a link between online and offline interactions.
Most users only use SNSs to maintain existing social relations (bonding
social capital) and to reinforce distant offline social contacts (bridging
social capital)23 (see for example Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007). In
other words, this kind of usage mainly supports sociability within
existing groups of friends. Youth “write themselves into being” through
their profiles (Boyd, 2008, p129). The way profiles are linked to each
other makes both the group structure and one’s own place in the group
visible and thus displays the own (social) identity. Youth also “write
their community into being” by choosing who to accept in their network
and who not (Boyd, 2008, p131). SNSs are, in other words, “networked
publics” that support sociability just as unmediated public spaces do (Boyd &
Ellison, 2008, p. 221). This renders the difference between offline and
online artificial because both are social spaces where communication
and the construction and definition of identity are central (De Koning,
2008).
Finally, research shows that the online and offline social contexts are
also strongly linked in case of young adults, even if they experience less
23 Social capital refers to benefits and opportunities that are derived from cooperation and inter-
action between individuals and groups. (Important sociological scholars on the subject are, for
example, Bourdieu, Putnam, and Fukuyama.) Bonding social capital refers to the benefits as a
consequence of the formation of social bonds between members of the same groups or between
a homogenous group of individuals. Bridging social capital refers to the benefits as a conse-
quence of the formation of social bonds between members of different groups or between a
heterogeneous group of individuals. Although social capital is always a positive asset for the
individual, not all forms of social capital are beneficial for society as a whole (for example
gangs). Bridging social capital has in general the most positive consequences for societies and
communities because it strengthens the bonds between members of different and sometimes
opposing groups (Putnam, 2000).
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structural barriers to public participation. Online communication is
mostly used in light of those things that are also of importance offline,
like the need for social connection and inclusion (Subrahmanyam et al.,
2008). Similar to adolescents, young adults use SNSs to reinforce and
support existing offline social networks. However, the goal is not to
explore and define one’s own identity, like is the case for adolescents,
but to confirm and anchor previously formed identities (Mcmillan &
Morrison, 2006).
2.4. Adolescents, the internet, and political 
participation
A declining political interest, especially among youngster, has caused
much political concern and subsequently has given rise to a large body
of literature addressing the causes of this issue (Livingstone, 2005). At
the same time, the rise of internet and the apparent ease and
enthusiasm at which youngster have massively embraced this new
technology have put the internet forward as both the cause and the
solution for the problem24, leading to numerous studies on the relation
between youth, the internet, and political participation.
These studies show that youth indeed prefer the internet over
traditional forms of political participation (Livingstone, 2005).
However, this does not mean that internet usage in itself leads to more
online political participation, such as visiting political or civic websites
(Livingstone et al., 2007). The amount of time spent online and the level
of internet literacy does not seem to influence political participation
contrary to background characteristics and socialization that do.
Livingstone et al. (2005) suggests that the life of youth is shaped by the
daily political context and institutional structures such as peers, school,
24 Supporters of the amplification theory state that the internet will even more amplify the differ-
ences between the traditionally political active and the less engaged groups of society because
of the self-selective character of the internet (Vissers, Hooghe, & Mareas, 2009). The internet
requires to actively search for information, implying that only those who are interested, have
the necessary resources and the right accommodation will do so (Kraut et al., 2002; Livingstone,
Couldry, & Markham, 2007). Supporters of the mobilization theory, on the other hand, state that
the internet, on the contrary, has the potential to engage groups into political activities (Vissers
et al., 2009). Through its capacity to inform, mobilize, and engage, the internet could potentially
be the technology that makes it possible for citizens to be direct and actively engaged in polit-
ical processes (see also Bentivegna, 2002; Levine & Lopez, 2004; Montgomery, Gottlieb-Robles,
& Larson, 2004; Rice, 2002).
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and parents, creating (or not) possibilities to participate in the public or
civic sphere. Those who are already politically interested will use the
internet as an important and useful tool for participation, and the
others will not (see also Livingstone, 2005; Livingstone et al., 2005). In
other words, the internet seems to be a tool to pursue already existing
interests shaped by social capital, social expectations and general
opportunities in the daily lives of individuals. Research indeed
concludes that more and better informed internet users are more
inclined to be politically active, but that the collecting of information is
mainly dependent on political interest (Couldry, Livingstone, &
Markham, 2006; Vissers et al., 2009). Involvement and participation are
not enhanced or limited by (general) internet usage
Youth groups linked to traditional political institutions mostly use the
internet as an extension of traditional media (reading the newspaper
online, consult the political program, etc.) (Dahlgren & Olsson, 2007).
Youth involved in alternative political movements (outside traditional
political parties) are, on the other hand, skeptical of traditional media.
They find that their standpoints and actions are almost not represented
because they diverge too much from the mainstream. The few times
that they do make the news, they are depicted in a generalizing and
negative way and constructed as deviant, creating a strong us versus
them narrative. Through the internet, however, it is possible to find
relevant and supporting information, meet like-minded others,
organize oneself, mobilize, and debate. Because of this, it is possible to
construct a positive self-image as a political actor with an aberrant
opinion. In other words, internet is a useful resource for information
gathering and identity construction and is used in that context by new
and alternative social movements.
Because of their specific demands, alternative political movements
usually do not use commercial SNSs for their civic aspirations but
resort to what Goldie and Walker (2008) describe as online civic
engagement sites. Online civic engagement sites offer similar tools and
services (mail, blogs, forums, etc.) as commercial SNSs, but they are
linked to information and resources allowing their members to strive
for offline social change. They provide background information on
broad social themes, action plans, and connections to relevant groups,
organizations, and peers. These websites are used in support of offline
actions, rather than as a place for online action.
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2.5. Summary
For youth, NSM appear mainly to be attractive in light of the
construction of the own (social) identity and the possibility for self-
expression. Through NSM, it is possible to spread the own message in a
creative and attractive way within a multi-dimensional community and
to channel reactions of peers. In the end, these actions serve the
purpose of reinforcing already existing (offline) networks. Liberated
from restricting measures and structures, online activities act as an
extension of the offline social world. NSM allow youth to control
content and access to “their own” public space.
So it is to no surprise that youngsters prefer the internet for political
participation and the development of political identities. Still, research
indicates that NSM mainly reinforce the development of offline
originated interests. It is unlikely that the use of NSM in general will
lead to increasing political participation. NSM are rather used as a
useful tool by those who are already politically active. Especially those
youth active in alternative political movements use the internet for
information gathering and identity formation because this is not
enough supported in the offline world. Because, in essence, extremist
movements are still social and political groups (Klandermans & Mayer,
2010), it is likely that the internet and new social media will be used in a
similar way by extremist youth (see among others Dean, Bell, &
Newman, 2012; Thompson, 2011), namely as an extension of their
offline activities and interests.
Based on this analysis, it is important to keep a number of
recommendations in mind while researching NSM and violent
radicalization (Dahlgren & Olsson, 2007). First, it is important not to
approach NSM as a separate phenomenon but rather to frame it within
an integrated media environment (see also Konijn et al., 2010). Second,
the internet and NSM have to be placed within daily routines.
Attention should be given to the significance of the internet for
concrete, daily political engagement. Third, (extremist) identity
formation through the internet should not be seen as isolated from
identity formation in real life. On the contrary, the internet is a source of
constant identity formation contributing to already formed offline
identities.
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3. EXTREMIST GROUPS AND THE INTERNET
3.1. Introduction
Almost every social group or actor of importance in the real world is
also represented online (Woolley, Limperos, & Oliver, 2010). So it not
surprising that radicals, extremists, and terrorist also use this medium
and respond to the many possibilities that the internet has to offer
(Benschop, 2006; Stevens & Neumann, 2009; Thompson, 2009;
Weimann, 2004, 2010). Especially, NSM offer numerous possibilities in
terms of information exchange and recruitment. Right-wing extremism
(Daniels, 2008; Zhou et al., 2005), left-wing extremism, Islamic
extremism (Conway, 2012), and extremist animal activism (ADL, 2005;
Zhou et al., 2005) can all be found on the internet.
Political extremists and radicals do not use the internet fundamentally
different compared with other social movements (Kohlman, 2006;
NCTb, 2010). Extremists groups also try to organize communication
and information as smooth as possible, reinforce solidarity, and build a
collective identity. The changes in communication as a consequence of
the internet that are grasped by the rest of the world hold the same
advantages for extremist groups (Benschop, 2006; Stevens & Neumann,
2009; Weimann, 2004, 2010; Weimann & Tsfati, 2002).
1. The internet has strongly reduced the costs of communication,
making the exchange of information virtually free. Furthermore, the
internet is fast and easy to use.
2. The internet has created unlimited access to information and knowl-
edge from over the world. A free zone with limited police control is
created. Everybody can contribute to this knowledge by uploading infor-
mation.
3. The internet has made it easy to find like-minded individuals and cre-
ate social networks, even across borders.
4. As a relative anonymous medium, crossing social lines is made easier
and more acceptable. It is relatively easy to keep one’s identity hidden.
These developments have mainly had positive consequences, holding
the promise of better communities, mutual understanding, and more
solidarity (Neumann & Rogers, 2007). The difference between the use
of the internet for these kind of objectives or for extremist objectives lies
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not within the nature of the activities but rather in the content and goal
of the shared information. In the next section, the supply and demand
for extremist online content is further explored. Why are individuals
attracted to extremist content and how is NSM used by extremist
groups? Finally, it is assessed where extremist groups can be found on
the internet.
3.2. Online supply and demand
3.2.1. Why are individuals attracted to extremist websites?
Media gratifies certain needs of the public. In order to do so, media
provides a wide range of information and entertainment functions. The
“uses and gratifications model” as developed in communication
sciences describes how user’s needs motivate media use. Aly (2009;
2010) applies this model to the internet and violent radicalization, while
taking the social realities that create needs and that are antecedent to
internet usage into account. In doing so, she positions terrorist propa-
ganda on the internet in the context of a range of motivations and needs.
She suggests that exposure to online extremist propaganda alone cannot
account for violent radicalization in its entirety but that propaganda
may satisfy informational, personal identity, and social integration
needs. At the same time, the internet, through its various media func-
tions, acts as a facilitator of needs both in terms of content and attrib-
utes. The social situation of individuals generates media needs that are
gratified by different content and functions of the internet, as used by
radical and extremist groups. Figure 5 visualizes this.
Figure 5: Uses and gratification model of internet radicalization (Aly, 2009)
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3.2.2. How do radical and extremist groups use the 
internet?
A whole range of online activities can be useful for extremists
(Benschop, 2006; Weimann, 2004). In general, the literature agrees that
there are three specific activities that are of importance in the context of
violent radicalization and recruitment (Bowman-Grieve, 2011; Fermin,
2009; Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003; NCTb, 2010; Neumann &
Rogers, 2007; Stevens & Neumann, 2009; Zhou et al., 2005). These
activities are in line with the way alternative (non-radical) political
movements use the internet (see also section 3.4.4). These activities are
discussed in the next section. Before doing so, it must be pointed out
that making a clear distinction is not always possible. Dependent on
differences in geographical reach of the groups in question, their
ideology, strategic goals, and political legitimacy, different aspects will
be accentuated (Reid & Chen, 2007).
Propaganda
The roles of the different actors in the process of (violent) radicalization
are varied and change constantly (Neumann & Rogers, 2007). It would
be wrong to see only the official core of the movement as the active
suppliers of information and reduce the individual recruits and
grassroots movements to passive receivers. The latter also play an
important part in the dissemination and production of information.
Propaganda provides supporters (and potential recruits) in alternative
frames to interpret their grievances (Adams & Roscigno, 2005). Websites
and forums act as introduction channels to the extremist worldview and
provide legitimacy and access to specialized sources. The group that
conveys the most convincing message can count on the most support
(Brown & Silke, 2011). For contemporary political and social
movements, media attention is crucial to this end (Morris, 2000) because
through media, symbolic frames and messages can be spread for public
consumption. Terrorist actions are not of intrinsic importance, but the
media attention and publicity they generate and the message they
convey are (cfr. Theater of terror) (Weimann & Tsfati, 2002).
Extremist movements are aware of the, often marginalized, position
they hold in the mainstream media. Therefore, they opt to legitimize
their goals, methods, and tactics through the internet, allowing to
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control the content of the message (Hoskins, O’Loughlin, & Awan,
2009). The internet allows to control their image, paint a respectable
picture of the movement (Blazak, 2001; Gerstenfeld et al., 2003), and
reach a broad audience (Weimann & Tsfati, 2002). By drawing attention
to the barbarity of others, supporters can be attracted and passive
sympathizers can be pursued into action (Brown & Silke, 2011).
The internet also eliminates the dependency of journalists, making it
possible to circumvent filters in the traditional media. As a result,
material that otherwise would have never been broadcasted can now be
distributed (Olesen, 2009) and certain events can be spread, interpreted,
and commented upon from the standpoint of the extremist group (see
also Brown & Silke, 2011). Furthermore, the internet allows small
groups with limited resources to convey their standpoints, while
creating the impression of being more influential and successful than is
actually the case (Benschop, 2006).
Ideological messages and/or narratives can be reinforced and
confirmed by images and videos that are directly accessible through the
internet (Kohlman, 2006). New members will be directed to certain
websites for precisely this purpose. Image and sound can make an
otherwise abstract message realistic and dramatic. The viewer is
personally addressed, which increases the impact (Browne & Silke,
2011). These kinds of images have always been available but the
internet and free software allow to reach a broad audience in a
relatively cheap, fast, and anonymous way without leaving any trail
(NCTb, 2010).
Finally, practical information on potential targets and structural
weaknesses are distributed in a similar fashion, as are detailed
explanations on how to undertake certain actions (see also ADL, 2005;
Benschop, 2006)25. Moreover, extremist groups will always try to
establish contact and interaction with interested individuals, which can
be done much more easily through the internet. The same information
can be distributed through forums, allowing to react much faster to
certain questions and give personal and contextual advice.
25 According to Stenersen (2008), so far, the internet does not constitute an organized virtual train-
ing camp. Instead, the internet has to be seen as a resource bank maintained and accessed
largely by (self-)radicalized sympathizers and autonomous cells, which is used alongside more
traditional ways of training and preparing. Training material on the internet rather serves as a
preparation to classic Jihadi training.
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Network
Besides ideological formation, organizational development increas-
ingly occurs through the internet and online networks. The internet
forms a relatively safe way for new members and like-minded individ-
uals to meet each other and network. The internet’s technical possibili-
ties ensure anonymity and shield communication, promoting intensive
interaction between the members of a network (AIVD, 2012). Moreover,
the internet can bring people into contact who otherwise never would
have met. Extensive and well-functioning networks can give the group
an image of being efficient and effective (Adams & Roscigno, 2005).
This kind of virtual networks has limited social costs and huge advan-
tages.
Recently, as increasing number of self-directed and self-organized
networks appear that are bottom-up created. This is partially possible
because the internet allows to easily find like-minded peers and to
participate in otherwise closed discussions (AIVD, 2006). These
networks are characterized by a strong organization and directive
capacity, making them very resilient (AIVD, 2012; Gerstenfeld et al.,
2003). Nevertheless, new networks usually rise very fast but disappear
even faster as well. This, however, does not restrict these networks from
becoming bigger than physical networks and acquiring an international
character26. It is such networks that can increase the striking power of a
movement because they ensure the availability of an informal pool of
willing individuals who can be recruited (NCTb, 2010). Because of this,
virtual networks enable the achievement of practical goals and
aspirations.
Information is gathered about who visits certain websites and what is
posted and uploaded. Next, the most promising supporters are
contacted by recruiters (Benschop, 2006). The other way around, the
internet makes it also easier for would-be extremists to contact the
movement themselves. Most extremist websites offer the possibility to
become an online member or to request an information package.
Furthermore, online it is much easier to transcend initial small and
marginal groups of self-starters and integrate into more formal
organizations with much more resources and know-how (Neumann &
Rogers, 2007).
26 See Leuprecht & Hall (2014) for an overview of extremist network structure.
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Finally, the internet allows different small groups to link themselves
(Blazak, 2001; Gerstenfeld et al., 2003). For example, there exists a wide
range of right-extremist movements (e.g., Skinheads, white
supremacists, and neo-Nazis) that each are further divided into several
sub and splinter groups. In reality, the difference between these groups
is rather small. The internet makes it possible for these groups to
become electronically and logistically linked to each other, allowing for
the sharing of information and the formation of a collective identity
and goal. This creates the impression of these movements to be less
extreme and more influential.
Community formation
All strong marginalized groups need a free space to meet each other
and share convictions and culture without having to worry about what
members of the (dominant) majority will think or do (Evans & Boyte,
1992). In this free space, it is possible to discuss narratives that would
be unacceptable in other contexts and otherwise unacceptable social
behavior and ideas can be normalized. For extremist groups, who are
perceived as a high risk to society, it is not easy to gain access to such
offline free spaces. The internet, on the other side, is freely accessible
and can form a similar online free space (Simi & Futrell, 2006).
The internet facilitates connecting and identifying with like-minded
peers, regardless of distance, time, or borders (Daniels, 2009; Olesen,
2009). This creates a mondial “us versus them” feeling and can even
trigger a translocal identity, amplifying group bonds. Most individuals
join extremist communities without taking an explicit stance on
different issues (Bowman-Grieve, 2011). Their standpoints are formed
through interactions with other members. Often, older and more
experienced individuals take on younger and insecure members and
facilitate the formation of their identity. These kinds of virtual social
environments can become a sanctuary for individuals that have
difficulty finding their place in society and/or of which the opinions
provoke revulsion within the personal environment (De Koster &
Houtman, 2006). Shared experiences of social rejection create a shared
identity that together with the possibility to communicate with like-
minded peers in a safe environment triggers a feeling of alliance.
Shared experiences are, in other words, the driving power behind the
virtual community formation.
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Although most members have never met, these kinds of virtual
environments are perceived as a community because of the social and
supporting functions they fulfill. Extremist websites recruit youth by
emphasizing and linking their message to this community feeling and
shared grievances (Simi & Futrell, 2006). Deeper into the website, a
carefully framed message of intolerance can be found.
“Hate websites tend to build on this sense of welcoming in the outsider
by constructing messages thematically-linked to one form of identity or
another, whether it be cultural, religious, political, patriotic, or some-
thing else, the underlying subtext is still black and white. However,
within the more refined recruiting bases (often forums and download-
able contents of these sites) a narrower approach is evident in the framed
messages of intolerance. These messages, posed as contemporary forum
topics, are introduced by the hate website and its associated inscribers
and gradually accepted by new members.” (Klein, 2009b, p. 83).
The whole of online activities creates the impression of the existence of
a “collective movement community” (Simi & Futrell, 2006) that consists of
other extremists that openly adhere to the same ideals and with whom
one can sympathize and make contact27. Through the internet,
continuous involvement in this community is ensured even when
offline encounters are not possible. Virtual images reinforce this feeling
by their big emotional impact (AIVD, 2006). These virtual communities
become dangerous when the virtual world takes in the place of real
societal circumstances, causing individuals to become detached of
society and to ignore cultural historical factors and/or the societal
context.
3.2.3. What kind of websites do extremists use?
Extremist groups make use of different kinds of websites. The most
important group can be described as the official websites of
important organizations. First, this group includes websites of official
political organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (http://
www.ikhwanweb.com). These are open and free-access websites that
contain information about the history, mission, and ideology of the
27 See Simi en Futrell (2006) for an overview of the white power movement in this aspect.
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organization (Aly, 2010). They offer links to the own media
statements, publications, news channels, etc. Second, this group
includes websites of (extremist) political counter movements, which
act as the digital face and information board of the group (Wagenaar,
2010), much like the right-extremist websites www.kkk.bz or
www.natvan.com. Third, in case of targeted or illegal organizations,
another format is needed because it is very unlikely that a website like
alQaeda.com would be possible. The solution is found in more or less
official Jihadi forums that can be described as Jihadist core forums
(AIVD, 2012) or mother sites (NCTb, 2010) and are principally
localized in the invisible part of web28. These forums are not directly
linked to global organizations such as Al Qaeda, although they are
dependent on the approval and input of the official media branches of
these organizations (e.g., As-Sahab). The infrastructure and members
of these forums are used in the functions of mobilization, recruitment,
propaganda, and ideological indoctrination. Access to these forums is
limited and the content is subjected to control and censorship.
A second group of websites is formed by independent interactive web
2.0 applications and websites29 endorsed by extremist groups without
official ties with or guidance from official organizations; for example,
newsaxon.org (Conway, 2012; ICT, 2012; Qualyle & Taylor, 2011)30.
(Unofficial) extremist groups often start their own interactive websites
in order to reach a bigger and more diverse audience than would be
possible by just using regular websites. Recruitment and guidance of
new members often takes place on these websites, making them the
most dangerous applications. Interaction with members and other
interested parties is introduced through reactions on news items,
(inter)national events, personal experiences, etc. By following certain
links, individuals are easily redirected from small websites to “official”
extremist organizations. Especially, classic web forums remain of
importance (Wagenaar, 2010).
28 The invisible web refers to that part of the internet that has not been indexed and thus cannot
be found using public search engines like Google. The visible web, on the contrary, is visible
and searchable. It is estimated that about 99.8% of the total internet is still invisible (AIVD,
2012).
29 Social network applications (e.g., finding friends, sharing photos) are not the same as social
network sites that are not limited to Facebook and Myspace. Groups can create their own social
networking sites or social network applications can be incorporated into existing websites, etc.
30 This does not exclude possible links between this kind of forums and members of subgroups
who can resort to violent action on their own.
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These forums differ in the extent to which they are freely accessible,
controlled, and guided. Jihadi forums are often exclusively closed
spaces that are used as a platform for continued involvement of loyal
members (Hoskins et al., 2009). They are often hierarchically organized
and controlled by moderators and representatives of official media
branches (ICT, 2012). Other forums are freely accessible, allowing them
to reach a broad audience. This advantage can turn into a disadvantage
because a lack of guidance can result is fierce discussions between
different subgroups, undermining the popularity and usefulness of the
websites. On the other hand, these open forums allow new members to
read posts, form an opinion, and gather information without being
disturbed (Van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010).
Still these kinds of thematic websites mostly reach those individuals
who are already interested and they miss a large group of searching
individuals. For this reason, extremist groups also use mainstream
NSM, such as Youtube and Facebook, and general (religious or
political) websites because they know these attract youth (Arts &
Butter, 2009; NCTb, 2010; Weimann, 2010). NSM have made it easy and
cheap to upload and watch information and videos. Because of this,
access to extremist material is strongly increased and a much broader
audience is reached (Conway, 2012; ISD, 2012b). These websites harbor
individual extremists but can also be used as a platform for extremist
organizations (Wagenaar, 2010). NSM mirror especially the growth of
populist movements. Next to formal members, these movements are
formed out of thousands of online sympathizers and followers (Bartlett
et al., 2011). On the other side, general NSM are less suitable for
recruitment and communication. First, NSM are often moderated.
Second, the open individual communication characteristic of NSM is in
sharp contrast with necessary secrecy and control demanded by
extremist movements. Third, the further a website is removed from the
official extremist organization, the less it is possible to control content
and users, paving the way for new and conflicting interpretations of the
extremist message (see also Conway, 2012). In other words, mainstream
NSM are mainly suitable for reproducing and emphasizing what is
available online and bringing individuals into contact with like-minded
others and organizations.
Individuals that radicalize under the influence of the internet usually
go through a certain number of stages (AIVD, 2012). General websites
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usually host open discussions and debates. Starting from here, the
further the individual radicalizes, the more online activities are moved
into specific and closed forums and the more shielded communication
is preferred (AIVD, 2006; ICT, 2012). First radicalizing individuals look
for like-minded peers on NSM and mainstream websites (AIVD, 2012).
They stand out because of their extremist statements and the
dissemination of propaganda. Eventually, they are noticed by recruiters
who try to get into contact through one to one chat sessions and work
toward recruitment (AIVD, 2006). Through specific secondary forums,
the individual eventually ends up in an increasingly extremist online
environment of like-minded others holding an extremist discourse that
limits their worldview, nurtures their ideological conviction, and
creates a climate for violence. Finally, accounts on mainstream NSM
and websites are deleted in order to be able to disappear into the deep
web and prepare oneself for the violent battle. Often, offline meetings
will take place sooner or later.
3.3. Summary
The benefits in terms of communication, information exchange,
networking, and privacy that the use of NSM implies for the general
population also brought extremist groups and individuals to
increasingly locate their activities online. This implies that the
difference between the use of the internet for general, positive
objectives and extremist objectives lies not in the nature of the activities
but rather in the content and goal of the shared information. Media
gratifies certain needs and the nature of these needs determines how
and why media is used. In case of extremist groups, NSM, which are
inherently based on communication and interaction, form a perfect
channel to realize their own agenda of recruitment and indoctrination
by allowing to easily anticipate and satisfy the needs for information,
identity, and social integration of their target audience.
The online routine activities of extremists in itself do not differ
fundamentally from general internet use and are in line with the way
non-extremist alternative political movements use the internet to their
advantage. Extremists mainly use the internet for propaganda and
information sharing, networking, and community formation. These
activities allow to optimize the functioning of the movement, recruit
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new members, and thus further the own cause while providing in the
needs of their supporters.
These functions are mainly exercised from three different kinds of
online spaces. First, official websites and forums of organizations;
second, independent and autonomous interactive websites; and third,
mainstream NSM and websites. Although these last websites have the
most potential in terms of connecting individuals, reaching a broad
audience and the distribution of propaganda, they are not the focal
point of recruitment because of limited control on the own anonymity
and the actions of the audience. Mainstream NSM are mainly used for
reproducing and emphasizing what is available and directing
interested individuals and potential recruits to more suitable websites
and organizations. This implies that exposure to extremist content
online becomes worrying when individuals switch to more specialized
and closed websites and forums where the extremist voice is no longer
one among many but specifically aimed at indoctrination and
radicalization.
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4. INFLUENCE OF MEDIA EXPOSURE ON 
VIOLENT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR
4.1. Introduction
It is clear that radical and extremist groups use the internet for (violent)
radicalization, organization, and recruitment (Kohlman, 2006; NCTb,
2010; Weimann & Tsfati, 2002). Still, it remains unclear to what extent
the internet and, more specifically, social media influence the process of
(violent) radicalization. The general concensus shared by political
actors and policy makers is that NSM facilitates the search for
information and subsequently the immersion into online extremist
milieus. This creates the dangerous possibility of becoming involved in
extremist groups or movements, both online and/or offline (Conway,
2012). Academics, on the other hand, do not agree on the internet
playing a significant role in the process of (violent) radicalization.
In general, the internet, because of its low threshold, provides in the
possibility for individuals to convey their opinions regardless of their
social status and thus fulfills a positive social function by enabling free
debate (Arts & Butter, 2009; Benschop, 2006). However, the same low
threshold together with high levels of anonymity have also turned the
internet into a free haven of free speech, a place where one can
proclaim the own opinion in an unlimited and unnuanced manner.
Especially internet forums contain a lot of extremist expressions,
sometimes leading to sharp, black and white debates and/or interactive
scolding sessions. This way, the internet also functions as a catalyst of
societal polarization and intensification. This trend is noticeable, not
only on extremist websites, but also on more moderate websites and,
for example, forums of newspapers and news channels. Another
concern focusses on the amount of online extremist impressions that
youth are subjected to as being so extensive that they are not enough
counterbalanced by real offline experiences (Klein, 2009a). These offline
experiences should enable individuals to judge the reliability and
reality of online content. This is dangerous in an online world, where
the social spaces that are occupied by youth are easily infiltrated by
commercial, social, political, and extremist actors.
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However, this is not new. Messages of hate, the recruitment of others in
name of this message, and the use of media can be found throughout
history (Klein, 2009a). What is continuously changing are the context
and receivers of this message. This means that in order to stay adapted
to the audience, the methods to reach them have to change as well,
using all media elements that the public has access to. In other words, it
is not so strange that the internet and NSM will also be used.
Unfortunately, the relation between NSM and (violent) radicalization is
not sufficiently researched. On the contrary, the relationship between
violent media exposure and violent behavior is thoroughly researched,
providing first indications for the relationship between NSM and
extremist behavior. In section 5.2, the results of this research on the
influence of exposure to violent content through (traditional) media on
violent behavior and attitudes will be discussed
4.2. Media, behavior, and attitudes
There has been little research conducted to investigate the relationship
between NSM and political violence. However, the relationship
between exposure to violence in the media and violent behavior and
attitudes has been extensively researched. Concerns about violent and
sexually explicit images as the root causes of all sorts of deviant
behavior, especially violence, among youth long predate the emergence
of the internet. It seems that every new technology goes together with
an outburst of moral panic regarding its content (Trend, 2007)31. One of
the most discussed public debates covers the potential and actual
negative effects of mass media and especially television and
videogames (Newburn, 2007). Similar concerns have been expressed
about the radio, cartoons, comic books, and even newspapers. The idea
is that exposure to violent media content leads to the undermining of
social norms and values and the learning of deviant norms through
cultural transmission, resulting in crime and violent behavior
31 New technologies provide (certain) groups with access to information that previously was off
limits. This means that not only the new technology in itself causes concern but also does the
discovery of this information by the new audience (Trend, 2007). Usually this refers to members
of low social classes, youth, and/or immigrants. The concerns about exposure to media violence
are limited to media use by sub and youth cultures while violence in media consumed by the
mainstream audience does not provoke any reaction. So, it is not about the content of media but
about its audience.
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(Newburn, 2007). Anderson et al. (2007) have categorically stated that
“exposure to media violence causes an increase in the likelihood of
aggression in at least some significant proportion of the population.”
Nevertheless, the debate about the effects of exposure to violent images
on behavior is highly polarized with, on one side, researchers
convinced of a moderate (negative) effect of violent media content on
behavior (Anderson et al., 2010; Bushman, Rothstein, & Anderson,
2010), and on the other side, more skeptical scholars (Ferguson, 2007;
Ferguson & Kilburn, 2010) who submit that most of these studies only
find small and marginal effects, of which the direction is unclear and
which, most of the time, cannot be reproduced (Savage & Yancey, 2008;
Sherry, 2001). The first group of researchers seems able to draw upon a
large body of scientific literature and empirical studies to reinforce its
statements, pointing out both short-term (experimental and cross-
sectional studies32) (Anderson et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2003;
Huesmann, 2007) and long-term effects (longitudinal studies)
(Anderson et al., 2003).
Other, more critical reviews of the media-effects literature suggest that
while some studies provide support for short-term media effects on
attitudes and behavior, they also often suffer from severe methodolog-
ical problems and the findings tend to be inconsistent (Browne &
Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005; Freedman, 2002). Typically, some evidence
can be found for small effects of violent media images on children’s
thoughts and behavior. However, the evidence only points in the direc-
tion of short-term effects and is less clear for older children and adoles-
cents. Second, most studies only measure aggression (temper) and not
actual violence (Savage & Yancey, 2008). This makes it hard to address
the real-life link between media violence and violence. Furthermore,
many studies fail to address causation, since the observed results are
based on correlations, which in themselves do not imply causation
(Browne & Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005; Gentile, Lynch, Linder, &
Walsh, 2004; Newburn, 2007). So one must assume that this relation can
mean a number of things. For example, children who prefer violent
programs also tend to be more aggressive than children who watch less
violent programs (Freedman, 2002).
32 For a review see Chaffee (1972), Comstock (1980), Eysenck & Nias (1978), and Huesmann
&Miller (1994) as cited in Anderson et al. (2003).
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Finally, only a few studies consider background factors when assessing
media effects, although most scholars do recognize that factors such as
culture, context, social environment, family (violence), and personality
have to be taken into account when explaining real-life violent behavior
(Anderson et al., 2003; Ferguson et al., 2008; Ferguson, San Miguel, &
Hartley, 2009). A critical reading of the findings of Anderson and
colleagues suggests that when statistically controlling for other factors
that may moderate the relation between exposure to violent video
games and aggression, the effect of media violence exposure on
aggression becomes non-significant. Anderson et al. (2003) found
similar results for their cross-sectional and longitudinal study on
television violence and physical aggression. If exposure to media
violence is indeed an added risk for aggression, one would expect that
its effects would remain significant even after controlling for other
factors. However, this is not the case. As such, these three studies
suggest that exposure to media violence does not lead to increased
aggression.
A criticism that can be lodged against both viewpoints is that many of
the studies cited to support their respective views of media effects are
somewhat dated (i.e., from the 1960s to the mid-1990s). Many recent
studies of media effects seek to identify “third factors” that may
account for both youth’s consumption of violent media and their
aggressive behavior67, 68 and reviews of the literature suggest that it is
important to do so (Browne & Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005; Chen, Miller,
Grube, & Waiters, 2006). One may, therefore, hypothesize that third,
fourth, and fifth factors frequently operate in reported media-effects
findings.
Within the communication sciences an equally large amount of
literature can be found on the influence of (mass) media on attitudes
and convictions. These studies also show that not one simple direct
effect can be determined, but that instead different factors are of
importance.
1. The “hypodermic needle” effect of Katz and Lazersfeld (1955) that
depicts media as directly injecting ideas and attitudes into the
psyche of the target audience is dated by now.
2. The social cognitive theory of Bandura (2001a, 2001b) challenges this
idea and instead states that the audience plays an active role in
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media influence by identifying (or not) with the message or
messenger.
3. Ever since, a number of important theories on the influence of
media have been developed. Most importantly (see Konijn et al.,
2010), on the one hand, the cultivation theory33 (Gerbner, Gross,
Morgan, & Signorielli, 2002) and social learning theory34 (Bandura,
1977) focus on the receiver, and on the other hand, the agenda
setting theory35 (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and the two step flow
model36 (Lazersfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1949) focus on the
content. Based on these theories a clear influence of media on
society in general can be established but this relationship is less
clear on the individual level. Research shows that the effects of
media vary according to personal characteristics and process
variables37 (Konijn et al., 2010).
4.3. Summary
Concerning the formation of attitudes, exposure to violent media
content appears to be only one of several environmental factors that in
combination with individual characteristics can lead to aggressive and/
or extremist attitudes (see Wood, Wong, & Chachere, 1991). On the
effects of exposure to violent media content on behavior, the opinions
remain divided. Although a large body of research maintains that
exposure to violent media can cause violent behavior, empirical
evidence only points into the direction of small and marginal effects. It
seems to be a question of a specific combination of specific personal
33 The cultivation theory states that individuals who are exposed to media for longer periods of
time are more likely to be influenced by the ideas and standpoints conveyed by this media
compared to those who hardly use these media. The worldview displayed by media is sup-
posed to be distorted, implying that long-term media exposure will likewise lead to a distorted
worldview.
34 Social learning theory states that individuals adopt behavior and attitudes of role models in soci-
ety, explicitly showing how to react on others and their environment. Individuals searching for
identity (e.g., adolescents) are supposed to be more susceptible for this kind of influence and
turn more quickly to attractive role models in the media.
35 The agenda setting theory states that topic and themes that are picked out by media are adopted
by the audience. What the media defines as important is also viewed as important by the audi-
ence.
36 Receivers discuss media content and these discussions eventually influence the final effects.
Especially on sensitive topics, it is found important by the audience to know how others view
the matter.
37 The way in which individuals process media content, for example, emotional involvement.
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factors and specific environmental factors that can lead to specific
behavior. If one factor changes, the outcome changes as well.
“Any act—delinquent or otherwise—depends on ‘something about the
actor’, that is, something about his values, his goals, his interests, his
temperament or, speaking inclusively, his personality, and it depends
also on ‘something about the situation’ in which he finds himself.
Change either actor or situation and you get a different act […] delin-
quent acts always depend on appropriate combinations of actor and situ-
ation…” (Cohen & Short, 1961, pp. 89-90).
Trend (2007) states that media exposure does not directly cause
violence but enhances the acceptance of violence in daily life, by giving
rise to the idea that the world is a dangerous place and violence is
needed to make it safer. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that
violence can be part of what makes violent extremism attractive and as
such can be a trigger through NSM.
However, it should be kept in mind that NSM differ fundamentally
from traditional media in one aspect. The content of traditional mass
media is determined top-down and offered to the public in its final and
fixed form (ISD, 2012b). On the contrary, NSM are based on interaction
and revolve around constantly changing user-generated content
(Thompson, 2011). In fact, criminological theories, or at least some key
etiological variables in contemporary criminology, can be applied to the
online world, as NSM more than any other medium are interactive,
making real-life interaction possible in cyberspace. This importance of
virtual communities has been recognized previously (Pauwels,
Weerman, Bernasco, & Volker, 2012; Soudijn & Monsma, 2012;
Weerman, 1998). This makes NSM, compared to traditional media,
especially effective in providing the “preconditions for radicalization,”
as we discussed earlier38. Through the internet 1) extremist narratives
encouraging political violence are easily accessible at any time and
place and 2) the necessary social bonds and networks are easily
accessible.
Thus, although it seems unlikely that exposure to extremist content
through NSM can give rise to violent radicalization, it does seem to be
the ideal medium to enhance and facilitate violent radicalization once a
38 See section 1.6
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breeding ground is already in place. In the next chapter, the strength of
possible influence of exposure to extremist content through NSM is
assessed, both for involuntary (passive) exposure of uninterested
individuals and for deliberate (active) exposure of already motivated
individuals.
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5. RADICALIZATION: ONLINE OR OFFLINE
5.1. Introduction
The internet is characterized by an increasing distribution and
technological development. This contributes to the possibilities and
risks of NSM being much more pertinent compared to other traditional
media. Although previous research on NSM and political participation
suggests that NSM will be used only in the function of previously
formed interests and research on violent media exposure and behavior
only reveals small and marginal effects, the specific characteristics of
NSM could entail stronger and more influential effects.
First, the possibilities offered by the internet and NSM in terms of
socialization of new recruits and maintenance of (violent) radicaliza-
tion should not be underestimated (Bashar, 2012; Torok, 2010). NSM
hold a lot of potential in terms of networking, information exchange,
integration of applications, etc. Second, this also causes the involun-
tarily exposure of youth to dangerous content and groups, simply by
using the internet as it is supposed to be used (Dean et al., 2012). Youth
have access to a diverse and extended network of friends and peers.
This provides them with access to not only the own social network but
also the social networks of other members of the own network. This
way youth can get involved in extremist milieus on a very short notice
just by following links, checking out groups, liking posts, and giving
comments (Maura Conway & McInerney, 2008). In other words, the use
of NSM as it should be can give rise to a whole array of access and
influencing possibilities.
By being inventive and adapting to the target audience, extremist
groups try to maximize these possibilities. Still, a causal connection
between exposure to extremist content through NSM and violent
radicalization and violent extremism cannot be assumed. The majority
of individuals exposed to the same extremist content do not radicalize
(Conway, 2012). The next section will discuss in what ways extremist
try to enhance their influence through NSM, followed by some
arguments that nuance the extent of this influence.
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5.2. Virtual techniques of influence
The use of the internet by extremist groups to introduce oneself to the
general public has become more professional over the last few years
(Europol, 2011). At the first glance, many extremist websites appear to
represent objective opinions and plausible arguments through user
friendly and professional designed webpages. The content of the
website is adapted and targeted at the group one wants to reach
(Thompson, 2009). Instead of offering openly racist or extremist
messages, these websites are adapted to the culture, interests, frustra-
tions, trends, etc., of a new generation of internet users. Homepages are
designed to convey the image of a fully functioning and active cyber
community, providing access to a range of activities that appeal to
contemporary internet users like chatting, shopping, dating, etc. (Klein,
2009a). Individuals visiting these websites are less vigilant when inter-
preting the extremist messages because of the mainstream and subtle
character of these websites, making it more likely that 1) the message
will be positively received and 2) the rest of the website will be
explored with a positive attitude (Lee & Leets, 2002)39.
Social network sites and forums also adapt their names, images, and
information to the profile of the social group that is targeted for
recruitment (Klein, 2009b; Weimann, 2010). This is facilitated by
member profiles that hold a lot of useful information that can help
extremist groups to determine which groups and individuals to target
and how to convey the message.
Right-extremist websites especially synchronize their message with
popular trends and try to use popular images and rhetoric from youth
culture (Klein, 2009b). Salafist websites are also very popular among
Islamic youth because these sites offer information on questions relevant
to them and provide simple and appealing answers (De Koning, 2008).
One step further, we can find cloaked websites or websites that
actively try to conceal the fact that they are offering extremist
39 For comparison, see www.kkk.be, www.aryan-nation.org, and www.stromfront.org. The first
website seems, at first glance, to represent mainstream family values. The real message is hid-
den deeper into the website. On the contrary, the second website openly calls for hate and vio-
lence. Stormfront is clearly a white nationalist forum, proudly displaying the message “white
pride world wide” but still comes across as reasonable because of the wide variety of topic
items and a clearly stated prohibition of illegal content and insulting messages.
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information (Daniels, 2008). Although professionally designed, it is not
very likely that an individual will accidently start to browse
www.kkk.bz since everybody knows what KKK stands for. Cloaked
websites, on the other hand, are carefully designed around a
respectable theme such as civil rights or history. Individuals looking for
information on these themes could easily end up on these websites
through the use of general search terms in online search engines40. The
combination of a professional graphic design and the seemingly
absence of extremist content can easily deceive visitors. This is certainly
true for youth who have not yet acquired enough internet literacy to
accurately judge these websites nor possess thorough knowledge and
understanding of social (in)equality, racism, and different forms of
suppression. The cloaked website tactic is mostly used when trying to
attract and “educate” new members (Weatherby & Scoggins, 2005).
The internet facilitates the formation of so called “echo-rooms”
(Geeraerts, 2012). Echo-rooms are spaces on the internet where
individuals can meet other like-minded individuals. Within this kind of
homogenous groups the risk of violent radicalization is significantly
higher than in other groups because the same opinions and arguments
are constantly repeated and both formally and informally reinforced
(Wojcieszak, 2010b). The AIVD (2006) refers to “ideological ghetto
formation” because the rest of society is completely disregarded.
Arguments, both pro and contra, are simplified in black and white
statements. This gives rise to a popular and polarizing discourse
especially appealing to youth. Although mostly this does not go any
further than rhetoric, in some cases, it can have the effect of hyper
radicalization (AIVD, 2006).
Of course, this kind of homogenous groups can also be found in real
life; however, the effect of them is amplified by the internet (Geeraerts,
2012). Through the internet, it is not only easy to find alternative points
of view but also equally easy to ignore certain information. Communi-
cation through the internet often lacks personal details, transforming
individuals into exponents of the entire group. This causes the group to
look more homogenous. This can be dangerous because anti-status quo
40 Examples of this kind of websites are the website of the Institute for Historical Review,
www.IHR.org, an organization that denies the holocaust, and martinlutherking.org, offering
alternative information on Martin Luther King. The extension .org also gives the impression of
reliable and objective information.
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activists and extremists are over represented in radical forums
(Oegema, Kleinnijenhuis, Anderson, & Van Hoof, 2008).
5.3. Need to nuance
1. The processes described until now clarify the role of the internet
once already interested in violent extremism. It would be very
difficult for extremist groups to attune themselves to the target
group if there was not already a ground for discontent and/or
extremist ideas. Extremist forums and webpages need a foundation in
the real world. The internet is the perfect place to recruit, because it
is used by searching and disgruntled individuals to search for
information and access to networks (NCTb, 2010). Those with a
certain extremist frame/understanding of the world will partici-
pate on the internet in accordance to this frame (Daniels, 2009).
2. Youth are exposed to the same amount of extremist content
through traditional media as through websites and forums (Konijn
et al., 2010). Traditional media increasingly emphasize extreme
opinions, terrorism, the link with Islam, and often do so in bold
and strong words. This can provide a ground for violent radicali-
zation not only among minorities but also among the majority that
is offered a scapegoat for the many discussed problems (see e.g.,
ISD, 2012a). This creates a need for a more accurate image and
correct information, pursued on international news channels and
the internet (Arts & Butter, 2009; Buijs et al., 2006; Konijn et al.,
2010). So the internet in itself does not lead to violent radicalization
but does form a reflection of social tendencies in general society.
The social structure that can be found on forums reflects the social
structure within society (van Stekelenburg, Oegema, & Klander-
mans, 2008). This way, forums are nothing more than online places
of conversation, digitally reflecting societal polarization. Radical-
izing and polarized debates on internet forums and NSM mirror
the development of the same radicalizing and polarized debates in
the offline world. This, polarization and radicalization of the
public debate can create a susceptible social climate for violent
extremism (ISD, 2012a). Oegema, Kleinnijenhuis, Anderson & Van
Hoof (2008) indeed conclude that the subject and content of discus-
sions on online discussion groups are largely based on what can be
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found in mainstream mass media. The topics as well as the nega-
tive attitudes and opinions that are offered through traditional
media are adopted and magnified on online forums. Furthermore,
Van Stekelenburg et al. (2008) show that participation on the
internet only increases after the occurrence of an important event
and not the other way around. With each new relevant event, the
tone and nature of the conversation more and more polarizes in
terms of us versus them41.
3. It is very unlikely for somebody to go through the entire process of
(violent) radicalization without any offline contacts. Recruitment
is a complex social process that mainly occurs offline and through
face to face contacts (see Blazak, 2001). Personal relationships and
direct human contact still remain essential and so far the internet
cannot replace the bonds of friendship and kinship that are at the
base of personal loyalty without a minimum of direct personal
contact (Precht, 2007). Even in case of extensive and meaningful
online community formation, these online activities are mainly
used to obtain and maintain access to offline free spaces,
gatherings and communities (Simi & Futrell, 2006). Especially
regarding the kind of loyalty and dedication demanded by
extremist activism, online social ties are not very likely to suffice.
Violent activism implies significant risks (Olesen, 2009). The
decision to join an extremist, violent, and illegal movement is
seldom individual but instead based on existing offline social
bonds (Della Porta, 1995). Also, for the extremist movement,
recruitment can be dangerous because of the risks of exposure and
dismantling (Della Porta, 1995). Because of this, considerable
attention goes to security and trust when recruiting new members.
This aspect of trust and the lack thereof is one of the major
disadvantages of virtual networks (NCTb, 2010)42.
41 Van Stekelenburg et al. (2008) explain this by general group processes. Following an intergroup
incident, members of a group will try to “repair” their damaged social group identity by inter-
group differentiation processes. These processes occur within all social groups whose identity
is threatened and are not limited to an online environment (van Stekelenburg et al., 2008).
42 Within virtual groups, subgroups can arise that possess the necessary offline social bonds
(AIVD, 2006; Olesen, 2009). In this case, Pantucci (2011) refers to a “lone wolf pack” and Rogers
& Neumann (2007) to “self-starter groups.” In other words, small, isolated groups of extremist
individuals form without formal bonds or guidance of more organized extremist groups. Even
then, this would not automatically mean that the internet plays a unique or decisive role. Rather
the internet merely took the place of other institutional settings where individuals can meet and
network, such as schools, work, and youth movements (Olesen, 2009).
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4. The offline environment directly impacts violent extremism and
negotiates the extent to which individuals participate on online
extremist forums and are influenced by this participation. Strong
social ties moderate the influence exerted by media to the extent
that which media will affect individuals depends on interpersonal
political talk. Individuals that do not feel supported by their offline
environment and whose opinions are disapproved of, will be more
strongly drawn to antisocial websites, judge their content more
positively (Plaisir & Konijn, 2013), and be more strongly
influenced by them (Wojcieszak, 2010a, 2010b).
5. Among participants of extremist websites a difference has to be
made between visitors out of curiosity (or lurkers), supporters,
and active participants, although new web 2.0 applications have
made the difference less clear (Daniels, 2008; Ramsay, 2009).
Online activism is ideal for participation along the sidelines
without making too much effort. Some researchers suggest that
most of online participants are only passive extremists, limiting
themselves to supporting and encouraging violent extremism
through the internet. They voice extremist attitudes but will
rarely be an active member of an extremist group or use political
violence (Al-Lami & O’Loughlin, 2009, Hoskins et al., 2009;
Neumann & Rogers, 2007; Ramsay, 2009). What can be found on
general forums and NSM can be described as a “culture of
talking big” (Benschop, 2006) or a Jihadist youth culture
(Bovenkerk 2011). Extremist expressions are mostly an attempt to
make an impression and fit in. Through the internet, it is easy to
put up a big mouth without being called on this later (van San,
2013). Therefore, it is important not to confuse the number of
online participants of an online group with the actual influence
of that group. There are indications that the online presence of
extremist groups often exceeds their actual capacity to mobilize
(Bartlett & Littler, 2011; ISD, 2012c). Most of the time, such
groups are formed by a core of activists and a larger group of
sympathizers without official membership. Official statements
often do not reflect the aspirations of these individual
sympathizers. The research of Bartlett and Littler (2011) suggest
that the majority of online supporter only tries to bring legitimate
concerns on the political agenda. This means that not considering
these groups and by defining them as extremist and thus illegal
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holds a risk for further violent radicalization of a large group of
non-extremist supporters (see also ISD, 2012a).
6. Finally, networks formed via online forums often consist of loose,
horizontal structures without any hierarchical organized
leadership (Wagenaar, 2010)43. Mostly they consist of a broad
variety of individuals that do not necessarily hold the same
conviction, on the contrary. If the charismatic leaders that monitor
these forums and the related social networks fall out, the group
becomes more or less afloat (ICT, 2012). If nobody succeeds in
taking over this leadership, most probably the group will fall apart
because of internal discussions and arguments. An example is the
Dutch right extremist Stormfront website, which lost a lot of its
influence in the Dutch and Flemish community because of internal
quarrels and disagreements (Wagenaar, 2010).
5.4. Summary
“The internet is an important part of the radicalization process in most
cases, intensifying and accelerating radicalization. It can provide
the user with the information they are looking for to confirm their
beliefs. Especially important in this regard are videos and images that
reinforce a particular world view […]. It allows individuals to find like-
minded people when they are not able to do so offline, creating an online
community. [… ]There is less evidence about the role of the internet in
recruitment for the purpose of violent activity. In the majority of cases to
date, the internet tends to be complemented by offline contacts and
influences (ISD, 2012b, p. 3).”
In summary, the literature shows no straightforward evidence for the
internet in itself being a cause of violent radicalization. Radicalization
grounds are determined by the social, societal, and personal offline
factors that are discussed in section 1.3. Online extremist content can at
most reinforce the decision of an individual to use political violence but
cannot be at the foundation of this decision (Githens-Mazer, 2010).
43 Secondary forums differ in level of access and control. The more important in terms of organi-
zation and coordination, the less accessible, the higher the level of control and the stricter the
social structure and hierarchy. More popular and open forums in general have a broad base of
supporters and therefore also more loose horizontal structures (Conway, 2012).
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Similar to any other technology or medium of communication, the
internet and NSM can be used for both positive and negative goals
(Conings & Van Linthout, 2012; Tops & Zouridis, 2012). NSM do not
entail a new thread of something that did not exist before. The internet
seems only a means to an end or, in other words, an enabler (Weir,
Toolan, & Smeed, 2011). The internet is the place par excellence for
radicalization to take place and a powerful means for the recruitment of
vulnerable youth (NCTb, 2010) but it is does not cause violent radicali-
zation (Europol, 2011, 2012; see also, Thompson, 2009). In other words,
involuntary exposure of “innocent” individuals to extremist content
through NSM will be most unlikely to cause violent radicalization.
Most researchers agree that offline contacts remain essential to bring
the entire process of violent radicalization to an end and to allow for
trust between the members of a group. Therefore, for now, violent radi-
calization remains a social phenomenon that mainly occurs in the
offline world and is only partially virtual in nature. Radicalization is a
mutual process where events from the offline world are brought into
the online world and vice versa (Weir et al., 2011). The internet comple-
ments rather than substitutes face to face communication (von Behr,
2013). This is confirmed by von Behr et al. (2013). Based on qualitative
interviews, they conclude that “the internet has to be seen as a mode, rather
than a unitary method of radicalisation (the internet can play an important
role in facilitating the radicalisation process; however it cannot drive it on its
own). Instead, the internet appears to enhance the process, which in turn may
or may not accelerate it (p. 33).” For all their respondents, the internet
forms a key source of information and communication. Because of the
easy accessibility and the possibility to make contacts with like-minded
individuals from all over the world, the internet offers more opportuni-
ties for radicalizing individuals then does the offline world. However,
in all cases, the offline world remains essential, and physical contacts
are always present. Cleary, the internet facilitate the process of violent
radicalization but it is hard to determine whether it also accelerates the
process because this is individually determined.
Therefore, the risk of online recruitment is not so much a problem as
the fact that some youth actually want to visit certain websites (Daniels,
2008). The danger of online media lies in the ease at which alienated
and/or frustrated youngsters can find validation for their opinions. Van
San (2013) noted that the majority of (Islamic) youth who follow
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violence online hold a strong black and white image of the world (De
Koning, 2008). Their vision leaves no room for nuance or compromise.
What matches their point of view is the truth and everything else is
propaganda. The internet is very attractive to this kind of individuals
because it allows to very precisely select what information can be used
within a certain frame and what has to be ignored. Extremist groups try
hard to keep up with the continuous development of internet and to
adjust themselves to their audience. This means that constant and fast
analysis is needed to be ready for new developments (Dean et al., 2012;
Thompson, 2011). If not, the problem is at risk of being underestimated
and anti-radicalization policy will be based on outdated analyses.
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6. OVERVIEW
In Chapter 1, different risk factors that could lead to violent
radicalization and violent extremism have been discussed. Based on
this overview, two preconditions for violent radicalization could be
identified: 1) extremist viewpoints providing an answer to experienced
grievances have to be present and accessible and 2) social bonds,
networks, and/or extremist groups that can pull individuals further
into violent extremism have to be present and accessible. The internet
and especially NSM can easily provide these two preconditions,
emphasizing the question whether exposure to extremist content
through NSM is a risk factor for violent extremism or not. In order to
answer this question, the subsequent chapters reviewed existing
research, looking for indicators.
Chapter 2 reviewed why NSM are popular among youth and how they
affect their political participation. Youth indeed prefer the internet and
NSM for political participation and the development of (political)
identities. However, this mainly applies for youth who are already
politically active in the offline world. NSM use does not lead to more
political participation if one is not interested in politics. Especially
youth active in alternative political movements will prefer the internet
and NSM for positive identity formation and political activities because
of the limited possibilities they have in the real world. Since extremist
groups are essentially just another kind of political movement, it is
likely that NSM will be used in a similar way.
Chapter 3 revealed that extremist groups do not use the internet very
differently from other political and social movements. The advantages
the internet has to offer also apply to them. They mainly use the
internet for 1) propaganda, 2) networking and practical organization,
and 3) community formation. Extremist groups actively try to adapt
their (online) offer to the media demands of their audience. In
particular, in terms of propaganda, they strive for frame alignment,
adapting their narratives to the grievances and demands of their target
audience. Although these activities are common for all political and
social movements, they can hold extra importance for extremist groups
because they have difficulties enfolding these activities in real life.
Especially in terms of community formation, the internet can provide a
exposure.social.media.book  Page 80  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
PART 2 • THEORETICAL REVIEW
81
free haven or sanctuary for extremist individuals who face difficulties
in expressing their opinions or keeping contact with like-minded
individuals in the offline world.
Now that it is established how NSM is used in terms of political
participation by both extremist individuals and extremist groups, the
question remains whether exposure to extremist content through NSM
will lead to violent radicalization and violent extremism. Unfortu-
nately, this has not been researched yet. Therefore, in Chapter 4 some
indications are sought in previous research on the relationship between
exposure to violent media content and violent behavior and attitudes.
Most research only finds small and marginal effects, indicating that it is
unlikely that exposure to extremist content through NSM will cause
violent extremism. However, NSM differs fundamentally from tradi-
tional media in one aspect; namely, it is based on interaction and user-
generated content. This implies that NSM can make real-life interaction
possible in cyberspace. Consequently, a possible influence of (involun-
tary or passive) exposure to extremist content through NSM, although
unlikely, cannot be excluded. Second, these characteristics of NSM
make them especially effective in providing the two preconditions for
(violent) radicalization. Therefore, although it seems unlikely that
exposure to extremist content through NSM can give rise to violent
radicalization, NSM do seem to be the ideal medium to enhance and
facilitate violent radicalization once a breeding ground is already in
place (active or deliberate exposure).
Chapter 5 discussed in what ways extremist groups try to enhance their
influence through NSM, followed by some arguments that nuance the
extent of this influence, for both deliberate (active) and undeliberate
(passive) exposure. In this literature, there is no evidence for the
internet in itself to be a cause44 of violent radicalization. Exposure
through NSM can at most reinforce the decision of an individual to use
political violence but is unlikely to be the cause of violent extremism. In
other words, involuntary exposure of “innocent” individuals to
extremist content through NSM will most likely not cause violent radi-
calization. On the other hand, NSM hold the power to reinforce and
facilitate violent radicalization of searching and already interested indi-
viduals. This already implies an interaction between the individual
44 See also footnote 5.
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(attitudes) and the environment (exposure). The processes of violent
radicalization and recruitment, on the other hand, seem to move more
and more to the online world. This confirms our previous presump-
tions.
However, there is virtually no empirical research confirming or
contradicting these assumptions. Therefore, the goal of this project is to
test the influence of exposure to extremist content through NSM on
violent extremism. Special attention will go to the difference between
the use of NSM by already interested individuals (deliberate or active
exposure) and real or undeliberate (passive) exposure. Before doing so,
the next chapter will explain what is problematic about the risk factor
approach we started from and how this can be resolved in order to
come to better and more straight-forward results.
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7. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
7.1. In general
Although considerable research has been conducted on the process of
radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism, the domain is still
lacking overarching theoretical frameworks. The existing theoretical
frameworks are fragmented and not integrated. This situation is a
consequence of a number of conceptual and methodological difficul-
ties, poor access to valid and reliable data banks, and multiple concep-
tual definitions of the phenomenon under study (see Bouhana &
Wikström, 2008). Edwin Sutherland made the same remarks
concerning the state of affairs in etiological criminology in the 1930’s.
Sutherland criticized the fragmented field and confusion as a conse-
quence of empirical research starting from a multiple risk factor
approach, endlessly reporting on risk and protective factors. Since the
1990s, one can observe attempts to integrate the study of crime against
the broader framework of several integrated theoretical perspectives.
Regarding traditional theories of offending, Elliott, Zgeton and Canter
(1979) argued more than two decades ago that theoretical reliance on a
single explanatory variable to explain criminal behavior has resulted in
theories that are capable of explaining only a small percentage of the
variance in crime or criminal behavior. That statement is probably
equally true for political violence and we argue subsequently that crim-
inology has useful theoretical and methodological insights to offer in
the study of violent extremism (Deflem, 2004b).
Subsequently, in the last fifteen years, the integrative approach in
sociology and criminology has had an impact on the field. For example,
in criminology, we see a renewed attention for integrated theories that
aim at internal coherence and clear substantive argumentation on the
direct and indirect causes of crime (Wikström 2014; see also, Pauwels &
Svensson, 2013). According to us, the research domain on the causes of
violent radicalization and violent extremism will equally benefit from a
similar theoretical reflection and reconsideration of the relevant risk
factors: which ones can be seen as direct causes and which ones not.
This is also important for a (prevention) policy that strives to
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comprehend and control the phenomenon through an interventionist
approach (Wikström, 2011; Pauwels, Svensson & Ponsaers 2010).
We believe that integration has merits as long as it is built around an
internal causal logic, i.e., distinguishing between proximate and distant
factors45. This standpoint is taken from the analytical tradition in crimi-
nology and provides a thorough start for the development of integrated
theories: an analytical approach is concerned with the understanding of
why people engage in acts of political violence, which can be accom-
plished by identifying the key social, developmental, and situational
processes (mechanisms) involved in crime causation. The key message
of an analytical approach to political violence is to take causation,
human agency, and the person–environment interaction more seriously
to advance our knowledge about (political) violence, its causes, and
prevention. This has implications for the study of political violence: it is
important to gain not only insight into what is referred to as the
“causes” of political violence but also to what can be referred to as “the
causes of the causes of political violence.”
The integrated framework to study individual differences in violent
extremism (political violence) that we propose is built on the principle
of end-to-end integration. End-to-end integration entails the
integration of mechanisms that play a role in different theories so that
the dependent variables of some theories become the independent
variables of the integrated theory (Pauwels, Ponsaers, & Svensson,
2010).
45 Starting in the 1970’s, it is regularly debated whether the integration of criminological theories
is in fact a good idea. Proponents and opponents are often directly opposed (Miedema, Bru-
insma, & Hoogerwerf, 1998). Opponents state that criminological theories tend to contradict
each other and thus cannot be integrated. Integration does not automatically lead to a better
theoretical perspective and is seen as deadly for a healthy competition between the theories.
Hirschi is one of the most famous opponents. He states that “separate and unequal is better”
(Hirschi, 1979). Proponents, on the other hand, maintain that theoretical integration has to be
seen as an opportunity to develop less but more comprehensive theories (Vold, Bernhard, &
Snipes, 2002). By means of integration, new questions arise, making scientific progress possible
(Miedema et al., 1998). According to Wikström and Sampson (2006), at least four types of inte-
gration are possible: 1) integration of theories (cf. social learning theory and social control the-
ory), 2) integration of methods (cfr. quantitative and qualitative methods, 3) integration of level
of analysis (cf. neighborhood and individual), and 4) integration of disciplines (cf. psychology
and sociology). Especially integration of level of analysis and, more specifically, of individual
and environmental factors leading to violent extremism is often overlooked in etiology. By
starting from an integrated, action-focused approach, we make an attempt to fill this gap.
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We draw upon one of the most promising etiological theories of our
time, the situational action theory, and we apply its philosophy on the
phenomenon of violent extremism and political violence. The key
assumption of this theory is that individual propensity and environ-
ment exposer in interaction with each other cause criminal acts
(Wikström, 2014) or, in this case, acts of political violence (Bouhana &
Wikström, 2008, 2011). In terms of causes of the causes, concepts for the
explanation of violent extremism are derived from different theoretical
perspectives in criminology addressing crime and offending, ranging
from strain theory, control theory, and procedural justice theory.
In this section, we will first focus on why theoretical integration is
needed in research on violent extremism and political violence, the
analytical problems hindering theoretical integration, and how the
solutions for this problem in the explanation of crime also apply to the
explanation of violent extremism. Second, we will discuss the situa-
tional action theory as a useful framework for theoretical integration on
the explanation of violent extremism. Third, key concepts from theories
explaining offending will be outlined as causes of the causes of violent
extremism.
7.2. Analytical problems in the research on 
violent extremism and political violence
When examining the literature, various risk factors can be found that
are related to violent extremism and political violence. In other words,
there is a large knowledge base on the individual factors and
circumstances that can be linked to this phenomenon, as clarified in
Chapter 1. This situation is almost identical for what can be found in
the literature on criminal and deviant behavior of adolescents
(Farrington, 2007; Loeber & Farrington, 1998; Wikström, 2004).
However, this kind of risk factor approach is not capable in
distinguishing between real causes and mere correlates, causing
confusion about what is of importance and what not (Horgan, 2008).
Theoretical integration and fully developed frameworks integrating
individual, situational, and environmental levels of explanation are
lacking. This is partially due to some analytical problems hindering
integration.
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7.2.1. Need for theoretical integration
Wikström (2004) states that the risk factor approach essentially is a
theoretical approach that does nothing more than gathering and inven-
torying characteristics associated with delinquent behavior in a non-
random pattern. A factor is seen as a risk factor when it increases the
chance of the commitment of an act of crime. In reality, these are all
correlates “predicting” crime. This listing of correlates has become a
goal in itself, causing the problem of causality in etiological crimi-
nology to be neglected. Namely, there are too many correlates, making
it impossible to see the wood from the trees. Risk and protective factors
do not per definition qualify as the causes of delinquent behavior46.
They have been seen as events that are linked to a higher opportunity
for a specific outcome, in this case, delinquent behavior. A number of
those risk factors can rightly be interpreted as causal but the majority
not. Exactly this establishment makes some criminologists to state that
“everything matters” and others that “nothing matters” (Wikström,
2007). This has caused research to be arbitrary.
In order to avoid making the same mistakes as most 20th century
criminological theories, research into violent extremism and political
violence should not stay trapped in such a risk factor approach.
However, if we review the scientific literature and theory formation on
violent radicalization and violent extremism, it is noticeable that this
danger lurks around the corner. The catalogue of identified risk factors
is very long and still expanding, and researchers are not able to agree
on a general causal model (Christmann, 2012). Still, not every risk
factor leads to violent extremism, and even more, experts agree that
multiple and complex factors alternate in function and significance.
Bouhana and Wikström (2008, p. 1) state that “though quite a lot is known
about terrorism—and certainly much has been published […]—one may feel
as if little is understood.” Researchers disagree on the relative importance
of different levels of explanation (individual vs environment); there is
no attention to the interaction between both and statistical correlation is
misinterpreted as causality ascribing causal value to mere background
characteristics (e.g., gender, origin, race).
46 Strictly speaking, the establishment of causal connections is limited to experiments. However,
this is not always possible or desirable because of ethical reasons. The alternative is statistical
analysis using non-experimental data to study causal effects. Its value is limited since statistical
correlations do not imply causality. However, vice versa, causality does imply a correlation.
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Wikström and Bouhana (2008; 2011) state that if we really want to
explain violent extremism, we have to evolve from a risk factor
approach to a more explanatory method. They propose to conduct
etiological research on violent extremism by looking for explanatory
mechanisms47 that link background characteristics (“background of
crime”) to the real causal factors (“foreground of crime”) (see also,
Wikström, 2004). We have to make a difference between the direct
causes or mechanisms that have a direct influence on violent
extremism, and distant causes that only have an indirect influence on
violent extremism48.
In other words, we have to use our knowledge on how background
characteristics (genetics, biological psychological, and social) influence
extremist behavior to assess their impact on the real direct causes (what
individuals move to action). This allows to look for those correlates that
qualify as causes (or part of a cause) and to discover causal mecha-
nisms. In short, this approach searches for the reasons for the linking of
background characteristics to crime and identifies the intervening
processes. What was and is needed is a comprehensive theoretical
framework capable of differentiating causal factors from the rest.
7.2.2. Analytical shortcomings hindering theoretical 
integration
In order to establish a clear theoretical framework, a couple of
shortcomings characterizing the research into violent extremism and
political violence have to be addressed first (Bouhana & Wikström,
2008). It is argued how the solution for similar problems in the
explanation of offending as outlined by Wikström can also be applied
on the study of violent extremism and political violence.
47 The concept “explaining” is not always unambiguous. Establishing causal connections does not
mean to be able to explain a phenomenon. Explaining has to do with the identification of causal
mechanisms that answer the question why there is a causal connection. This is the field of eti-
ological theories. In other words, explaining is a theoretical process. The following mechanisms
can be distinguished: i) social mechanisms, ii) situational mechanisms, and iii) developmental
mechanisms.
48 A cause is a causal factor that increases the probability of action or, put differently, that has the
characteristics to bring about action. In social sciences, causes are never deterministic. See also
footnote 5.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 87  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
88
(1) Conceptual confusion
There is some conceptual confusion on what exactly needs to be
explained. The subjectivity of violent extremism means that researchers
do not agree on a common, widely accepted definition. Also, the
concepts of violent radicalization, radicalism, violent extremism, and
terrorism are used interchangeably, thus further hindering the search
for direct causes. These concepts are related but not identical. “Without
a clear understanding of what it is we propose to explain, it is difficult to
unambiguously identify putative causes and suggest plausible causal processes
that may produce the effect under study.” (Wikström, 2010, p. 214).
Wikström already addressed the same problem in the explanation of
crime. What crime entails is in fact dependent on a political decision
and thus dependent of time and place (Wikström, 2007). By defining
criminality as a special form of moral action, Wikström (2010) is able to
circumvent this conceptual discussion49. More specific, he defines
crime as “acts that breach moral rules as defined in law.” Using this
definition, the explanation of crime fundamentally lies in the question
why individuals break moral rules when they know it is wrong to do
so. In other words, the focus rests on the breaking of the moral rule (as
defined in law) and not on the moral rule itself (Wikström, 2010).
Defining crime this way makes it possible to cradle different kinds of
criminal behavior, including violent extremism (political violence).
What differs between different types of crime is not the explanatory
process but the content of the offense. When committing a murder,
moral rules defined in law are broken, so is the case when damaging
government property, stealing a bicycle, or dodging taxes. “When
explaining acts of crime, the aim is not primarily to explain, for example, why
people drive at 100 mph, smoke cannabis or demolish a building, but why they
do so when it is against a rule of conduct (defined in law).” (Wikström, 2010,
p. 218).
According to Bouhana and Wiström (2008), violent extremism and
political violence can be defined in exactly the same way, i.e., as an
offense against the moral rules as defined in law. Although expressions
of violent extremism differ, all forms of violent extremism are violent in
49 Moral actions are guided by moral rules about what is right or wrong to do, or not to do, in
certain circumstances. How a crime differs from other actions that break moral rules is that
crime breaks those moral rules that are stated in (penal) law.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 88  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
PART 2 • THEORETICAL REVIEW
89
nature50, and violence refers to violations of the (penal) law51. This has
as an advantage that all expressions of violent extremism fall under the
same umbrella; be it the throwing of rocks during a manifestation, the
taking of hostages, or violent attacks. Furthermore, studying violent
extremism as a moral action solves the problem of violent acts being
perceived as violent extremism in some jurisdiction and/or time
periods and not in others. The focus lies on the explanation of the
breaching of the moral rule. The validity of the moral rule and/or
whether or not the breaking of the rule can be justified is not addressed.
The only thing of importance is the breaking of the moral rules, as
stated in the law irrespective of motive.
(2) Intervening mechanisms
Research has identified a long list of possible causal factors, but a vision
about causality, explaining the mechanisms that account for violent
actions of individuals, is missing. It is unclear how causal factors and
action outcomes are connected. This could be resolved by a mechanism
based approach. The basic idea behind such an approach is to explain a
social phenomenon starting from the mechanisms that account for
differences and changes in a certain condition. In other words,
mechanisms explain how something works by clarifying how a certain
cause is linked to a certain outcome (action) (Agnew, 1993; Hedström,
2005). Situational action theory (SAT) states that in order to unravel
such a mechanism, it is important to keep two basic principles of
human behavior in mind. First, humans have agency, meaning that
they can act deliberately in reaction to their environment. This means
that the causes of action are situational. People act because of who they
are in relation to the characteristics of the environments they are part
of. Second, humans are essentially rule guided actors. They base their
50 This is where the problem starts: different phenomena are located on different spots of the same
continuum. This different “location” cannot be seen as an argument to look for different causes
for each different expression of the same phenomenon.
For example, the same discussion can be found on the geographical distribution of vandalism
and crime. Both are phenomenological different in terms of gradation, but have possibly the
same root causes. Using one expression (vandalism) to causally explain the other expression
(crime) creates problems of tautology. The same element cannot be part of both the explanans
and the explanandum.
51 Penal laws are a crystallization of moral rules that are present in a society in a certain time and
space. The moral “one should not use violence” is part of most societies since violence threatens
the integrity of the society as whole and its members individually.
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actions on moral and social rules about what is right or wrong to do in
certain situations. Since action is the expression of agency, defined as
the behavior exhibited under a person’s guidance, in order to explain
acts of criminality, one must specify what prompts people to break the
rules of law (Wikström, 2004). Consequently, the basic argument of
Wikström (2014) is that violent extremism, as well as crime, is
ultimately the result of
• The perception of what is right or wrong to do and based on this
the action alternatives a person perceives in a certain situation.
• The way people choose to carry out a specific (perceived) action
alternative.
In other words, people commit acts of political violence because they
perceive and choose a particular kind of violence as an action
alternative in response to a specific motivation. In SAT, this is referred
to as the perception–choice process. It is the mechanism that forms the
base for the explanation of action. Perception is what links a person to
his or her environment and choice is what links a person to his or her
actions. Therefore, the perception–choice process is crucial for
understanding action.
For research on the causes of violent extremisms, this means that
identified risk factors, both individual and environment factors, can
only be accepted as causes of political violence if they can be shown to
directly influence 1) the perception of action alternatives in a particular
situation and 2) the process of choice.
(3) Individual and environment
Research is polarized between explanations based on individual factors
and those based on environmental factors, while in fact, it is the
interaction between individual and environment that can explain
behavior. Interaction means that the correlation between two factors is
dependent on another third factor. In other words, we speak of an
interaction when the effect of the theoretical explanans X on
explanandum Y varies according to a third factor Z. Environmental
influences (exposure) can, for example, have an effect on violent
extremism but the strength of this effect depends on certain individual
characteristics (propensity). In short, whether or not an individual will
undertake an extremist action depends on a specific combination of
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individual propensity and environmental exposure52. This is made
visually in Table 2. According to Wikström (2004, p. 19) attention
should be paid to “kinds of individuals in kinds of settings.” In some cases,
the environment will be decisive, in other cases, the individual.
(4) Direct causes and causes of the causes
The causes of violent extremism (action process) need to be
distinguished from the causes of the causes (social and developmental
processes). Some factors directly influence action (causes); other factors
influence the emergence of these causes. They are the “causes of the
causes.” Early theories, including the risk factor approach, only seldom
take this into account.
Causes (or proximate causes) are causal factors that directly bring
about action. These can be certain individual characteristics (propen-
sity) or environmental characteristics (exposure) that influence the
perception–choice process and thus initiate action. Causes of the causes
(or distant causes) are factors that influence these individual and envi-
ronmental factors. The difference between the two is crucial if one
wants to study and explain violent extremism and political violence.
Some factors influence directly the perception of violence as an action
alternative and/or the process of choice of whether or not to carry it out.
Other factors only indirectly influence the perception–choice process
through their influence on propensity and exposure.
52 It must also be noted that individuals will only undertake action if motivated to do so. If not,
even in case of an encouraging match between individual (high propensity) and environment
(high exposure), the action will not take place, simply because one is not motivated to do so.
However, motivation alone can never be the cause of action.
Table 2: Violent extremism resulting from the individual–environment interaction from 
the standpoint of SAT
Individual
Propensity to 
extremism
No propensity to extremism
Environment High exposure to extremist 
environmental influences 
Extremism ++
Extremism (depended of 
situation) (cf. peer pressure)
Low exposure to extremist 
environmental influences
Extremism + No extremism
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7.3. Situational action theory (SAT) as a useful 
framework for theoretical integration
SAT is based on insights and research from the social sciences, in
general, and criminology more specifically. SAT offers a comprehensive
and integrated approach for the study of crime as moral action and its
causes. By placing violent extremism under the same umbrella, it is
possible to use SAT as a framework to explain political violence. The
basic arguments of SAT are the following (Wikström, 2004, 2010, 2014;
Wikström & Butterworth, 2006):
1. Acts of crime are moral actions guided by what is right or wrong to
do, or not to do, in a certain situation, and should be explained as
such. More specific crime can be seen as the breaking of moral
rules stated in law. Violent extremism and political violence are, as
other forms of crime, equal to intentional breaking of the rules.
2. Action, including political violence, is ultimately an outcome of a
perception–choice process. It is necessary to 1) see political
violence as a valid action alternative and 2) chose to carry out this
action alternative over others.
3. This perception–choice process is initiated and guided by relevant
aspects of the individual–environment interaction. In other words,
the probability of political violence is dependent on the individual
propensity for political violence and the interaction with exposure
to extremist settings.
4. What kinds of people and environments are present in a
jurisdiction is the result of historical processes of personal and
social emergence. Processes of social and self-selection place kinds
of people in kinds of settings (creating particular kinds of
interactions).
Perception–choice process
According to SAT, action is not the result of the person (propensity) or
the setting (environmental characteristics) but of the perception–choice
process that arises from the person–setting interaction (situation).
Crucially SAT states that the decision–choice process is shaped by a
combination of characteristics of the individual (crime/extremist
propensity) and the environment (exposure to criminogenic/extremist
settings). Wikström (2014) puts it as follows: “When a particular kind of
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person is exposed to a particular kind of setting, a particular situation
(a perception choice process) arises that initiates and guides his action
in relation to a specific motivation” (p77). According to SAT, propensity
and exposure are causally relevant, indicating that changes in
propensity and/or exposure will lead to changes in action, through
their impact on the perception–choice process (Wikström, 2014;
Wikström & Treiber, 2007). This has already been tested numerous
times on youth delinquency (Pauwels & Svensson, 2011; Svensson &
Pauwels, 2010; Svensson, Pauwels, & Weerman, 2010).
Every action is guided by moral rules about what is not acceptable
given a certain situation. Based on this situation, people perceive a
number of action alternatives. What particular action alternatives are
perceived is dependent on the interplay between the personal moral
rules and the moral norms of the setting in which the action takes place
(moral filter). Out of these alternatives, one is chosen to be carried out
over the others. So in order for an act of political violence to be
committed, a person must, first, perceive to act as a valid action
alternative, and second, choose to carry it out. This perception–choice
mechanism, as shown in Figure 6, is the basic explanatory mechanism
for actions, in this case, political violence. The perception of action
alternatives precedes the process of choice. When a person does not
perceive a certain action as a valid action alternative, this action cannot
be chosen and thus will not take place. This means that the perception
of action alternatives is more important for the explanation of actions
than the process of choice. In other words, the process of choice only
becomes relevant in the explanation of political violence (or the
refrainment from it) if the individual considers political violence as a
valid option. Only then, the choice whether or not to commit political
violence could be made.
SAT states that individual choices can be made out of habit or after
deliberation, depending on the circumstances. Repeated exposure to a
certain situation creates an automatic association with a default
reaction. The individual only sees one effective action alternative,
selected on the basis of previous experiences in previous similar
circumstances. The individual will automatically choose this course of
action or, in other words, just do what he normally does in the same
circumstances. The more well-known the circumstances are, the more
likely the perception choice process will be based on habit. This is also
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true for very stressful or emotional circumstances. Deliberative choices
do not fall back on predetermined alternatives, makes an assessment of
what is a morally acceptable way to act and achieve ones goal. This is
mostly the case in new or unfamiliar circumstance. The individual has
to assess the moral pros and cons of the different perceived action
alternatives. Actions out of habit draw upon prior experiences to guide
current choices. Actions out of deliberation are future oriented and
consider potential future outcomes and consequences of perceived
action alternatives. In both cases, the result is intentional, reflecting
agency. Most actions come forth out of habit (Wikström, 2010;
Wikström & Treiber, 2007).
People, of course, differ in their crime propensities and settings differ in
their criminogeneity53. Individuals vary in the likelihood of perceiving
political violence as an action alternative in response to a particular
setting. For example, person A has a higher extremist propensity than
person B if person A is more likely than person B to see an act of polit-
ical violence as an action alternative when they are in the same setting.
Settings vary in the extent to which their characteristics promote
extremist behavior. For example, setting A is more extremist then
setting B if the same person in setting A is more inclined to see political
violence as an action alternative than in setting B. When crime-prone
people are exposed to criminogenic settings, it is very likely that they
may see crime as an action alternative and choose to act on it.
“Situational Action Theory does not propose a simple additive model of
propensity and exposure but that propensity and exposure interact to
initiate a perception-choice process that encourages or discourages a
person’s crime involvement Crime propensity is activated by crimino-
genic exposure and criminogenic exposure is made relevant by crime
propensity. The general nature of this interaction is that the influence of
exposure depends on a person’s propensity: the importance of crimino-
genic exposure amplifies with increasing crime propensity.”
(Wikström, 2010, p. 221).
53 Of course, people’s crime propensity may also vary depending on the crime in question and the
criminogenity of a setting may vary depending on the crime in question (Wikström, 2014).
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Propensity
Variations in propensity to violent extremism are essentially
determined by (Wikström, 2010, 2014):
1. The morality of the person. This corresponds to the extent to which
personal morality corresponds to the various rules of conduct
stated in the law and the level of rule breaking a person allows for
himself. It encompasses both a cognitive component (disposition
or moral attitudes) as well as moral emotions (feelings of guilt and
shame). Moral rules are important because they determine which
action alternatives an individual perceives (Wikström, 2010).
Together with control they also determine the evaluation and
choice of the perceived alternatives.
2. The possibility to exercise self-control. Self-control is determined
by several individual characteristics such as impulsivity, sensi-
tivity, and risk taking and momentary environmental influences
such as intoxication or high levels of stress. Self-control is not a
lifelong stable characteristic (Wikström & Treiber, 2007).
Moral setting or exposure
A setting is part of the environment that is directly accessible through
an individual’s senses (including media). The environment of an
individual thus consists of multiple different settings, each with
different characteristics. The complete set of settings an individual
Figure 6: Illustration of the perception–choice process (Wikström, 2011)
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interacts in is called the activity field. Settings give rise to situations
that facilitate violent extremism and political violence. Only when
present in such a setting, it becomes causal importance for individuals
with low morality and/or self-control.
The criminogenic character of the setting is determined, according to
(Wikström, 2010, 2014) by:
1. the moral rules of the setting or the extent to which they encourage
(or discourage) the breaking of particular laws in relation to the
opportunities and frictions created in the setting;
2. the level of enforcement of these moral rules…
Moral correspondence
From this, it follows that morality can be seen as the most important
individual factor and the moral context of the setting as the most
important environmental factor in crime causation. Their interaction
largely determines which action alternatives will be perceived by the
individual and whether or not one of these alternatives is a crime.
When personal morals and the moral norms of the setting both
encourage (or discourage) a particular action in response to a
motivation, that action is likely (or unlikely). This is referred to as the
principle of moral correspondence. Only when people deliberate between
several action alternatives and there is conflicting rule guidance,
control becomes important. This is referred to as the conditional
relevance of control. Both self-control (internal control processes) and
social control or deterrence (external control processes) can play a role
in the decision process. Self-control refers to compliance with their
personal moral rules and deterrence impels people to comply with the
moral rules of the setting. The role of controls is shown in Figure 7.
In other words, the moral correspondence between the individual and
the setting is crucial in explaining political violence. It is plausible that
based on the principle of moral correspondence, an individual already
susceptible to extremist convictions is more likely to further radicalize
when coming in contact with an extremist organization compared with
an individual who holds the same convictions but is not exposed to a
similar extremist milieu.
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Causes of the causes: emergence and selection
As already explained, the direct causes are these factors that directly
influence an individual to violent behavior. Distant causes (or the
causes of the causes) are factors that influence the direct causes. Social
context and development must be addressed as causes of the causes.
Most literature identified that causes (e.g., bad upbringing) are in fact
causes of the causes. They are, however, part of the causal chain leading
up to political violence. For example, a bad upbringing can influence
the capability to self-control, which in turn influence an individual’s
reaction to temptations in its environment, leading to violent behavior
(or not).
We also explained that the interaction between individual propensity
and environmental exposure as direct causes initiates a percep-
tion–choice process leading to criminal or violent behavior. So in order
to fully explain political violence, it is necessary to:
Figure 7: Role of the moral filter and control in case of a deliberate action choice, 
according to SAT (Wikström, 2003)
Motivation 
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attention) 
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(Rule-guidance as an outcome 
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1. Understand how individual propensity develops; or in other
words, why individuals differ in terms of propensity to violent
extremism.
2. Understand why some settings have acquired an extremist
character and others not.
3. Understand how certain kind of individuals end up in certain kind
of settings.
The first two questions are questions of emergence. The third question
is a question of selection.
Emergence refers to the process of development. How does something
develop to be what it is? More specifically, it refers to the causes of the
causes explaining propensity and exposure. Personal emergence refers
to the processes that lead to crime-prone people or an individual
propensity that sees violent extremism as an action alternative. This is
best addressed by developmental psychosocial processes of moral
education and cognitive nurturing. Social emergence refers to the
processes that explain the development of a criminogenic character of
some settings. This is best addressed by historical socio-ecological
processes such as processes of segregation and their consequence.
Selection explains how certain kinds of individuals get introduced in
certain kind of settings. This is best addressed by cotemporaneous
social and self-selection processes. Social selection refers to social forces
that encourage, discourage, limit, or ban certain kinds of people from
interacting in certain kinds of settings. Self-selection refers to
preferences of individuals for certain settings, within the limits of social
selection.
Attributes and motivations
Situational action theory strongly opposes the idea that (social
demographic) background characteristics (e.g., gender, nationality,
level of education, class) can ever be causes of criminality. Empirical
research by Wikström & Butterworth (2006) clearly shows that such
characteristics do not contribute to the explanation of crime. Instead,
SAT understands background characteristics as attributes (Wikström,
2007, 2010). Attributes are factors that correlate with offending but,
logically speaking, cannot be causes. They are either factors that
correlate with the outcome (symptoms) or factors that correlate with
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the causes of this outcome (markers). Although they do not hold any
explanatory power, they can be helpful in discovering the real causes.
The concept of motivation is often and repeatedly confused with the
concept of cause. However, following SAT, a motive can never be a
cause of criminal behavior. According to SAT, motivation is a necessary
but insufficient precondition to break moral rules (Wikström, 2010). It
is a necessary precondition because undertaking a certain action
demands a certain motivation to do so. It is an insufficient precondition
because the motivation in itself does not necessarily entail the breaking
of a moral rule. Individuals are motivated to obtain a certain goal, not
to break a moral rule. A motivation is a specific achievement (like
establishing the Sharia in Belgium or founding a state based on white
nationalism,) that does not always require the breaking of a moral rule
to get there. In general, there are several options to achieve this goal,
and breaking the moral rule is only one of them. So, motivations can
provide insight into the goals individuals want to realize, but they do
not explain why they do or do not break the moral rule to achieve these
goals.
7.4. Causes of the causes of violent extremism: 
elements of key theories in the explanation 
of offending
Basically, we propose an integrated perspective on political violence
that includes concepts of strain theory, procedural justice theory, and
social control theory as causes of the causes. The integrated approach
argues that strains lead to weakened bonds, which in turn affect
personal beliefs and exposure to extremist settings. The study takes as
an explicit starting point that social integration, procedural justice, and
perceived discrimination may positively affect moral support for
violent extremism and, therefore, be of importance in the explanation
of individual differences in the study of violent extremism and political
violence.
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7.4.1. Concepts from general strain theory (Agnew)
General strain theory (GST) is one of the leading theories on crime and
delinquency, and it essentially argues that strain or negative treatment
by others leads to negative emotions, particularly anger and
frustration, which may lead to a number of outcomes. Agnew (2006)
argues that violent delinquency is one possible response to the pressure
created by these negative emotions. GST identifies three main sources
of strain: 1) situations that block positively valued goals (e.g., money,
status, autonomy), 2) situations that remove positively valued stimuli
(e.g., loss of spouse, theft of valued possessions), and 3) situations that
produce negative stimuli (e.g., discrimination).
These responses can be behavioral, cognitive (attitudes), or emotional.
Not all responses are violent or delinquent but these are of most
interest to GST. Strains that are 1) seen as unjust, 2) high in magnitude
3) associated with low social control, and 4) create some incentive to
engage in criminal coping are most likely to lead to delinquency and
violence. Coping via illegal behavior and violence may be especially
true for adolescents because of their limited coping resource, greater
influence from peers, and inability to escape many stressful
environments. Some vent out their aggression on people, while others
engage in delinquent behaviors such as drug use and property crime
(Agnew, 2004).
GST has attempted to specify the factors that increase the likelihood
that individuals will cope with strain by committing crime. Agnew
contends that crime becomes a likely outcome when individuals have a
low tolerance for strain, when they have poor coping skills and
resources, when they have few conventional social supports, when they
perceive that the costs of committing crime is low, and when they are
disposed to committing crime because of factors such as low self-
control, negative emotionality, or their learning history. Empirical
research has offered some support for the above (Agnew, 2002). On the
other hand, some factors (e.g., social support, positive relationship with
adults, and attachment to school) can reduce the negative outcomes of
strain and help explain why only some youth become delinquent
(Agnew, 2004; Morash & Moon, 2007).
Perceptions of injustice and discrimination can be viewed as stressors
that can lead to delinquency as a coping mechanism. Agnew actually
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identifies experiences with prejudice and discrimination, based on
ascribed characteristics like race/ethnicity, as one of several strains that
increase the probability of crime (Agnew, 2004). Perceived personal and
group discrimination may not only trigger negative emotions as a
response toward situations of personal and group discrimination but
may also affect personal belief systems that are relevant for the expla-
nation of violent extremism (such as moral support of right-wing
violent extremism, authoritarianism, political powerlessness (or
anomia)). Caldwell, Kohn-Wood, Schmeelk-Cone, Chavous and
Zimmerman (2004) reported that for both females and males, involve-
ment in violence significantly increases with perceived discrimination.
Previous research has also documented a positive association between
perceived discrimination and delinquency (Gibbons, Gerrard, Cleve-
land, Wills, & Brody, 2004; Simons, Chen, Stewart, & Brody, 2003;
Stewart & Simons, 2006) both for minority groups and parts of majority
groups, such as right-wing extremist youth who experience their own
situation as discriminating and unjust (Bjørgo, 1997; Van der Valk &
Wagenaar, 2010). Therefore, it is likely that other kinds of discrimina-
tion and injustice effect delinquency and problem behavior in general
and not only in minority groups. Taken together, these findings suggest
that perceived discrimination will increase negative emotions that
contribute to political violence.
7.4.2. Concepts from control theory and the importance of 
social bonds (Hirschi)
Control theory has traditionally pointed to the importance of social
bonds of the individual to society to keep individuals from committing
crime. Contrary to strain theory, control theory argues that differences
in crime are caused by variation in control and not motivation. The very
nature of mankind as gratification seekers makes individuals per defi-
nition motivated to commit crime. Only the presences of controlling
social bonds keep individuals from acting on these motivations.
Hirschi (1969) distinguished in his social bonds theory between
attachment to parents, commitment to school, social involvement, and
conventional beliefs as important elements that restrain an individual
from committing acts of (violent) crime. The (cumulative) absence of
these bonds leaves individuals unattached to society and thus free from
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constraints to committing crime and violence. Sampson and Laub
(2003) redefined Hirschi’s elements of the social bonds in terms of social
capital. They argue that participation in a coherent social network, built
around social institutions such as family, school, or work keeps
individuals from committing crime and violence. An accumulation of
social bonds to society provides individuals a means to enable them to
live with critical situations. Sampson and Laub (2003) argued that it is
not the social bonds in itself, but the social control resulting from these
bonds that prevent youth from committing (violent) crimes.
Since its publication in 1969, Hirschi’s social bond theory has been one
of the most tested theories in the field of criminology. Although
empirical tests have sometimes used weak operational measures, there
is a large body of evidence that the elements of control theory are
inversely related to the commitment of crimes (Kempf, 1993). It is
hypothesized that high levels of societal integration (social bonds with
parents, parental control, school bonds, social integration at school,
absence of school failure) may decrease the chances of being involved
in political violence. We argue that social bonds to the family and
school are an important condition that fosters law abiding through
several ways; not only through the support of conventional beliefs but
also through the shaping of the individual’s trust in the police as a
legitimate element of law enforcement.
7.4.3. Concepts of procedural justice theory (Tyler)
According to the procedural justice model, confidence and compliance
depend largely on perceptions of fairness of the justice system (Reisig,
Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Tyler, 2006). Research has shown that the legiti-
macy of authorities plays an important role in gaining public support
for imposed rules and decisions made by these authorities (Hinds &
Murphy, 2007). Individuals are willing to accept decisions made by
relevant authorities if these authorities are perceived as legitimate,
independent of personal gain, possible sanctions and desirability of the
outcome (Tyler, 1997, 2006; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In other words, individ-
uals will comply, even if the outcome has negative personal conse-
quences or is only beneficial for others. This implies that legitimacy is of
major concern to guarantee an effective functioning of democratic insti-
tutions, such as the police and the criminal justice system. Legitimacy
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can be understood in two ways. When institutions meet various agreed
objective criteria, such as the absence of corruption, they achieve legiti-
macy based on an objective standard. In the case of perceived legitimacy, it
does not matter whether institutions meet objective criteria, as only the
public perception of legitimacy matters. Only an institution that
commands high levels of perceived legitimacy can count on public
support (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010).
So the legitimacy of authorities is not judged on its efficacy but on the
perception of it to be just and fair (Tyler, 2006). This depends on the
assessment of the fairness of the decision-making procedures used by
the relevant authority (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Murphy, 2003). In general,
there are two criteria: (1) the quality of decision-making and (2) the quality
of the personal treatment. First, citizens want to feel that authorities
handle their questions and/or problems honestly, objectively, and
without bias. Second, citizens want to be treated with dignity and
respect, regardless of their role as a victim, suspect, or witness. Lastly, it
is important for citizens to have the opportunity to explain their visions
and behavior before the police take decisions (Tyler & Fagan, 2008).
They want to participate actively (having a voice) in discussions during
the decision-making process. Hence, if an individual believes that an
authority has attempted to be neutral, has treated him/her with respect,
and has given him/her voice, feelings of fairness will be enhanced
(Murphy, 2003) and he/she might perceive this authority as having
legitimate power and thus has to be obeyed.
On the contrary, those who distrust the authorities are bound to engage
in crime, and might even develop radical and/or violent attitudes.
Research has already shown that minorities often feel discriminated
against and targeted by police (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). This under-
mines perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy. Furthermore,
Jackson et al. (2012) make a distinction in perceived legitimacy as not
only the recognition of power by the public, which is based on the idea
that a legitimate authority has the right to be obeyed, but also the justifi-
cation of power, which is based on the perception that the police and
public share similar values and norms. Hence, the perception of police
legitimacy is instantiated due to not only the willingness to obey the
police (public recognition) but also the belief that citizens and police
share the same values and norms (moral alignment) (see also, Tyler &
Sunshine, 2003). This is important regarding violent radicalization and
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violent extremism because certain individuals or groups might advo-
cate a radically different view on society and distance themselves from
core western values. If this is the case, they may feel as if the authorities
only represent the majority, resulting in the rejection of the (legitimacy)
of these authorities.
Analogous to social bond theory, procedural justice theory examines
why people conform to the law, instead of asking why people are
motivated to break the law. Yet, unlike social bond theory, procedural
justice theory accepts that controls are weakened by structural
constraints. These constraints are situated at the institutional level: the
police, the criminal justice system, can treat people unfairly, which may
have consequences for the commitment of (violent) crimes. The fact
that procedural justice theory recognizes the importance of strains,
especially strains caused by institutions of law enforcement, makes it
an important candidate for theoretical integration of social bond theory
and strain theory.
7.5. How is NSM exposure related to violent 
extremism
The central focus of this study is the influence of exposure to extremist
content through NSM on behavior and attitudes. The public concern
focusses on the idea that unlimited exposure to extremist content will
influence vulnerable adolescents to the point that they will take over
and adopt the displayed attitudes and behaviors. In other words there
is a concern that exposure to violent extremism will lead to “online
brainwashing” and radicalize youth. This concern is especially
pertinent for NSM because of its communication and networking
characteristics. Theoretically this concern can be framed using a social
learning approach, that states that behavior is adopted through
processes of social learning, dependent on communication and social
relations. The social learning theory (SLT) emerged from the differen-
tial association theory as developed by Sutherland. The principle of
differential association asserts that a person becomes delinquent
because of an “excess” of definitions favorable to violation of law over
definitions unfavorable to violation of law. In other words, criminal
behavior emerges when one is exposed to more social messages
favoring criminal conduct than to prosocial messages (Sutherland,
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1947). The same reasoning can be applied to the explanation of violent
extremism or political violence (Akers & Silverman, 2004).
Social learning is a general extended version of differential association
theory that seeks to explain all forms of (criminal) behavior by offering
an explanation of the acquisition, maintenance, and change in criminal
and deviant behavior. It embraces social, non-social, and cultural
factors operating both to motivate and control criminal behavior, and
both to promote and undermine conformity. The basic proposition is
that the same learning process, in a context of social structure and
interaction, produces both behavior defined as deviant and behavior
defined as conforming (Akers, 1998; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). The
emphasis is on the mechanism of social learning, transmitting certain
norms and values justifying certain behavior and not, as could wrongly
be understood, on what constitutes deviant behavior and what not. For
example, in the case of political violence one would have acquired the
belief that such actions are necessary and justified through the same
process of social learning that brought others to condemn these actions.
The probability of criminal or conforming behavior is a function of the
balance of exposure to criminal versus conforming social settings and
definitions. Not only are present associations of importance but also
those operative in one’s learning history and those predictive of future
behavior (Akers, 1998). SLT argues that there are four learning
mechanisms.
Differential association refers to direct and indirect association and
interaction with others who engage in certain kinds of behavior or
express certain attitudes. These groups provide the major social context
in which all the mechanism of social learning operates. The most
important groups are primary ones, such as friends and family;
nevertheless, secondary and reference groups as well as mass media and
the internet can also be of importance. If one’s differential associations
balance in the direction of greater exposure to extremist behavior and
attitudes, the greater the probability of engagement in political violence
will be. Definitions refer to an individual’s own values and belief
system about what is and is not acceptable behavior. These attitudes and
values are learned and reinforced through differential association. The
greater the number of definitions favorable to violent extremism, the
greater the likelihood that an individual will take part in political
violence. On the contrary, the greater the number of definitions
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favorable to conventional norms, the less likely an individual is to
engage in political violence. Differential reinforcement refers to the
balance of anticipated or actual rewards and punishments that follow
behavior. The greater the value, frequency and probability of rewards
for deviant behavior, the more likely it will be repeated. Most of the
learning in political violence is the result of interaction in settings where
political violence is rewarded and encouraged. Imitation is the notion
that individuals engage in behavior that they have previously witnessed
others doing (Bandura, 1962; Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961).
7.6. Integrated conceptual model
Each of the discussed criminological theories can make a valuable
contribution to the explanation of violent extremism but are on their
own only capable of partially explaining violent extremism. They each
highlight specific (important) aspects, causing the knowledge on
violent extremism and political violence to be fragmented. In order to
come to a full explanation, we argue to combine their insights by
integrating these theories. As already explained, SAT offers a useful
framework that allows us to structure and integrate what is already
known. This model is shown in figure 8.
Based on this framework, we developed an integrated model for the
explanation of violent extremism (political violence) that distinguishes
between direct causes and causes of the causes, and pays attention to
both the individual level as well as the environment. This model is
Figure 8: Situational Action Theory framework
PROPENSITY 
to offend 
EXPOSURE 
to 
criminogenic settings 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
(POLITICAL VIOLENCE) 
EMERGENCE 
BACKGROUND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
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shown in figure 954. Key concepts form criminological theories
explaining offending are integrated as the causes of the causes. We state
that factors derived from control theory, strain theory, and procedural
justice theory form the causes of the causes of political violence. They
can be found in the components “poor social integration,” “subjective
alienation,” and “perceived discrimination.” They influence personal
beliefs and attitudes favorable to violent extremism (propensity) and
exposure to extremist settings, as the direct causes of political violence.
Since the main focus of this project lies on the influence of NSM, our
attention will mainly go to exposure to NSM and its influence on polit-
ical violence. The focus is on exposure to extremist content through
NSM, but other forms of exposure can be equally important (for
example, peer pressure or delinquent peers). In our definition of violent
extremism, it was made clear that the concept encompasses both an
attitudinal and behavioral component. Keeping in mind that the behav-
ioral consequence of violent extremisms (the use of violence) poses the
greatest direct threat to society and following the logic of SAT, we focus
only on explaining this behavioral aspect of violent extremism: the use
of political violence. The cognitive aspect of violent extremism
(extremist attitudes) is incorporated in the model as a dependent vari-
able (part of propensity).
54 Note that we did not include the trigger events in this model. This is because trigger events are
essentially a motivation to act and as such cannot be causes of political violence. Most people
experience something that can be described as a trigger event in their lives. This does not
explain the use of political violence. Often they are only given as a justification for political
violence in retrospect. See also sections 1.3.4.1 and 7.3.
Figure 9: Integrated model explaining political violence
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8. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH: EXPLAINING 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE
8.1. Introduction
This study aims at gaining insight into the relationship between expo-
sure to extremist content through NSM (ENSM) and violent extremism
among Belgian adolescents and young adults. More specifically, the
focus is on testing the developed integrated model, explaining political
violence, and testing the relative strength of the relationship between
different measures of NSM exposure and political violence, controlled
for other risk factors. Data were collected (1) through a classic paper
and pencil survey of pupils (aged 16–18) in the third cycle of secondary
education in Antwerp and Liege and (2) through a web-survey of
young adults—both students and young adults who have left school.
8.2. Research design
8.2.1. Data
8.2.1.1. Self-report study
During, but especially right after, the Second World War, survey
methodology was slowly introduced in North American criminology
(Bruinsma, 1991; Ponsaers & Pauwels, 2003). Originally, the survey
manifested itself in two forms: self-report studies and, sometime later,
victim research. Both wanted to overcome the flaws in official
registered criminology, the so-called dark number55. The self-report
55 The number and nature of criminal offenses that are officially registered in police statistics
reflect only a fraction of the real amount of crime committed. The offenses that end up in these
statistics are the ones that come to the surface or of which the perpetrators are arrested. This
means that official (police) statistics and self-reported crime measure two different things.
Research has repeatedly shown that official (police) statistics are flawed and incomplete (Far-
rington, 1992; Junger-Tas, 1990). They show a distorted image about the real number and dis-
tribution of crime over different population groups (Van Kerckvoorde, 1995). Already very
early on, it was established that different population groups commit the same kind of offenses
but that crime committed by certain groups was less likely to end up in the justice system (Short
& Nye, 1958). See also Akers (1964), Clark and Wenniger (1962); Dentler and Monroe (1961),
Erickson and Empey (1963), Slocum and Stone (1963), Vaz (1966) and Voss (1966).
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method aims at asking potential offenders about (self-reported)
committed crimes, while victim surveys measure victimization and
feelings of insecurity. In the current context, self-report studies are
slowly introduced into a new developing research tradition: the study
of violent extremism (Dunkel & Gengn, 2003).
It was Porterfeld (1943, 1946) and Wallsterstein and Wylie (1947) who
first discovered that 1) young people are prepared to admit crimes they
have committed and 2) young people in the general population have
committed the same offenses as institutionalized individuals, although
less frequently and under the radar. First, examples of survey research
among extremists indicates the same is true for this population
(Skillicorn, Leuprecht, & Winn, 2012). Today, self-report studies are
still mostly used for youth. This has to do with the fact that people
commit most offences in this phase of life (Farrington, 1992; Junger-
Tas, 1990). In addition, through schools, this population is easy to reach
for researchers. By posing questions about different aspects of the
social lives of the adolescents, on the one hand, and self-reported
criminality, on the other hand, in the same questionnaire, statements
can be made about the connection between self-reported crime,
attitudes, free time, behavior, attitudes of friends, and social situations
in school and the family. This makes it possible to answer theoretical
research questions.
There is a lot of discussion on the validity and reliability of self-report
studies56. According to some, it is not possible to reach a valid and reli-
able image of delinquent behavior using self-report studies (Bruinsma,
1994; Hessing & Elffers, 1995). However, although it is indeed impos-
sible to reach one hundred percent valid and reliable conclusions about
delinquency based on self-report studies, it is important to keep in
mind that it is equally impossible using official police data (Thornberry
& Krohn, 2000). When self-report studies comply to certain precondi-
tions, it is certainly possible to reach a sufficiently valid and reliable
image of delinquent behavior (Farrington, Loeber, Stouthamer-Loeber,
Kammen, & Schmidt, 1996; Huizinga & Elliott, 1986; Thornberry &
Krohn, 2000; Van Kerckvoorde, 1995).
56 (Internal) validity can be described as the extent to which a concept is measured as described.
Reliability refers to the extent to which a new measurement would result in similar results.
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Most problems are situated around possible over or under report of
offenses. On the one hand, there is the risk of more severe offenses to be
held back and, on the other hand, it is possible that facts are reported
that do not qualify as crime in a juridical sense (Tourangeau & Smith,
1996). It is also possible that questions are interpreted wrongly, or
interpreted to broad or not broad enough.
Because of social desirability, there is also a chance that certain (major)
facts are not reported and/or other (minor) facts are exaggerated.
Furthermore, “nonresponse” can be an issue in case of refusal to partic-
ipate by the youngster himself, his parents, or the school. Some
students might not take the questionnaire seriously or are not moti-
vated to fill out all of the questions. Finally, also “item nonresponse”
can be an issue when certain respondents do not answer on certain
questions.
8.2.1.2. Web survey
A web survey was conducted in addition to the classic paper and pencil
studies57. Web surveys are increasingly acknowledged as a valid and
reliable tool for measuring self-reported delinquency, with their data
quality measuring up to that of paper and pencil studies (Lucia,
Herrmann, & Killias, 2007). This is confirmed for studies targeting
children in primary school (McCabe, Boyd, Young, Crawford, & Pope,
2005) as well as youth in high school (Wang et al., 2005) and higher
education (Miller et al., 2002). Two factors influencing the response rate
compared with paper and pencil studies were taken into account.
(1) Research population (Nulty, 2008). For certain groups, e.g., students
or certain professionals, a survey can generate higher response rates
than paper and pencil studies (Greenlaw & Brown-Welty, 2009;
Kiernan, Kiernan, Oyler, & Gilles, 2005) because these groups are
familiar with computer usage and the internet is part of their daily life
(Yetter & Capaccioli, 2010). This is also true for youth, the research
population of our research. (2) Survey presentation (Shih & Fan, 2008).
We presented the survey in such a way that minimizes effort for
completion. Invitation emails provide a direct link to the project’s
Facebook page and the survey. Respondents had to click to start and
click again to submit the results. This means there is no requirement for
57 A copy of the Dutch and French web survey can be found in Appendix 1 and 2.
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saving of files, mailing of questionnaires, switching between paper and
computer, etc. (Kiernan et al., 2005).
This web survey consisted of a self-administrated questionnaire that
was conducted online. Access to the survey could be gained through a
link on the survey’s webpage on Facebook. This survey mode requires
almost no organization, does not cause disruption of working time, is
more fun to complete, has minimum costs, boosts confidence in
anonymity, and leaves decisions to participate entirely to the students.
This method proved to be most effective. In other words, an online
survey has numerous advantages compared with the paper and pencil
method, without compromising data quality.
Although the possibility of distributing the questionnaire via online
platforms or mailing lists has significantly contributed to the survey
response, one must still have some reservations with regard to the
response: while web surveys seem to be increasingly popular in social
science research, there are some questions left with regard to the
systematic bias that might result from exclusively using the world wide
web as a sample frame. (1) We acknowledge that the researcher cannot
completely monitor the processes of response selection and we must
admit that we cannot verify the conditions under which the
questionnaire is completed. The researcher cannot control where,
when, and in the presence of whom the questionnaires are completed
and cannot answer questions. In extreme cases, this can lead to poor
quality data because of misunderstanding of questions, wrong
answers, and social desirability. (2) In addition, the initiative to
participate in the survey is entirely left to the respondent. It should,
however, be mentioned that issues such as preparedness to answer
survey questions and willingness to report are central to the more
traditional survey modes as well. (3) Finally, since it is not possible to
verify what and how many youth received the questionnaire or to say
something about the response rate and non-response.
8.2.1.3. Distribution of the paper and pencil survey
The paper and pencil study was restricted to the cities of Liege and
Antwerp for practical reasons: Liege and Antwerp are, except for
Brussels, the two largest cities of Belgium (+100 000 inhabitants). It has
numerous times been empirically shown that deviance is concentrated
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in cities. In order to maximize variation in self-reported offending the
following strategy was followed.
All schools in the third cycle of the secondary education in Antwerp
and Liege were contacted and invited to participate in the study. A total
of 34 schools in Antwerp and 32 schools in Liege were contacted. The
initial request for participation was sent to the schools principals in the
second part of August 2012 both by email and regular mail. Schools
that did not reply after the second request were contacted by telephone,
with a maximum of five contact points. Only three schools in Antwerp
(470 students) and no school in Liège were prepared to participate
through a paper-and-pencil questionnaire and for handing out the
questionaires in class. In case of refusal, the schools were given the
option to offer the survey to their students through the online educa-
tional platform of the school. This forced us to apply the web survey
design to the sampling of adolescents who were still in secondary
education at the moment of data collection. Otherwise, almost no
adolescents would have participated58. Since this method hardly needs
any organization and does not imply loss of class hours, it was
included to anticipate the strain on schools because of the many ques-
tions to participate in research. Through this method, we could
convince six additional schools in Antwerp (1748 potential respond-
ents), making a total of nine, and six schools in Liege (1500 potential
respondents). To enhance participation, teachers were asked to intro-
duce the research in class and hand out flyers and/or put up some
posters. Often, there were no refusals for substantive reasons. The prac-
tical and organizational constraints nevertheless continued to be a
barrier to participation. Schools that continued to refuse were offered
the possibility of putting up posters and handing out flyers in the
school. This was done by 6 additional schools in Antwerp and 3 addi-
tional schools in Liege. Schools wishing to review a draft of the ques-
tionnaire had access to the document.
58 This is an alarming tendency. As survey methodologists have, during the last decade, repeat-
edly warned about the decrease of citizens’ willingness to participate in surveys, we certainly
were expecting that this tendency would be reflected in a decreasing participation of oragniza-
tions. However, we had not expected that no school (Liège) and only a handfull of schools
(Antwerp) would have been prepared to participate through the classic paper and pencil study.
It soon became clear that the web survey was the only way to obtain the participation of sec-
ondary school pupils.
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8.2.1.4. Distribution of the web survey
The web survey was developed using the free software program thesis-
tools.com. In order to distribute the survey, a Facebook page was
created, where a direct link to the questionnaire as well as more infor-
mation on the project and researchers and contact information could be
found. We provided a Dutch as well as a French Facebook page59. The
pages were moderated by the researchers, who posted videos, links,
articles, etc., on a regular basis. In addition, an email address was
provided where youth could send all their questions60.
As the web survey was meant to reach both students and non-studying
young adults, posters were placed visibly in different strategic places
that attract a high number of the target population, such as popular
pubs and bars in Antwerp, Gent, and Liège. Additionally, flyers were
distributed in buildings of virtually all faculties of the university and
university colleges in Antwerp, Ghent, Louvain la Neuve, and Liège,
and pamphlets were distributed among the students. The central facul-
ties and administrational services for students of all universities and
university colleges of Flanders, Liege, and Louvain la Neuve were sent
an email invitation with a request to circulate the web link to the ques-
tionnaire’s Facebook page. This method proved to be most effective.
This resulted in very diverse reactions. The University of Liège and
HELMo College centrally distributed the survey among all their
students. There was no cooperation of individual departments or facul-
ties. In Flanders, on the contrary, only student administrations at
faculty level were willing to cooperate61. Some departments confirmed
their cooperation; however, based on the public information on
respondents Facebook pages, some additional departments distributed
the survey among their students. Finally, many additional organiza-
tions, associations, sport clubs, and local youth clubs were contacted
with a request to distribute the survey to their members and to reach
youth who are no longer in school.
The fact that the questionnaire was visible and could be shared on
Facebook meant that a high number of respondents could be reached in
a very short time. The survey was online between September and
59 www.facebook.com/radimedonline and www.facebook.com/radimeducl.
60 radimed@ugent.be and radimed-juri@uclouvainn.be.
61 With the exception of University College Gent, who mentioned the survey in their weekly
newsletter.
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December 2012 and the response was huge with 3653 respondents in
Flanders (including the 470 paper and pencil surveys) and 2367
respondents in Wallonia.
8.2.2. Sample description
Age was originally measured as year of birth but was categorized for
the purpose of the analyses into three categories: 0 for <18, 1 for 18–22,
and 2 for >22. The respondents where on average 20 years old. Gender is
coded 0 for women and 1 for men. 64.7% of the respondents were
female and 35.5% of the respondents were male. Native background is
coded 1 if the respondent and both the parents were born in Belgium
and 0 in all other cases. 76.2% of the respondents where native Belgian,
with both parents born in Belgium. The other respondents have at least
one parent born elsewhere. The importance of religion is coded from 1
(religion not being important at all) to 7 (religion being very important).
When asked about the importance of religion in their lives, 35.8% indi-
cated that religion has no importance at all, 38.5% indicated that reli-
gion has no importance, 10.1% reported no opinion, 10.4 stated religion
to be important, and 5.2% indicated that religion is very important.
Attending religious services is coded from 1 (never) to 6 (every day).
Concerning the attending of religious services, 40.6% of the respond-
ents never attend a religious service, 32.1% only once a year, 19.3% once
every six months, 4.3% every month, 3.3% once a week, and 0.4% every
day.
8.2.3. Measurement of constructs
In the present study, numerous scale constructs are used to assess the
relationship between the exogenous variables, mediators, and self-
reported political violence. Scales were constructed using the following
formula: X * MEAN (Y1, Y2, Y3, ….), where X is the number of scale
items and Y is the individual scale items used to construct the scale.
This resulted in scales on a metrical level. Due to the extensive nature of
the concepts that were used in the present empirical study, we chose to
present a general overview of the scale constructs in the present section
(see also table 3) and refer to Appendix 3 for a more detailed overview
of the scales. We included question wording and additional factor
loadings per item for each scale.
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Dependent variables
Political violence was measured using two scales: one that measures
acts of violence committed toward persons and another that measures
acts of violence committed toward property (damaging or destroying
things) for political or religious reasons. Self-reported political violence
toward property was measured by asking the respondents if they had
ever “vandalized anything in the street or at the public transport
stations (e.g., bus stops, bicycles, streetlights, or something else),”
“participated in a political action that was not allowed,” “thrown
stones at the police during a demonstration,” “destroyed something on
the streets because of your political or religious belief,” “damaged
someone’s property because of your political or religious belief,” or “set
something on fire because of your political or religious beliefs. The
scale is derived from a Belgian study of nonconventional/illegal
political participation by youth (Gavray et al., 2012). Self-reported
political violence toward persons was measured by asking the respondents
if they had ever “fought with someone because of your political or
religious belief,” “threatened someone on the internet because of your
political or religious belief,” “threatened someone in the streets because
Table 3: Scale constructs and Cronbach’s alpha
Scale construct Cronbach’s alpha
Political violence toward property 0.80
Political violence toward persons 0.87
Overall political violence 0.89
Online communication extremism NSM 0.69
Exposure extremism NSM 0.78
Exposure extremism TM 0.82
Police procedural justice 0.84
Police legitimacy 0.80
Perceived political powerlessness (anomy) 0.85
Perceived personal discrimination 0.89
Perceived group discrimination 0.95
Perceived personal respect 0.86
Religious authoritarianism 0.87
Impulsivity 0.63
Thrill-seeking behavior 0.73
Support for violent extremism 0.92
Peer racism 0.68
Peer delinquency 0.70
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of your political or religious belief,” “hit a foreigner,” or “hit a
capitalist.” The scale is translated from Swedish and was originally
used in a youth survey conducted by the Swedish Council for Crime
Prevention (Säkerhetspolisen, 2009; Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, &
Hardie, 2012). Overall political violence was measured by combining the
two scales measuring violence toward persons and violence toward
property.
Independent variables
Independent variables are drawn from the well know criminological
theories explaining crime that we used to construct our integrated
model. These are strain theory, procedural justice theory, social control
theory, social learning theory, and situational action theory.
The first set of variables refers to online exposure. Active extremist
contact NSM was coded 1 if the respondent has been searching contact
with extremists using NSM and 0 if this was not the case. Online
communication extremism NSM measures the extent to which the
respondent takes part in discussions on violent extremism via different
NSM applications. Exposure extremism NSM measures the extent to
which the respondent has been exposed to extremist content via
different NSM applications. Exposure extremism TM measures the extent
to which the respondent has been exposed to extremist content via
traditional media. Peer racism measures racist behavior of peers. This
scale is adapted from Van den Bos, Loseman, and Doosje (2009).
Next, measures of offline exposure or peer influences are also
included. Peer delinquency refers to the respondent’s perception of law-
breaking behavior by their best friends. This scale originates from the
PADS+ study (Wikström, 2010).
A number of individual traits/beliefs that reflect a certain propensity
for violent behavior can make individuals more susceptible for violent
extremism. Religious authoritarianism refers to extreme dogmatic views
with regard to religion. This scale is based on Altemeyer’s authorita-
rianism scale. Two dimensions of Hirschi and Gottfredson’s conceptu-
alization of self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) were used in the
present study: impulsivity, the tendency to seek immediate gratification,
and thrill-seeking behavior, the tendency to seek adventure and kicks.
The items for the two scales were taken from the attitudinal self-control
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scale used by Grasmick et al. (Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, & Arneklev,
1993). Support for violent extremism was measured combining three
scales measuring support for religious and left-wing and right-wing
extremism. These items were originally used in a Dutch survey of atti-
tudes toward extremism conducted by Van den Bos, Loseman, and
Doosje (Van den Bos et al., 2009).
Certain strains may pressure individuals into political violence.
Perceived personal discrimination refers to the feeling that one is
discriminated against by other groups in society. Perceived group
discrimination refers to the feeling that the group to which the
respondent feels he/she belongs to is being discriminated against.
Perceived personal respect refers to whether or not an individual feels the
authorities treat him with respect and dignity. The items were taken
from the study by Bos, Loseman, and Doosje. To study the impact of
variables derived from procedural justice theory, the survey included
items that measure trust in police procedural justice and police legitimacy.
These scales have previously been used in the European Social Survey
(Hough et al., 2010) and have been additionally tested in a large-scale
student survey in Belgium (Van Damme & Pauwels, 2013). The
difference between police procedural justice and legitimacy is that the
justice variable corresponds to people’s overall picture of how citizens
are treated by the police. The variable legitimacy, on the other hand,
concentrates on the extent to which persons perceive the police as
legitimate. Perceived political powerlessness (or anomia) is derived from
Srole’s (1956) study of personal alienation. This scale has been
numerously used in the European social survey.
Finally the absence of strong social ties with different key institutions
in society are taken into account. Low social integration addresses the
accumulation of low social ties with key institutions. An overall scale
was constructed based on subscales that refer to attachment to parents,
parental monitoring, academic orientation, and school integration and
3 variables measuring household disadvantage, family structure, and
school performance. The original scales were used to create risk scores
(1= upper risk quartile) and these risk scores were then collapsed into a
general scale that measures the number of risk factors. The higher the
number of low scores on the indicators of low social ties, the higher the
score on this scale (indicating a high risk of low social integration).
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Risk scales
We grouped relevant independent variables in a series of risk end
scales, reflecting our integrated model. The same procedure was
followed as for the creation of the low social integration scale. The
original scales were used to create risk scores (1= upper risk quartile)
and these risk scores were then collapsed into a general scales that
measure the number of risk factors. Perceived discrimination was created
combining perceived personal discrimination, perceived group
discrimination, and perceived personal respect. The scales measure
general levels of perceived strain by focusing on the experience of
discrimination. Subjective alienation measures feelings of alienation of
society or not fitting in. It was created combining procedural justice,
overall legitimacy, and powerlessness. Propensity measures the level of
individual propensity to violent extremism. It contains both elements
of personal control as well as attitudes supporting violent extremism. It
was created combining impulsivity, thrill seeking behavior, and the
level of violence support (or attitudes toward violent extremism).
Exposure focusses on exposure to extremist content through NSM and
thus is the focus of our research. Overall NSM exposure combines a
measure of passive exposure with total active exposure. In order to get
a complete and nuanced image of the role and influence of exposure,
these measures are also incorporated separately into the analysis. Total
active exposure is created combining the variables active extremist
contact NSM and online communication extremism NSM. The latter
was dichotomized. Passive exposure was visually binned. Since our
focus is on NSM exposure, peers where not included.
8.2.4. Analysis
Both dependent variables are highly skewed. This means that most
respondents group around the low values of these scales. After all, the
majority of respondents have never committed an act of political
violence. This poses problems for analyzing the data, since regression
analysis demands a normal distributed dependent variable. So, these
variables are dichotomized and binary logistic regression is used to
gain insight into the independent effects of the available set of
independent variables (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).
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The emphasis is on the effects of different measures of ENSM on self-
reported political violence. A difference is drawn between more active
forms of exposure (extremist contact through NSM, online communica-
tion with extremists via NSM) and more passive forms of exposure
(exposure to extremism through NSM and exposure to extremism
through TM). Active exposure refers to actively and deliberately
seeking out certain information and communication. Passive exposure,
on the other hand, refers to accidental encounters with extremist
content while doing other things online. Distinguishing between these
types of exposure allows for studying the differential effect of ENSM.
According to social learning theory/differential association theory,
active forms of communications would have a stronger impact than
passive exposure. Sutherland previously argued that exposure that
develops through processes of communication should be more strongly
related to criminal behavior than exposure through traditional media.
First, we estimate the effect of a series of independent variables on the
likelihood of having committed political violence toward property/
persons versus not having committed political violence toward prop-
erty/persons. Scale variables have been standardized in order to facili-
tate the comparison of effects. The extent to which different ENSM are
related to toward political violence toward property/persons,
controlled for other risk factors, is assessed. For each dependent vari-
able, various logistic regression models are presented. Each regression
model shows the net effects of indicators of exposure to extremist
content on the dependent variables. These effects are presented inde-
pendent of a series of demographic background variables and low
social integration (model 1), independent of variables indicating strain
(model 2), independent of personal characteristics (model 3), and inde-
pendent of measures of peer deviance (model 4). Finally, all direct
effects are presented in model 5. This procedure was chosen to get an
insight into the strength of the association between measures of expo-
sure to violent extremism and self-reported political violence and to
identify potential mediators of this relationship.
Second, we grouped the relevant independent variables into a series of
risk scales reflecting our integrated model. (See also figure 9 and
Appendix 3 for the measurement of constructs.) By performing a
logistic regression using these risk scales for each dependent variable,
we were able to test the integrated model for the explanation of polit-
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ical violence. Given our research focus, our main attention lies with the
role and function of exposure and more specifically ENSM. In order to
fully assess the extent to which different ENSM are related to toward
political violence toward property/persons, the difference between
active and passive forms of exposure is maintained. A first series of
logistic regression models incorporated total active NSM exposure, on
the one hand, and passive NSM exposure, on the other. A second series
of logistic regression models assessed the influence of overall NSM
exposure on political violence. Third, the model was tested for the
interaction between propensity and (overall) NSM exposure.
Fourth, a series of path-models were analyzed using the statistical
program Mplus62. Path analysis describes the directed dependencies
among a set of variables. This allows us to test for the sequence of
constructs in our integrated model and compare the best statistical fit
with the theoretical model.
8.3. Results
8.3.1. Descriptive
The different scales are constructed on a metrical level. In order to
make the descriptive analysis more comprehensive, these scales are
brought back to a categorical level, using the original (item) categories
as offered to the respondents in the questionnaire63. An overview and
bar charts can be found in Appendix 4, and crosstabs in Appendix 5.
8.3.1.1. Dependent variables
Concerning political violence toward property, almost all respondents
(96.7%) reported never to have committed any act of political violence
toward property. 2.7% reported to have done this 1 to 6 times (over
different delict items) and 0.3% between 7 and 18 times. Only 0.1%
reported more than 18 acts of political violence toward property. 0.1% is
equivalent to 8 respondents out of 4459 respondents who answered the
question. Concerning political violence toward persons, we see the same
pattern. 96.9% reported never to have committed an act of political
62 Although the other analysis were conducted using SPSS, the execution of a path analysis on a
dichotomous dependent variable is not possible using SPSS. Therefore, M-plus was used.
63 [ X*MEAN (y1, y2, y3, …)]/X
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violence toward persons, 2.2% 1 six times, 0.7% 7 to 18 times, and only
0.2% more than 18 times. This is equivalent to 11 respondents out of
4457 respondents who answered the question. (This means that only 11
respondents indicated on all six items of political violence toward
property to have done this more than 3 times).
For overall political violence, 97.6% of the respondents reported never to
have committed any act of political violence. 1.8% of the respondents
confessed to have committed an act of political violence 1 to 6 times.
Only 0.4% 7 to 18 times, and only 0.2% more than 18 times.
When the individual delict items used to construct the scale are looked
at more closely, the following results can be noted. The large majority of
respondents had never committed any of the individual delict items
(95% or more for all delict items). The most popular delicts item within
political violence toward property are participation in a forbidden
action and vandalism. 5.1% of the respondents indicated to have
participated in a forbidden political action and 5% reported to have
vandalized something. The scores on the other delict items measuring
political violence toward property were relatively low. Only 1.6% had
thrown stones at the police, 1.9% reported to have destroyed
something, 1.7% admitted to have damaged someone’s property, and
1.2% indicated to have set something on fire. Concerning political
violence toward property, the most popular delict item is fighting with
somebody over political beliefs. 4% admitted to have been involved at
least once in a fight with somebody because of political reasons.
Threatening somebody in the streets (1.4%) and hitting a racist because
of political beliefs (1.4%) scored the lowest. 3.1% of the respondents
reported to have threatened somebody on the internet because of
political beliefs. 3.7% of the respondents admitted to have hit a
capitalist because of political beliefs, and 3.2% stated the same for
hitting a foreigner. The results can be found in table 4.
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8.3.1.2. Individual scales
Independent variables measuring ENSM
For activist extremist contact NSM, a relatively large number (7.1%) of
the respondents indicated to have sought contact with extremists using
NSM, compared to 92.9% who reported never to have done this.
Regarding online communication extremism NSM, 96.2% stated never to
have taken part in online discussions on extremist forums or websites.
This left only a small minority that had taken part in these activities.
2.5% reported to do this less than once a month, 0.8% indicated to do
this at least once a month, and 0.3% supposedly does this less than once
a week. Only 0.1% reported to go online to participate on extremist at
least once a week and 0.1% indicated to do this every day. Concerning
passive exposure to extremism NSM, 49.3% stated never to have been
exposed to extremist content through NSM. 25.1% reported to have
encountered extremist content through NSM less than once a month,
13.3% at least once a month, and 7.5% less than once a week. However,
3.3% stated to have been confronted with violent extremism using NSM
at least once a week and 1.6% even stated that this happens every day.
Surprisingly, we see similar numbers for exposure to extremism using
traditional media: 50.6% reported never to have encountered extremist
content using traditional media, 21.3% less than once almost, 12.2% at
Table 4: Self-reported political violence
PV property
Never
% (N)
Ever
% (N)
Once
% (N)
2–3 times
% (N)
+ 3 times
% (N)
vandalized anything… 95 (4204) 5 (219) 2.6 (114) 1.3 (58) 1.1 (47)
participated in a forbidden political 
action
94.9 (4215) 5.1 (228) 2.6 (115) 1.3 (57) 1.3 (57)
thrown stones at the police 98.4 (4372) 1.6 (70) 1.0 (44) 0.3 (12) 0.3 (14)
destroyed something on the streets 98.1 (4346) 1.9 (82) 1.1 (48) 0.3 (12) 0.5 (22)
damaged someone’s property 98.3 (4341) 1.7 (76) 0.8 (36) 0.6 (26) 0.3 (14)
set something on fire 98.8 (4372) 1.2 (55) 0.6 (26) 0.2 (11) 0.4 (18)
PV persons
fought with someone 96.0 (4257) 4.0 (176) 2.6 (114) 0.8 (36) 0.6 (26)
threatened someone on the internet 96.9 (4302) 3.1 (138) 1.8 (82) 0.6 (26) 0.7 (30)
threatened someone in the streets 98.1 (4338) 1.4 (85) 1.1 (49) 0.3 (14) 0.5 (22)
hit a foreigner 96.8 (4303) 3.2 (142) 1.8 (81) 0.7 (29) 0.7 (32)
hit a capitalist 96.3 (4280) 3.7 (165) 2.2 (97) 0.7 (29) 0.9 (39)
hit a racist 98.6 (4373) 1.4 (63) 0.7 (29) 0.4 (16) 0.4 (18)
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least once a month, 8.2% less than once a week, 5.6% at least once a
week, and 2.2% every day.
Independent variables measuring possible strains
When asked about police procedural justice, a large proportion of
respondents had strong (26%) to very strong (1.9%) feelings of
procedural justice. Still, 16.6% of the respondents had only weak
feelings of procedural justice. For 2.4%, these feelings were even very
week. The majority of respondents (53.1%) stated to perceive the police
neither as just nor as unjust. Regarding the perception of being treated
with respect the majority (47.2%) of respondents had strong perceptions
of personal respect in daily treatment by the police. For 26%, these
perceptions were very strong. Only 5.9% had weak to very weak
perceptions of personal respect and 21% had neutral feelings.
Regarding police legitimacy, 37.5% of the respondents strongly perceived
the police as being legitimate. For 2.8%, these perceptions were very
strong. Only 10.3% had weak to very weak perceptions of legitimacy
concerning the police. 19.4% of the respondents perceived the police as
neither legitimate nor illegitimate. For perceived personal discrimination,
74% did not perceive themselves as being discriminated against. Still
7.4% of the respondents perceived themselves as being discriminated
against. 19.6% did not express an opinion. A similar pattern emerges
for perceived group discrimination. 75.2% of the respondents did not feel
their own group as being discriminated, compared to 8.8% that did.
15.9% did not agree nor disagree. Lastly, a similar proportion of
respondents report strong (22.1%) to very strong (6.6%) compared with
low (23.7%) and very low (4.9%) feelings of perceived political
powerlessness. 42.8% remained undecided.
Independent variables measuring personal characteristics (extremist 
propensity)
On the questions measuring thrill seeking behavior, 10.8% could be
described as having a moderate risk taking personality and 1.5% as
highly risk taking personality. On the contrary, the majority scored low
(38.5%) to very low (17.4%) on the risk taking scale. 31.7% remains
undecided. About impulsivity, we see that 23.8% classified as impulsive,
3.1% as very impulsive, 24.5% as not very impulsive, and 1.5% as not
impulsive at all. 47.1% remained undecided. Measuring religious
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authoritarianism, we see a fairly skewed distribution. The majority of the
respondents scored very low (38.9%) to low (38.6%), compared to only
3.4% that scored high and 0.7% that scored very high. 18.4% remained
undecided. The majority of respondents strongly disagreed with violent
extremism (57.1%), 24.7% disagreed, only 1.8% agreed, and 0.6%
strongly agreed. 15.8% of the respondents took a neutral stance.
Independent variables measuring peer influences and low social 
integration
17.9% of the respondents indicated to have no racist friends, compared
to 53.8% indicating to have some racist friends; 26.0% had mostly racist
friends and 2.3% stated to have only racist friends. Regarding peer
delinquency, a large majority (80%) of the respondents indicated to have
no delinquent peers. Still 19.4% reported to have some delinquent
peers. Only 0.5% stated to have mostly delinquent peers and 0.1%
indicated to have only delinquent peers. 24.4% of the respondents
proved only to be of negligible risk to low social integration. 50.8% was
at low risk of low social integration, while 13.8% proved to be at normal
or general risk. 10.4% was at high risk of low social integration. Only
0.6% of all the respondents qualified as at very high risk of low social
integration.
8.3.1.3. Risk scales
Causes of the causes
For poor social integration, we see that 24.4% of the respondents proved
only to be of negligible risk to low social integration. 50.8% were at low
risk of low social integration, while 13.8% proved to be at normal or
general risk. 10.4% were at high risk of low social integration. Only
0.6% of all the respondents qualified as at very high risk of low social
integration. Concerning perceived discrimination, we see that 56.5% of the
respondents were at very low risk of feeling discriminated. 20.3% were
at low risk, whereas 10.5% were at risk and no less than 12.7% were at
high risk of feeling discriminated against. Measuring feelings of
alienation from society, we find that the majority of the respondents
were of very low (42%) to low (23%) risk of feeling alienated. Still,
13.2% were of high risk and 4.5% even at very high risk of feeling
alienated.
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Propensity
Assessing individual propensity to violent extremism, we see that half
(52.2%) of the respondents were at (almost) no risk at developing a
propensity toward violent extremism. As the risk increases, the number
of individuals at risk decreases. Only 3% displayed a high (risk of)
propensity toward violent extremism.
Exposure
Looking at total active exposure, we see that a large majority of
respondents were only at low risk of actively seeking out extremist
content through NSM. 11.1% were at medium risk and only 1.1% were
at high risk. For passive exposure, we see a different picture with only
40.4% of the respondent being at risk of passively being exposed to
extremist content while using NSM for other purposes. 28.2% were of
medium risk and no less than 31.4% is at high risk. Combining the two
(passive and active ENSM), we see that for overall exposure, the majority
(37.4%) were at very low risk of being ENSM, while only 0.7% were at
very high risk.
8.3.1.4. Cross tabs
The following section tries to answer a few descriptive questions, using
cross tabs. The numbers and tables that these conclusions are based on
can be found in Appendix 5. Because political violence is the dependent
variable, in this case, the column percentages provide the most relevant
information. It is after all political violence that is possibly being
influence by the other variables64.
Political violence and native background
If we look at native background and violent extremism, we see that
only 12.1% of all respondents of foreign origin indicated to have been
involved in political violence toward property and 14, 2% in political
violence toward persons. However, this is still twice as much compared
to the respondents of Belgian origin. For these respondents only 8.6%
stated to have been involved in political violence toward property and
64 Nevertheless, we also comment on the row percentages in footnote. They can be intuitively
interesting and can help us to nuance certain results.
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only 6.7% in political violence against persons65. These results can be
found in table 5.
Political violence and the use of NSM for extremist discussions
This cross tab shows that 32.9% of the respondents that used NSM for
extremist discussions reported to already have used political violence
toward property, compared to 7.7% of the non-users. For political
violence toward persons, these numbers are similar; 25. 4% for NSM
users and 7.2% for non-users. Results are listed in table 6.
Political violence and gender
About twice as much boys (14.4% of all the boys in the dada set) as girls
(6.8% of all the girls in the dataset) reported to have already committed
65 However, of all the acts of political violence, the majority was reported by Belgians. In case of
political violence toward persons, 69.5% were Belgians and in case of political violence toward
property, 60.2% were Belgian.
Table 5: Political violence according to native background
Native background
other Belgian
PV property Not reported 87.9% (931) 91.4% (3107)
Reported 12.1% (128) 8.6% (291)
Total 100.0% (1059) 100.0% (3398)
PV persons Not reported 85.8% (907) 93.3% (3171)
Reported 14.2% (150) 6.7% (227)
Total 100.0% (1057) 100.0% (3398)
Pv property: chi: 11.765, df.: 1, sig. .001; Pv persons chi: 58,711, df.:1, sig: .000
Table 6: Political violence according to extremist use of NSM
Extremist use NSM
no yes
PV property Not reported 92.3% (3830) 67.1% (198)
Reported 7.7% (321) 32.9% (198)
Total 100.0% (4151) 100.0% (295)
PV persons Not reported 92.8% (3849) 74.6% (220)
Reported 7.2% (300) 24.4% (75)
Total 100.0% (4149) 100.0% (295)
Pv property: chi. 204.501, df. 1, sig. .000; Pv persons: chi: 117,987, df. 1, sig: .000
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political violence toward property. For political violence toward
persons, these numbers are respectively 15.3% (boys) and 4.9% (girls)66.
Results are shown in table 7.
Political violence and the importance of religion
For political violence against property, we see that 15.1% of the
respondents that find religion very important reported this behavior.
For medium and low importance of religion, this number decreased to
respectively 9.9% and 8.4%. For political violence against persons, the
numbers lie even further apart with 21.2% for those that find religion
very important and, respectively, 8.6% and 6.6% for those that find
religion medium to low important. Here, we have to point out that the
distribution looks different when we take the total number of offenses
into account67. These numbers can be found in table 8.
66 If we compare this with the total number of political violence against persons, we see that
indeed ¾ is committed by boys, or 61, 9%. However, political violence against property shows
a different image. Boys and girls are equally guilty; about half of the offenses were reported by
boys (52.4%) and the other half by girls (47.6%).
Table 7: Political violence according to gender
Gender
Boy Girl
PV property Not reported 85.6% (1299) 93.2% (2729)
Reported 14.4% (219) 6.8% (199)
Total 100.0% (1518) 100.0% (2928)
PV persons Not reported 84.7% (1285) 95.1% (2784)
Reported 15.3% (232) 4.9% (143)
Total 100.0% (1517) 100.0% (2927)
Pv property: chi: 68.335, df: 1, sig. .000; Pv persons: chi: 140, 081, df: 1, sig: .000
67 For political violence against property only, 13.8% of all offenses were committed by the
strongly religious, compared to 29.8% for medium religious and 56.3% for non-religious
respondents. For political violence against persons, we see similar numbers.
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Political violence and age
Concerning political violence against property, we see that 10.4% off all
18 year olds reported to be guilty of this offense, compared with 8.5%
off all 19–22 year olds and 11% of all +22 year olds. For political
violence against persons, these numbers are, respectively, 12.7%, 7.2%,
and 5.6%. These numbers can be found in table 9.
8.3.2. Bivariate correlations
Bivariate correlations can give us an idea of the (non-explanatory)
association between political violence and the independent variables.
Although they do not indicate causal relationship, they can give an idea
of what to look for and what to expect. The compete correlation
matrixes can be found in Appendix 8.
Table 8: Political violence according to the importance of religion
Importance of religion
not average very
PV property Not reported 91.6% (2566) 90.1% (1139) 84.9% (325)
Reported 8.4% (236) 9.9% (125) 15.1% (58)
Total 100.0% (2802) 100.0% (1264) 100.0% (383)
PV persons Not reported 93.4% (2616) 91.4% (1155) 78.8% (301)
Reported 6.6% (186) 8.6% (108) 21.2% (81)
Total 100.0% (2802) 100.0% (1263) 100.0% (382
Pv property: chi: 18,302, df: 2, sig: .000; Pv persons: chi: 92,404, df: 2, sig: .000
Table 9: Political violence according to age
Age
<18 years 19–22 years >22 years
PV property Not reported 89.6% (1069) 91.5% (2372) 89.0% (585)
Reported 10.4% (124) 8.5% (220) 11.0% (72)
Total 100.0% (1193) 100.0% (2592) 100.0% (657)
PV persons Not reported 87.3% (1040) 92.8% (2406) 94.4% (620)
Reported 12.7% (151) 7.2% (186) 5.6% (37)
Total 100.0% (1191) 100.0% (2592) 100.0% (657)
Pv property: chi: 5,805, df: 2, sig: .055; Pv persons: chi: 39,821, df:2, sig: .000
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Table 10 gives an overview of the correlations between political
violence and the different measures of exposure. These results seem to
indicate already a difference in the influence of accidental exposure to
extremist content using NSM (passive exposure) and deliberately
looking up certain information (active exposure). Compared with
passive exposure, the correlation between this last category and polit-
ical violence, both toward persons and property, is much stronger. This
indicates that active exposure is more important (or influential) in the
explanation of political violence than passive exposure. Furthermore,
there seems not to be a big difference in passive exposure coming from
TM or NSM.
Table 11 gives an overview of the correlations between political
violence and the independent variables measuring strain, personal
characteristics, poor social integration, and peer influences. The
strongest correlations (>0.2) can be found for peer delinquency and
extremist attitudes. The strong correlations between political violence
and peer delinquency compared with other variables indicate that
especially the presence of a delinquent peer group will be of impor-
tance in explaining both political violence toward property and toward
persons. Extremist attitudes especially correlate strongly with political
violence toward persons. Also, perceived discrimination and person-
ality characteristics seem to correlate more strongly with political
violence toward persons compared with that toward property.
Table 10: Correlation matrix of political violence and exposure
Political violence 
property
Political violence 
persons
Active searching contact 0.171** 0.150**
Online communication 0.421** 0.405**
Passive exposure NSM 0.157** 0.142**
Passive exposure TM 0.76** 0.045**
** significant at 0.01 level *significant at 0.05 level
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8.3.3. Regression analysis
Since both dependent variables are highly skewed, these variables are
dichotomized and binary logistic regression is used to get an insight
into the independent effects of the independent variables (Lemeshow &
Hosmer, 2000). These independent effects are presented as the net odds
ratios (Exp B)68.
8.3.3.1. Effects of active and passive exposure through NSM 
controlled for other risk factors
First, we estimate the effect of a series of independent variables in the
likelihood of having committed political violence versus not having
Table 11: Correlation matrix of political violence and independent variables
Political violence 
property
Political violence 
persons
Perceived procedural justice -0.124** -0.123**
Overall police legitimacy -0.166** -0.158**
Perceived personal respect -0.116** -0.124**
Perceived personal discrimination 0.144** 0.184**
Perceived group discrimination 0.161** 0.180**
Perceived powerlessness 0.036* 0.111**
Poor social integration 0.139** 0.157**
Thrill seeking 0.164** 0.164**
Impulsivity 0.122** 0.194**
Religious authoritarianism 0.109** 0.173**
Support for violent extremism 0.195** 0.247**
Racist friends 0.133** 0.189**
Delinquent friends 0.307** 0.311**
** significant at 0.01 level *significant at 0.05 level
68 Odds ratios (Exp (B)) mirror the chance (or odds) that an individual scores positive on the
dependent variable.
For categorical independent variables, they indicate the odds of political violence between a
certain comparison category (coded 1) of the independent variable and a reference category
(coded 0). An individual in the comparison category has x times more likelihood of committing
political violence then an individual in the reference category. For metric variables, the odds
ratio indicates the x rise in odds of political violence when the independent variable rises with
1 unit. An odds ratio >1 indicates positive effects (a rise in odds), while an odds ratio <1 indi-
cates a negative effect (decline in odds). Odds ratios can be made easier to interpret by convert-
ing them to % using the following formula: [(Exp(B)-1] × 100%. For example: an individual
attending a religious service once a year has 1.030 times, or 3%, more likelihood of committing
political violence compared with an individual never attending religious service.
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committed political violence. Various logistic regression models are
presented, showing the net effects of indicators of NSM exposure, inde-
pendent of demographic background variables and low social integra-
tion (model 1), variables indicating strain (model 2), personal character-
istics (model 3), and measures of peer deviance (model 4). Model 5
presents all direct effects. The full results can be found in Appendix 6
and are elaborated upon in Schils and Pauwels (2014). For now, we only
present the results of model 5. The results for political violence toward
property and that toward persons are shown in table 12.
Table 12: Binary logistic regression analysis of political violence on ENSM controlling 
for other risk factors
Political violence 
toward property
Political violence 
toward persons
Model 5 Exp (B) Model 5 Exp (B)
Active extremist contact NSM (ref:no)
Yes 1.947*** 1.306
Online communication extremism NSM (ref: no)
Yes 3.061*** 1.911**
Exposure extremism NSM (ref: low)
Medium
High
1.109
1.431***
1.455*
2.102***
Exposure extremism TM (ref: low)
Medium
High
1.219
1.335
0.961
0.759
Native background (ref: other)
Belgian 0.965 0.611**
Gender (ref: women)
men 1.476** 2.746***
Age (ref: –18)
19–22
22+
1.348*
1.930**
0.899
0.751
Attending religious service (ref: never)
1x year
2x year
1x month
1x a weak
1.030
1.119
1.243
0.820
1.123
1.067
1.139
0.720
Importance of religion 1.098 1.224*
Low social integration 1.091 1.236**
Police procedural justice 0.892 0.918
Perceived personal discrimination 0.915 1.121
Perceived group discrimination 1.304** 1.031
Overall police legitimacy 0.953 0.846*
Support for violent extremism 1.108 1.080
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Concerning political violence toward property, significant direct
effects were still found for active extremist contact NSM (OR: 1.95), online
communication extremism NSM (OR: 3.06), and exposure extremism NSM
(OR high: 1.43). Of all statistical control variables, only gender (OR:
1.47) and age (OR oldest group: 1.93) remain significant. Furthermore,
perceived group discrimination (OR: 1.30), thrill-seeking behavior (OR:
1.26) and peer delinquency (OR: 1.47) are significantly related to self-
reported political violence toward property. Nagelkerke R-square
reaches a value of 21.7%. The results of these analyses should be inter-
preted with care as these are mere regression coefficients that do not
demonstrate causality, yet it is striking how strong the association
between ENSM and self-reported political violence toward property is.
Even when controlling for important background variables, variables
indicating strain and even personality characteristics such as impul-
sivity and thrill-seeking behavior as well as attitudes such as authori-
tarianism and support for violent extremism and peer influences, the
statistical association remains statistically significant and fairly
constant. It should further be noted that the strongest effect comes from
the variable measuring the active use of NSM for radical purposes (A-
ENSM)69. For the more passive measures of ENSM (P-ENSM), only the
Religious authoritarianism 0.980 1.073
Thrill seeking behavior 1.264** 0.978
Impulsivity 1.128 1.847***
Peer racism 0.968 1.193**
Peer delinquency 1.477*** 1.325***
PCP 91.2% 92.2%
-2ll 2054.676 1742.396
Nagelkerke R² 0.217 0.304
*** significant at 0.00 level ** significant at 0.01 level *significant at 0.05 level
Reference category = Low/0
69 A-ENSM refers to the measures of exposure through NSM that are more active in nature: active
extremist contact NSM and online communication extremist NSM. P-ENSM refers to the meas-
ure of exposure through NSM that are more passive in nature: Exposure extremism NSM.
Table 12: Binary logistic regression analysis of political violence on ENSM controlling 
for other risk factors (continued)
Political violence 
toward property
Political violence 
toward persons
Model 5 Exp (B) Model 5 Exp (B)
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highest category of exposure extremism NSM remains significant.
Surprisingly, support for violent extremism shows no significant effect.
Concerning political violence toward persons, online communication
extremism NSM (OR: 1.91) and exposure extremism NSM (OR medium:
1.46; OR high: 2.10) still show significant positive effects. Of all the
statistical control variables, native background (OR: 0.61), gender (OR:
2.75), and importance of religion (OR: 1.22) have a significant statistical
effect on self-reported political violence toward persons. Also, low
social integration still has a direct significant effect (OR: 1.24). Of the
variables indicating strain, only overall police legitimacy (OR: 0.85)
seems to be significantly related to the independent variable. Finally,
the same can be said of impulsivity (OR: 1.85), peer racism (OR: 1.19),
and peer delinquency (OR: 1.33). Similar to the analysis of political
violence toward property, a strong association between ENSM and
political violence toward persons remains present even after
controlling for background variables, variables indicating strain, peer
delinquency, and personality characteristics. However, it can be noted
that contrary to the previous analysis, the effect of A-ENSM seems to
decrease when controlling for all the other variables in the model, while
the effects of P-ENSM remain constant. In this final model, support for
violent extremism has no significant effect. Nagelkerke R² is 30%.
In sum, the following should be remembered from these results. First,
we clearly see that different measures of exposure to violent extremism
through NSM are related to political violence. The relationship between
these measures and political violence is strong and continuous to exist
even when controlling for measures derived from rival theoretical
explanations. This is true for both active measure of exposure as well as
passive measures of exposure. However, it appears that active meas-
ures of NSM exposure (especially online extremist communication) are
more consistently related to political violence than the more passive
modality of exposure. In other words, passive ENSM cannot be disre-
garded when explaining political violence but the strongest and most
influential effects can be expected from active ENSM, especially when
actively and deliberately engaging in direct communication with other
extremist using NSM. Second, offline associations with peers with
racist attitudes and delinquent peers are also strongly related to polit-
ical violence, implying that we must not forget that harmful and influ-
ential exposure does not come from NSM and the internet only. Other
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offline sources of exposure, such as peers, are of extreme importance as
well. Third, the offline world and individual experiences in it stay
important in providing relevant strains, facilitating radicalization into
violent extremism. In other words, it is likely that the causes of the
causes are still located in the real world. Finally, the individual and the
presence of certain characteristics must be taken into account when
assessing the influence of ENSM. Both have an effect on political
violence, suggesting a possible interaction. This is in line with SAT that
states that interaction between propensity and exposure will determine
the perception choice process explaining action.
8.3.3.2. Effects of propensity and exposure through NSM controlled 
for the causes of the causes
For the analysis of the risk scales, in order to test the influence of the
individual elements of the integrated model70 explaining political
violence, we relied on logistic regression.
First, a logistic analysis was conducted with poor social integration,
perceived discrimination, subjective alienation, propensity, and total
active NSM exposure and passive NSM exposure as two separate inde-
pendent variables. The results can be found in table 13. For political
violence toward persons, we see positive direct effects of all risk scales,
both the ones measuring emergence (OR poor social integration: 1.36;
OR perceived discrimination: 1.34; OR subjective alienation), propen-
sity (OR: 1.5), and exposure (OR medium passive exposure: 1.46, OR
high passive exposure: 1.98, OR medium total active exposure: 1.37, OR
high total active exposure: 4.15). This indicates that the chance of being
involved in political violence toward persons rises as higher levels of
ENSM are experienced. This is true for passive exposure and even more
so for active exposure. Roughly the same results can be found for polit-
ical violence toward property. All risk scales have positive significant
effects on political violence toward property (OR poor social integra-
tion: 1.20; OR subjective alienation: 1.19; OR propensity: 1.34, OR
medium passive exposure: 1.83; OR medium total active exposure: 2.71;
OR high total active exposure 6.29) expect for perceived discrimination
and the medium measurement of passive exposure. This indicates that
70 As can be seen in figure 9, we included propensity and different measures of NSM exposure as
elements of exposure and poor social integration, subjective alienation, and perceived discrim-
ination as elements of emergence.
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individuals who experience medium levels of passive exposure to
extremist content through NSM are no more at risk of political violence
against property than individuals that only experience low levels of
ENSM.
However, what should be remembered is that the influence of total
active NSM exposure is far more important in the explanation of polit-
ical violence than the effect of passive NSM exposure. The OR for the
highest measure of total active exposure is twice as big as the OR for
the highest measure of passive exposure for political violence toward
persons and even three times as big for political violence toward prop-
erty. For example, individuals experiencing high levels of total active
exposure have 6.29 times more change of committing political violence
toward property than individuals only experiencing low levels of total
active exposure. For high levels of passive exposure, this is only 4.15
times more likely than individuals experiencing only low levels of
passive exposure. The strong effect of active exposure also implies the
importance of individual propensity. (In order to actively search for
information, one has to be interested in the subject; or in other words,
have a propensity toward the subject.) This in line with previous
research we discussed earlier: 1) on NSM and political participation
that suggest that youth actively use NSM as a tool to pursue their polit-
ical interests71 and 2) on media and violent behavior and attitudes that
suggest that the effect of (passive) exposure to violent media content
has only small and marginal effects on behavior and attitudes and that
these effects are most likely dependent on individual factors72.
71 See paragraph 2.
72 See paragraph 4.
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Second, the effect of poor social integration, perceived discrimination,
subjective alienation, propensity, and overall NSM exposure (combin-
ing total active NSM exposure and passive NSM exposure) on political
violence was assessed, again using a logistic analysis. The results can be
found in table 14. We see similar results as for the previous analysis.
For political violence toward persons, this means positive direct effects
of poor social integration (OR: 1.36), perceived discrimination (OR:
1.14), propensity (OR: 1.50), and exposure (OR medium overall expo-
sure: 2.04; OR high overall exposure 2.6; OR very high overall exposure:
7.52). For political violence toward property, this means direct positive
effects of poor social integration (OR: 1.22), subjective alienation (OR:
1.21), propensity (OR: 1.36), and exposure (OR medium overall expo-
sure: 1.81; OR high overall exposure: 4.59; OR: very high overall expo-
sure: 13.16).
What is noticeable here is that the effects of overall exposure remain
more or less constant over different levels of overall exposure but rise
exponentially for the highest measurement of overall exposure. Where
the odds ratio for individuals experiencing high levels of overall
exposure is only 2.60 for political violence toward persons, this
Table 13: Binary logistic regression analysis of political violence on active/passive 
ENSM controlling for causes of the causes
Political violence 
toward persons
Political violence 
toward property
Exp (B) Exp (B)
Poor social integration 1.361*** 1.204**
Perceived discrimination 1.136* 1.108 NS
Subjective alienation 1.334*** 1.193
Propensity 1.497*** 1.343***
Passive exposure low Ref Ref
Passive exposure medium 1.462* 1.230 NS
Passive exposure high 1.976*** 1.832***
Total active exposure low Ref Ref
Total active exposure medium 1.365* 2.714***
Total active exposure high 4.146*** 6.293***
PCP 92.2% 91.1%
-2ll 2000.012 2341.141
Nagelkerke R² 0.257 0.169
*** significant at 0.00 level ** significant at 0.01 level *significant at 0.05 level
Reference category = Low/0
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becomes 7.52 for individuals experiencing very high levels of overall
exposure. For political violence toward property, the odds ratios are
even further apart, with 4.6 for individuals experiencing high levels of
overall exposure and 13.16 for individuals experiencing very high
levels of overall exposure. Furthermore, there are only very low rates
for the lower and medium levels of overall exposure, the OR for low
level of overall exposure not even being significant. These results offer
new insights compared with those provided by previously discussed
research on media and violent behavior and attitudes73. Those studies
do not address the level of exposure, but instead suggest a linear effect.
Our results show that this is not the case and that the influence of
media exposure is, on the contrary, exponential.
73 See chapter 4.
Table 14: Binary logistic regression analysis of political violence on overall ENSM 
controlling for causes of the causes
Political violence 
toward persons
Political violence 
toward property
Exp (B) Exp (B)
Poor social integration 1.360*** 1.216***
Perceived discrimination 1.137* 1.107
Subjective alienation 1.336*** 1.207**
Propensity 1.500*** 1.355***
Overall exposure very low Ref Ref
Overall exposure low 1.310 NS 1.181 NS
Overall exposure medium 2.037*** 1.814***
Overall exposure high 2.597*** 4.594***
Overall exposure very high 7.519*** 13.162***
PCP 92.0 91.0
-2ll 2001.752 2347.732
Nagelkerke R² 0.256 0.166
*** significant at 0.00 level ** significant at 0.01 level *significant at 0.05 level
Reference category = Low/0
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8.3.4. Testing for the interaction between propensity and 
exposure to extremist content
Next, the model was tested for the interaction between the individual
and the environment. In other words, the model was tested for the core
assumption of SAT, that is, exposure (to extremist settings) and propen-
sity (to violent extremism) are the direct causes of action and that their
interaction sets the main explanatory mechanism (perception–choice
process) in motion. The existence of this interaction was already indi-
cated in the previous analysis. An OLS regression was performed with
overall political violence as the independent variable and extremist
propensity, total active exposure, and their interaction as the inde-
pendent variables. In order to study the interaction effects, the inde-
pendent variables are standardized to minimalize problems of multicol-
linearity (Aiken & West, 1991). Table 15 shows the results for the full
dataset. The interaction between propensity and exposure for subgroups
on gender and native background can be found in Appendix 7.
From this table, we see that 13% of the variance in overall political
violence is explained by both independent variables and the interaction
effect. Furthermore, both total active exposure (Beta = 0.132) and
propensity (Beta = 0.120) have significant independent positive effects
on overall political violence. These effects are more or less the same in
size. This means that both a higher propensity and a higher active
exposure will independently lead to higher rates of overall political
violence. More importantly, the interaction term also appears to have a
significant, rather strong, and positive effect on overall political
violence (Beta =0.243). This means that the positive effect of active
ENSM will rise (with a factor of 0.243) if propensity rises with 1
(standardized) unit. In other words, the effects of active exposure on
overall political violence will be stronger for individuals with a high
Table 15: OLS regression analysis. The interaction between propensity and exposure
B Beta SE
Exposure to extremist moral settings (total active 
exposure)
0.323 0.132*** 0.042
Propensity to extremism 0.355 0.120*** 0.042
Interaction term 0.428 0.243*** 0.030
R²*100 13.7***
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001
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extremist propensity. If we compare the standardized coefficients74
(Beta) for the interaction term and propensity and exposure, it can be
concluded that the interaction between propensity and exposure has
twice as much effect on overall political violence as either exposure or
propensity independently. The interaction effect is unaffected for
demographic background variables (see Appendix 7).
These results can also be seen on the accompanying regression lines
that are shown in figure 10. In this figure, we can clearly see the inde-
pendent effects of both extremist propensity75 and total active expo-
sure76 on overall political violence but also the interaction between
both77. Figure 11 presents a more intuitive visualization that shows the
observed values (group/category means) for extremist propensity and
total active exposure plotted against each other on overall political
violence78. From this figure, we can make a fourth observation, namely,
the effect of active ENSM seems to be exponential at the end. This
means that active exposure remains unproblematic (indicating low
corresponding measures of overall political violence) until a certain
point in time, even for those with a high propensity for violent
extremism. After this breakpoint, the effect of (active) ENSM rises
exponentially for medium and high propensity. For low or no propen-
sity, the effect becomes negative. This also confirms our previous
analysis.
74 Standardized coefficients or beta coefficients are the estimates resulting from an analysis car-
ried out on independent variables that have been standardized so that their variances are 1.
Therefore, standardized coefficients refer to how many standard deviations a dependent vari-
able (political violence) will change per standard deviation increase in the predictor variable
(e.g., propensity). Standardization of the coefficient is also done to answer the question of
which of the independent variables have greater effect. This is not possible using the unstand-
ardized coefficients, whose interpretation relies on the unit of measurement of the independent
variable.
75 High measures of propensity (orange line) score much higher overall political violence than
medium (blue) and low (green) measures of propensity, independently of total active exposure.
76 Higher measures of total active exposure mean higher levels of overall political violence for all
measures of propensity; low, medium, and high. All lines, orange, blue, and green, rise
77 The higher the level of exposure, the stronger the effects of total active exposure on overall
political violence. The orange line rises much more steeply than the green or blue line.
78 The image for the interaction between overall exposure and propensity and passive exposure
and propensity can be found in Appendix 7. These figures show the same general interaction
effect between propensity and exposure.
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Figure 10: Regression lines for the interaction between propensity and exposure on 
overall political violence for the total dataset
Figure 11: Interaction between propensity and exposure (group/category means)
exposure.social.media.book  Page 143  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
144
The key findings from these results are the following:
a. Propensity has a direct positive effect on political violence, inde-
pendent of total active exposure. This means that individuals with
a high propensity toward violent extremism have a higher chance
of committing political violence, independent of the level of extre-
mist exposure. This is in line with the previous analysis.
b. Total active exposure has a direct positive effect on political vio-
lence, independent of propensity. In other words, individuals that
experience a higher level of (total active) exposure to extremist
content through NSM have a higher chance of committing political
violence, independent of propensity. This means that everybody
experiences an effect of ENSM, whether or not this person has a
high propensity toward political violence. This is also in line with
our previous analysis.
c. We also see a clear interaction effect between propensity and total
active exposure. This means that the effect of (total active) ENSM is
much stronger for individuals with a high propensity for violent
extremism. This confirms the core assumption of SAT.
d. Finally, the figure clearly shows the effect of (total active) exposure
to be exponential at the end, meaning that high levels of active
exposure have a much stronger effect on overall political violence
relative to the fairly low and stable effects of medium and low
active exposure.
It is important to note that the observed interaction between extremist
propensity and (active) ENSM remains in place for subgroups by
gender and native background. This is elaborated upon by Schils,
Dewaele and Pauwels (forthcoming). The results of this analysis can be
found in Appendix 7.
8.3.5. The integrated model
Finally, the model as a whole was tested using structural equation
modeling (SEM) or path analysis. SEM offers the opportunity to
explore the extent to which a specific theoretical model can explain the
relations between the observed variables. The previous analysis
showed both the 1) influence and interaction of propensity and expo-
sure and 2) the importance of the offline world (emergence). Because
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these analyses only show the direct effects of all these elements on
political violence, it is not clear in which order they must be placed.
Does the sequence of influences follow the integrated model or not? In
order to verify this, a series of path models was executed using the
statistical program Mplus. Mplus was used for the following reasons.
First, a path analysis allows to simultaneously test for multiple inde-
pendent variables with different measurement levels. This makes it
possible to simultaneously determine which variables directly affect
political violence (dichotomous) and extremist propensity and NSM
exposure (metrical) and thus determine the direct causes and the
causes of the causes. Second, the statistical program SPSS used for the
other analyses does not allow for path models with a dichotomous
independent variable.
The integrated model specifies a number of routes leading to political
violence, which are tested using path analysis. Therefore, the integrated
model also forms the testable model, as can be seen in figure 12. The
basic idea is to gain an insight into the magnitude of the direct effects of
all exogenous variables on all endogenous variables. The exogenous
variables are low social integration and perceived discrimination.
Subjective alienation, propensity, overall exposure, and political
violence are treated as endogenous variables. Political violence is the
ultimate dependent variable in the present study. Based on this model,
the following hypotheses can be distilled.
H1 Subjective alienation from society can be explained by low social
integration and perceived discrimination.
H2 Propensity can be explained by subjective alienation and
exposure.
H2a Given hypothesis 1, there will be an effect of poor social integra-
tion and perceived discrimination through subjective alienation
on propensity.
H3 Overall exposure can be explained by subjective alienation.
H3a Given hypothesis 1, there will be an effect of poor social integra-
tion and perceived discrimination through subjective alienation
on exposure.
H4 Political violence can be explained by propensity.
H4a Relative to propensity, the effect of exposure on political violence
will be stronger.
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H4b Given hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, there will be an effect of poor social
integration and perceived discrimination through subjective alie-
nation, propensity, and overall exposure on political violence.
Several models were run to test the relationship between the variables.
We expected that subjective alienation would be explained by poor
social integration and perceived discrimination. We also expected that
subjective alienation would be the main mediator in explaining propen-
sity, exposure, and political violence, whereas we expected propensity
and exposure to have a direct impact on political violence. The best
fitting model is shown in figure 13. The observed data are in line with
our theoretical model. We found strong evidence that propensity and
exposure form the direct causes of political violence, whereas poor
social integration, perceived discrimination, and subjective alienation
form the causes of the causes that influence political violence through
propensity and exposure.
The connections between the variables show the direct significant
effects. The effects of perceived discrimination, low social integration,
and overall distrust on overall propensity and the effect of overall
propensity on overall exposure should be interpreted as Beta coeffi-
cients79. (Overall distrust, overall propensity, and overall exposure as
dependent variables are metrical). The effects of overall propensity and
overall exposure on political violence should be interpreted as log
Figure 12: Testable path model
79 See note 74.
Poor social integration 
Perceived discrimination 
Subjective alienation 
Political violence 
EXPOSURE 
PROPENSITY 
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odds80. (Political violence toward persons and property as dependent
variables are dichotomous).
The findings show that individuals who perceive higher levels of
discrimination also experience higher levels of alienation from society
(Beta = 0.39). Likewise, we also see a positive but less strong effect of
poor social integration on subjective alienation (Beta = 0.18). This means
that individuals who are less anchored in society, experience higher
levels of subjective alienation. The results thus endorse our first
hypothesis (H1). Second, the findings show a direct, moderate, positive
effect of subjective alienation on propensity (Beta = 0.27), meaning that
individuals who experience higher levels of alienation from society will
also be more inclined toward violent extremism. This confirms our
second hypotheses (H2 and H2a). However, we also see a, although
rather small, positive effects of poor social integration and perceived
discrimination on propensity. This means that poor social integration
and perceived discrimination not only have an effect on propensity
through subjective alienation but also directly influence propensity.
Individuals experiencing higher levels of low social integration (Beta =
0.13) and/or perceived discrimination (0.18) are more inclined toward
violent extremism compared with individuals who perceive low levels
of discrimination or poor social integration.
Third, the results show no direct effect of subjective alienation on
overall exposure. Thus, our results do not endorse our third hypotheses
(H3 and H3a). On the other hand, we see direct positive effect of
propensity on exposure (Beta = 0.18) but not the other way around. This
means higher levels of extremist propensity will lead to higher levels of
exposure to extremist content through NSM. These results reconfirm
the theoretical suspicion that the search for extremist information is
predated by the formation of an extremist propensity instead of
extremist propensity being formed under the influence of extremist
exposure. Put differently, it is unlikely that individuals that have no
interest in violent extremism will develop extremist attitudes (leading
to political violence) under the influence of exposure to violent
80 Log odds reflect the increase in the change in the dependent variable (commit political violence
vs not commit political violence) with respect to the value of the independent variable. The
higher the value of the log odds, the larger the effect. A positive value indicates a positive effect,
while a negative value indicates a negative effect. For example, the value of the effect of overall
propensity on political violence is 0.32 for every unit rise (1 std) in overall distrust, and the
change to commit political violence versus not to commit political violence rises with 0.27.
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extremism through NSM. Furthermore, low social integration and
perceived discrimination have an effect on exposure through
propensity instead of through subjective alienation. Fourth, the results
indicate that both propensity (log odds = 0.32) and exposure (log odds =
0.21) have moderate, positive effects on political violence toward
persons. The same can be said for political violence toward property
(log odds propensity = 0.23: log odds exposure = 0.25). This means that
individuals with higher levels of extremist propensity and/or higher
levels of exposure to violent extremism through NSM are more at risk
of committing acts of political violence than individuals with low levels
of propensity and/or exposure. Thus, our fourth hypotheses are
endorsed by our data (H4, H4a, and H4b).
In summary, the three variables measuring “emergence” indeed only
have indirect positive effects on political violence through propensity.
In other words, the model largely confirms our theoretical model. It
thus also confirms that 1) the direct causes of political violence are
propensity and exposure and 2) the other variables defined as risk
factors in the preface of violent radicalization are not causes of political
violence, but causes of the causes, exerting their influence through
propensity and exposure.
Figure 13: Path model of political violence
Poor social integration 
Perceived discrimination 
Subjective alienation 
Political violence 
towards personal 
EXPOSURE 
PROPENSITY 
0,18
0,27
0,39
0,18
0,32
0,13
Political violence
towards property 
0,18
0,21 
0,23 
0,25
Model fit: RMSEA=0.05, Chi-sq= 3109.819 df=20
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8.3.6. Summary of results
These results can be summarized as follows:
1. It must be kept in mind that next to ENSM, real-world/offline exposure
(e.g., peers) is equally important.
2. Especially active ENSM is of importance. The effect of deliberately sought
after extremist information and propaganda is much stronger than the
effect of the same information and propaganda that one encounter
accidently.
3. The effect of ENSM rises exponentially for very high rates of exposure.
This means that the biggest danger lies with repeated and constant
ENSM compared with low or medium rates of exposure.
4. There is an interaction between individual propensity to violent
extremism and exposure to violent extremism through NSM. ENSM will
have a much stronger effect on individuals with an already strong
extremist attitude compared with individuals with only a low or medium
extremist attitude.
5. Until a certain level, the effect of ENSM is not problematic, irrespective
of the level of propensity and exposure. However, after a certain
breakpoint, this effect rises exponentially. This means that although
ENSM always has an influence on individuals, it is not worth panicking
over small levels of ENSM (even when active) because they only result in
a very small rise in political violence. Of course, the challenge is to
determine where the breakpoint lies in reality.
8.4. Conclusion
The idea that exposure is something static has to be abandoned.
Exposure and, more specifically, exposure through NSM differ in
intensity, frequency, and self-selection. This means exposure is not the
same for everybody. In other words, given equal propensity (or
extremist attitudes), the effect of NSM exposure differs depending on
its nature. This is shown in figure 14. Figure 14 also shows that the
group that is sporadically, at a low intensity, exposed to violent
extremism is much bigger than the group that looks deliberately for
certain information and is frequently, at a high intensity, exposed to
violent extremism through NSM. It seems logical that especially this
last, very small group is at a danger for violent radicalization, violent
extremism, and political violence.
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The effect of ENSM is not a linear effect. Traditional research into the
effects of media exposure on behavior and attitudes is too static. It
assumes that exposure, e.g., violent television shows, is followed by a
process of social learning, leading directly and invariably to certain
behavior such as violence. Our results show that the interaction
between the individual and its already existing propensity toward
certain behavior, in this case violent extremism, has to be taken into
account. In case of equal exposure, the effect of exposure differs
according to propensity. Individuals already displaying a strong
acceptance of violent extremism/political violence will experience a
stronger influence of ENSM, both active and passive. Furthermore, the
aspect of self-selection is also important. Images, propaganda,
information, etc., that are deliberately sought after will have a stronger
effect than the same information one encounters accidently. This means
that the same ENSM (the same content with the same intensity and
frequency) will have a different effect on different individuals
depending on self-selection and the level of propensity to violent
extremism. This is shown in figure 15.
Based on the criteria discussed in the previous section, self-selection
and propensity to violent extremism, the “danger” of ENSM can be
ranked. This is shown in figure 16. For individuals with a low
propensity to violent extremism, the risks of ENSM, both passive and
active, are relatively low, and are no cause of concern. On the contrary,
ENSM might hold a risk for individuals with an already high
propensity toward violent extremism. This risk rises exponentially in
Figure 14: Exposure according to intensity, frequency, and self-selection
self-
selection
exposure while 
being interested
exposure without being 
interested
no exposure to extremist 
content through NSM
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the case of active ENSM. Thus, individuals most at risk of further
radicalization into violent extremism are those holding high propensity
toward violent extremism and actively seeking out extremist content
through NSM.
Different virtual settings give access to different levels of exposure and
determine the kind of exposure individuals undergo. This makes
virtual exposure part of the virtual lifestyle of youth. Propensity and
self-selection determine the kind of websites and virtual spaces that
individuals visit and these in turn determine the intensity, frequency,
Figure 15: Effects of exposure dependent on propensity and self-selection
Figure 16: Classification of exposure
 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
EXPOSURE OVER TIME 
exposure.social.media.book  Page 151  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
152
and nature of the exposure they undergo. We can make a distinction
between passive virtual settings and active virtual settings. Passive
virtual settings are formed by websites that target a certain population;
e.g., youth of Moroccan descend, but who are not extremist in nature or
intention. However, these populations can be of interest for extremist
groups and it is possible that they will be present on these websites by
posting videos, participating in discussions, etc. This way, the youth
visiting these websites are at risk of being exposed to extremist content.
However, because this would be passive exposure, aimed at youth with
a probably low or medium propensity to violent extremism, it is
unlikely to have much effect.
Active virtual settings are formed by websites and forums that are
extremist in nature. Often they are secured and not freely accessible.
Young people visiting these websites probably already have strong
extremist attitudes and have actively looked for this information and
access to these websites. In this case, the effect of exposure would be
much bigger.
The present study has some limitations that need to be taken into
account (Singer, 2009). First of all, there still remain some attributes or
markers that show a significant effect on political violence both toward
property and persons. This means that not all underlying mechanisms
explaining violent extremism are incorporated in this study. Second,
the present study is based on an analysis of cross-sectional data and
these data do not allow addressing questions of causal ordering. This is
an important limitation as there are competing explanations for the
existence of a relationship between online exposure to violent
extremism and offline differential associations with extremist groups,
on the one hand, and political violence, on the other hand. Recent
research on adolescent offending seems to find that selection effects are
stronger than socialization effects (Weerman, 2011). The selection
hypothesis suggests that population heterogeneity is responsible for
the observed correlation, i.e., extremist youth select extremist peers in
the real and virtual worlds and are therefore selectively exposed to
extremist content online. Proponents of self-control theory
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) would argue that low self-control is
responsible for the observed correlation between exposure and political
violence, yet the relationship exists even when controlling for self-
control and other individual characteristics.
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In the past decade, we have witnessed a growing body of longitudinal
studies of offending under the impulse of life-course criminology.
Studies of political violence would definitely contribute to the field as
they are able to unfold the development of individuals’ involvement in
political violence. Developmental studies could unravel questions such
as how people become exposed to extremist moral settings and how
they develop certain propensities to political violence (such as moral
support for extremist violence and religious authoritarianism).
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9. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING 
THE ROLE OF NSM IN RADICALIZATION 
TOWARD VIOLENT EXTREMISM
9.1. Introduction
The qualitative part of the RADIMED research aims at exploring the
experiences of (young) adults who are engaged in a radicalization
process in order to gain a larger scope on what could explain why some
people engage in political violence and why some others do not. One of
our concerns is to reveal the conditions under which radicalization
(into violent extremism) may have been influenced by the use of the
internet and especially NSM. In order to map the associated
psychological and social processes, we articulated our research via the
following questions:
What is the level of violence acceptance?
How does it differ between individuals?
What could explain this difference?
Is the internet a factor of radicalization?
Qualitative research methods are appropriate for particular types of
research. They can convey richness and intensity of details (answering
questions of meaning, who is affected (by the issue) and why, what
factors are involved, etc.) in a way that quantitative research cannot. In
a way, qualitative data is responding to a “bottom-up” logic of under-
standing a specific issue. Qualitative methods serve to provide a bigger
picture of a situation or an issue and can inform our understanding of
that issue in an accessible way. Qualitative research usefully completes
a quantitative approach that treats the same issue in a “top-down”
logic. Each method can compensate for the other’s weaknesses and
complement each other’s strengths.
9.2. Methodology
In order to reveal the psychological and social processes associated
with (violent) radicalization, the life story interview was deemed a
good fit for this qualitative, exploratory study. The life story interview
is a methodological approach to understand not only people’s general
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biography but also experiences specific to the domain in their lives
(Lawthom, Clough & Moore, 2004). Accordingly, our aim is to explore,
via life narratives, the extent to which technological applications, such
as the internet and NSM, impinge upon people’s radicalization process,
more specifically, upon the lives of individuals who are willing to
engage in violent political actions.
As part of this research, the method of analysis recommended to treat
qualitative data is the grounded theory developed by Glaser and
Strauss (1967). This inductive method seeks to bring out “empirically
based theories from social phenomena about which few analysis has been
articulated” (Laperriere, 1997, p. 310). The analytical approach is
therefore a theoretical interpretation, rather than a descriptive
approach. This leads to a theoretical understanding of a phenomenon.
In order for a theory based on empiricism to be applicable to other
situations, it must meet certain criteria to remain true to the everyday
reality of a specific area before claiming to explain wider areas, be
understandable to those involved in the phenomenon, and be
sufficiently abstract (Strauss & Corbin, 1991, p 23). This precaution is
common practice for any future application of this grounded theory
and requires an adaptation to the context or rework it so that its
explanatory power can be extended.
That being said, we point out that the grounded theory is used here as a
method to analyze the interviews conducted for this research. The
theoretical model previously developed by the research team was then
confronted with the analysis of these qualitative data. Therefore, the
general analysis is at the intersection of the inductive approach
(grounded method) and deductive approach. Empirical evidence is used
to further support and develop the theoretical model to make it as
relevant as possible (supremacy of field data).
9.3. Data research
Identification of respondents by the target profile was conducted over a
period from March 2013 to November 2013. After this period, a total of
14 interviews (6 conducted in Wallonia and Brussels and 8 conducted
in Flanders) were deemed relevant and used for research purposes.
Certain difficulties, both scientific and practical, have been encountered
by the research team (see below).
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9.3.1. Profile of target group
The three extremist trends discussed in this research are left-wing
extremism, right-wing extremism, and religious extremism (Muslim).
Within these trends, the profile of the target group was originally
drafted as follows: preferably young people between 16 and 25 years
(or more) who have radical to extremist convictions and are involved
online and/or offline in a radical or extremist group (or not).
Actually, it is rather difficult to determine who is “extremist enough”
and who is not, as it is a subjective approach. In order to find respond-
ents, the research’s main focus is on young people who are active in
movements other than the dominant political trends, and holding
potential for violent extremism. For left-wing extremists, these are, e.g.,
Marxist or anarchist movements. For right-wing extremists, those are,
among others, movements known as “White Power” movements. For
religious extremism (Muslim), these are movements that want to estab-
lish the Shariah law, etc. However, a young person active in one of
those movements and/or defending some strong political views that
deviate from mainstream ones is not necessarily an “ extremist.” Thus,
different profiles ranging from radicals through genuine extremists
have been incorporated in this study. This allowed to study different
pathways of radicalization and to compare the role of NSM within
them. Having different profiles is therefore not a problem, since the
purpose of the qualitative part is to develop a more nuanced under-
standing of the whole process of radicalization.
9.3.2. Means
The main means used to find people matching our profile were as
follows.
• Websites, forums, Facebook pages, blogs, etc.81
• Word of mouth
• Call for candidates via the listing collected during the online sur-
vey
• Letters sent to mosques in Wallonia and Flanders
81 These various websites, forums, etc., were not limited to platforms that have been set up by an
extremist person or a group. They also comprised general forums with the objective of being a
place for expressing political (radical) ideas, but without extremist intent.
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• Using key contacts, who facilitate contact with respondents
• Snowball effect
Most respondents were contacted through key contacts. Only three
respondents were successfully contacted on forums or websites online.
Attempts led through the online survey yielded two additional inter-
views.
9.3.3. Difficulties
The research team encountered some difficulties during the search for
respondents. These are mentioned below in no specific order.
– For the purpose of the research, which is related to a particularly
sensitive subject for some people, it would have been preferable to
perform long-term field work in order to increase the chances of
interviewing significant individuals. In addition, the political con-
text has not always allowed a neutral approach regarding issues of
violent extremism or even radicalization. The recent events regar-
ding young Belgian fighters in Syria has created an atmosphere of
suspicion and fear among some Muslim people who were approa-
ched during this search. Relations between the Muslim community
and the non-Muslim community have been regularly stretched in
recent years and this has not facilitated the research process when
it came to establishing a relationship of trust.
– This often went hand in hand with some suspicion about the scien-
tific approach in itself. People did not always see their “direct inte-
rest” in participating in our project. It was therefore not easy to
convince them of the benefits of taking part in it.
– Contacts found online via websites or Facebook pages are not
always inclined to switch to “offline” mode to participate in an
interview. Some are very reluctant to the idea. This is mainly
explained by the anonymity guaranteed by online interaction,
which would not be present in case of face to face interaction.
– Using the internet and social media as a tool to find respondents is
time consuming. Consulting the multitude of potential sources is a
very long-term process and would require a whole team dedicated
to this task alone. The Facebook platform only offers quick easy
service and free accessibility to all. The number of pages available
online is virtually impossible to review in its entirety.
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9.4. Interviewing method
The main research technique used to obtain the data necessary to
develop the theory was the semi-structured interview technique.
Using interview techniques, we were able to focus on the subjective
experiences of the respondents to determine their definitions of their
situations of radicalization and concrete elements that may explain this
process. Respondents were asked to discuss various topics and
encouraged to tell their stories in their own words. Using a topic list,
the interviewer guided the interview to ensure that relevant research
topics were well-covered during the conversation.
The interviews were conducted face-to-face (except for one interview
conducted online by means of a Facebook account created for research
purposes and two interviews “enriched” by e-mail) and have been
recorded on a dictaphone before being transcribed. On average, the
interviews took one hour and a half. Each respondent was reminded of
the objectives of the research process, the practicalities of the interview,
and their right to anonymity.
There were no major difficulties during the interviews. These were
conducted on a voluntary basis, where the respondents were coopera-
tive and willing to answer the questions. Some insisted that their
remarks would not get outside the scope of the research, but agreed to
have their names listed, while others had no such restriction. Some
respondents (mainly RWE) insisted that their anonymity should be
well-respected. Others (also RWE) insisted that the interview should
take place online because of the convenience and in order to avoid
complications related to making face-to-face appointments.
9.5. Sample size
Research projects using qualitative measures have smaller sample sizes
than quantitative studies. This in itself leads to a different approach
when it comes to utilizing the data collected. As Gifford (1996 p. 59)
points out in her paper on qualitative research: “While the computer has
greater assisted investigators in managing large volumes of data, the core of
qualitative analysis is interpretation.” An overview of the distribution of
the respondents according to different criteria can be found in table 16.
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The larger sampling available to quantitative research methods enables
findings to be generalized from the research sample to the entire
population. In qualitative research, such generalizability is not a
relevant criterion. Qualitative research seeks to deal with human
experience and as such is more concerned with transferability as a way
of validating findings. For this research, a relevant sample is that which
includes persons involved in different degrees and oriented toward
left-wing extremism (LWE), right-wing extremism (RWE), and
religious extremism (RE), mainly Muslim.
9.6. Strategic variables
The core strategic variable of this research divides our sample on the
axis of political and ideological orientations. A second strategic
variable, the level of involvement, was taken into account in order to
contrast the analysis.
9.6.1. Ideological orientation
In order to obtain a broad view on the radicalization process into
violence, the qualitative research has embodied three ideological
orientations: left-wing extremism, right-wing extremism, and religious
extremism. Those three orientations were chosen in order to avoid the
risk of partitioning data explaining the process of radicalization to one
specific ideological trend.
As we said earlier, not all respondents can be considered as
“extremists.” The aim is to compare different degrees of radicalism
within the same ideological trends and transversely between different
Table 16: Distribution of respondents according to different criteria (gender, residence, 
age)
M
en
W
om
en
Fl
an
de
rs
W
al
lo
ni
a
Br
us
se
ls
<3
0 
y.
o.
>3
0 
y.
o.
Left-wing extremism 4 2 4 - 2 6 -
Right-wing extremism 6 - 4 1 1 4 2
Religious extremism 2 - - 1 1 - 2
TOTAL 12 2 8 2 4 10 4
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ideological trends in order to understand the mechanisms of the violent
radicalization process.
Left-wing extremists are understood as individuals who seek to
abolish all forms of hierarchy, particularly the unequal distribution of
wealth and power, and support the use of violent measures in order to
pursue their goal. They strive for a society in which everyone is
provided equal economic and social opportunities, and no one has
excessive wealth or power over others (Woshinsky, 2008).
Right-wing extremists are understood as individuals with political
positions or activities that accept or support social hierarchy and/or
social inequality and support the use of violent measures in order to
pursue their goal. Those affiliated with the right-wing extremism
consider social hierarchy and social inequality as either inevitable,
natural, normal, or desirable, typically justifying this position on the
basis of natural law or tradition (Carlisle, 2005). They usually involve
support for social inequality and social hierarchy, elements of social
conservatism, and opposition to most forms of liberalism and
socialism. Both terms are commonly used to describe fascist, neo-
fascist, or other ideologies and organizations that feature extreme
nationalist, xenophobic, racist, or reactionary views (Carlisle, 2005).
The interviews conducted in this research with respondents from LWE
and RWE beliefs seemed to both confirm and adhere to these descrip-
tions.
Religious extremists are understood as individuals who promote,
impede, or direct social, political or economic change within a set of
religion-orientated doctrines and support the use of violent measures
to pursue their goal. However, it must be noted that in this study,
individuals trying to advance religion-oriented ideas within the
democratic system have also been interviewed. Therefore, two types of
activism have been observed: 1) activism within the system, using it in
order to enhance Muslim right recognition and equality of rights
between Muslim and non-Muslim people and 2) activism outside the
system, by struggling against it in order to impose a certain view of
Islam.
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9.6.2. Level of involvement
We choose to distinguish four different profiles considering the level of
commitment in an organized group: leader, subaltern, executive,
isolated82. Table 17 below makes a distinction between respondents
according to their levels of involvement in or out of a group. It does not
concern the degree of violent extremism.
“Leader” is understood as a person in charge of the decision-making
process within the group.
A “subaltern” is a person in charge of great responsibilities within the
group, but not part of the decision-making process. “Executives” do
not have many significant responsibilities but take part in the group
activities. Respondents who have claimed not being involved in any
organized group have been qualified as “isolated.”
As the data analysis shows us, the level of involvement of an individual
in an organized group depends on several elements of morality (the
degree of willingness to pursue a change in the status quo) and
practicality (availability)), the opportunity structure within the group,
and learning engagement techniques). Moreover, the desire to pursue a
change in the status quo is high, combined with a high level of
availability, timeliness, and learning. The degree of commitment is high
as well.
All of the respondents were not necessarily embedded in an organized
movement. These people do not necessarily have weak social ties (both
82 Each interview has been coded to ensure anonymity of respondents. Coding of interviews: L =
left; R = right; M = Muslim; L = leader; S = subaltern; E = executive; I = isolated; M = male; F =
female; + identification number. Thus, a code RSH3 is to be read as this person is right-wing-
oriented, a subaltern in the movement, and a man. This distinction has been developed for the
specific needs of this research.
Table 17: Distribution of respondents according to the level of group involvement
Orientation
Left-wing extremism 
(LWE)
Right-wing 
extremism (RWE)
Religious extremism 
(RE)
Level of engagement 
in a group
Leader Leader (1) Leader (2)
Subaltern (3) Subaltern (1) Subaltern
Executive (3) Executive (2) Executive
Not involved Isolated Isolated (2) Isolated
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scenarios were observed). Several hypotheses may explain why an
individual with radical or even extremist beliefs would not have joined
a movement.
– The person did not find an appropriate movement, either because
it does not exist or because he/she is not (yet) aware of such a
movement.
– The person prefers to develop an organized movement for him/
herself (as a guarantee that it will match his/her beliefs).
– The person does not wish to be actively involved in a movement
(refusal to align behind a “flag” for the sake of independent spirit,
or the satisfaction to only discuss his/her beliefs).
These assumptions do not take into account the possibility of active
engagement outside of any organized group (lone wolves), but we
emphasize that this case does not appear in our database.
9.7. Data analysis
For the most part, inductive analyses focused on the contents of the
interview transcripts. The word of respondents is the empirical
material on which theoretical proposals will be anchored, allowing us
to debate the theoretical model previously constructed.
9.7.1. Stages
9.7.1.1. Vertical analysis
Each interview was the subject of several in-depth readings and codifica-
tions of relevant extracts. Through the codifications, extracts were
grouped into themes and conceptual categories. The latter, of more inter-
pretive order, highlight underlying logics and/or elements reflecting an
interesting aspect. For this purpose, we used memos83 to keep track. The
coding was done in a completely open way, starting from the empirical
data. The progressive categorization of the data resulted in a first form of
interpreting the interviews, which were reread in turn. The data were
aggregated gradually to be compared and contrasted.
83 These are not included in their entirety in the appendix, given the private nature of the data
they contain.
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9.7.1.2. Horizontal analysis
Following these vertical analyzes, the themes and categories were
compiled, allowing the transversal comparison of data. It was then
possible to refine the conceptual categories and merge or divide
subcategories to maintain a close connection to the data. While doing
this, links between categories, their properties, and dimensions where
continually proposed and verified to assure that they were supported
in the data. Categories could then be connected together in theoretical
propositions and then used to discuss our theoretical model. This step
of linking categories also implies a certain selection and/or reduction to
achieve an integration of analytical developments in narrative logic
(Laperrière, 1997).
9.7.1.3. Limitations
As Mark Mason has underlined (Mason, 2010), samples for qualitative
studies are generally much smaller than those used in quantitative
studies. Ritchie, Lewis and Elam (2003) provide reasons for this. There
is a point of diminishing return to a qualitative sample. As the study
progresses, more data does not necessarily lead to more information.
This is because one occurrence of a piece of data, or a code, is all that is
necessary to ensure that it becomes part of the analysis framework.
Frequencies are rarely important in qualitative research, as one occur-
rence of the data is potentially as useful as many in understanding the
process behind a topic. This is because qualitative research is concerned
with meaning and not making generalized hypothesis statements (see
also Crouch & McKenzie, 2006). The quality of analysis is therefore not
based on a high number of interviews, but on a diversity that has not
failed here to reveal interesting elements for this search.
9.8. Transversal analysis/General perception
A certain number of categories were identified and grouped into
general themes on their own, thus facilitating the understanding of the
different mechanisms at work (see Appendix 9). The aim being to
answer the question “For what reasons do individuals engage in a
(violent) radicalization process?,” these categories were gradually
distinguished. However, this categorization is neither linear nor static
but rather characterized by complex and integrated relationships. Each
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of these categories is supported by extracts from interviews. In order
not to overburden this report, we refer to Appendix 10 for a complete
overview of all relevant extracts regarding the description of each
category. Given our main variable of diversification, we made a
synthesis of the particularities of each ideological trend in the various
categories. An overview can be found in table 18.
Left-Wing Extremism
• Level of violence acceptance: exclusion and instrumentalization.
• Indirect negative experiences towards a wide reference group
(human beings): feeling of general inequality and unfairness.
• Vague and difficult to identify opponent: the “Great Capital”.
• Family usually involved.
• Conventional confrontations with authorities (police).
• Feeling of social injustice based on information and speeches
rather than on personal experience.
• Feeling of indignation regarding failure of the authorities to carry
out their mission to restore equality and reduce inequalities.
• Strong social diversity.
Right-Wing Extremism
• Level of violence acceptance: instrumentalization and resignation.
• Direct and indirect negative experiences toward a specific refe-
rence group: perceived discrimination from authorities toward
non-natives.
• Opponent identified and identifiable: non-natives “who abuse the
system,” and the authorities that “allow” this injustice.
• Family less involved.
• Conflicting confrontations with authority figures (police, justice,
traditional parties, media).
• Perceived procedural injustice (in comparison to non-natives).
• Perceived discrimination toward the individual and the group
(“natives”).
• Feeling of indignation regarding the failure of the authorities to
carry out their mission: to restore equality and reduce inequalities.
• Weak social diversity.
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Religious Extremism (focus on Muslim respondents)
• Level of violence acceptation: instrumentalization (thrill seeking)
and resignation.
• Direct and indirect negative experiences toward a specific refe-
rence group: perceived discrimination from authorities toward
non-Muslims.
• Opponent identified and identifiable: Islamophobic persons “who
discriminate Muslim people,” and the authorities who “allow” this
discrimination; opponents to a specific “Muslim cause”.
• Strong foundation of definitions based on social setting, commu-
nity, and belonging (Muslims).
• Conflicting confrontations with authorities (police, justice, tradi-
tional parties).
• Perceived procedural injustice (in comparison to non-Muslims).
• Perceived discrimination toward the own community (Muslims).
• Feeling of indignation regarding the failure of the authorities to
carry out their mission: to restore equality and reduce inequalities.
• Either strong or weak social diversity.
Table 18: Features of ideological trends regarding the main categories of data
LWE RWE RE
Violence acceptance Exclusion & 
instrumentalization
Instrumentalization & 
resignation
Instrumentalization & 
resignation
Experiences Indirect; wide group In/direct; small group In/direct; small group
Adversary Diffuse Identified & 
Identifiable
Identified & 
Identifiable
Confrontation Conventional Conflicting Conflicting
(Perceived) injustice Social Procedural Procedural
(Perceived) 
discrimination
Indirect Direct Direct
Legitimacy of 
authorities
Strong/neutral Neutral/weak Neutral/weak
Social diversity Strong Weak Strong or weak
Model group Community > 
individual
Individual > 
community
Individual = 
community
Internet use Information/Action Information/Action Information/Action
exposure.social.media.book  Page 165  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
166
9.9. Discussion of the theoretical model
Based on significant criminological theories explaining crime (strain
theory (Agnew, 2006), procedural justice theory (Tyler, 2006), social
bonds theory (Hirschi, 1969), and social learning theory (Akers, 1998;
Sutherland, 1947)) and using SAT as an integrating framework
(Bouhana & Wikström, 2008), we developed an integrated model
explaining violent extremism. This model was tested in the previous
chapter. We will now review the meaning of the qualitative results for
our integrated model. What can they tell us in terms of the process
leading to political violence and more specifically about the formation
of attitudes (propensity), the emergence of extremist settings
(exposure), and the development of the perception choice process? Our
findings are illustrated by extracts from the interview. These extracts
are translated to English. The original quotes, in Dutch or French, can
be found in Appendix 12.
The conceptual model of SAT distinguishes between direct causes and
causes of the causes within the process leading to political violence. The
direct causes are those factors that determine the perception–choice
process as the causal mechanism explaining political violence. In other
words, the causes of political violence determine which action
alternatives an individual perceives in a certain situation, whether or
not one of the alternatives is violent, and which choice will be made.
SAT identifies the direct causes as the propensity to violent extremisme
and the exposure to violent extremist moral settings. Propensity entails
1) the morality of a person (moral beliefs and emotions) and 2)
elements of self-control. Exposure entails 1) the moral rules of the
environment and 2) the level of control on those moral rules. Since the
focus of our research lies on the influence of NSM, we primarily paid
attention to exposure to extremist content through NSM. However, we
established earlier that peer delinquency can also play a major role.
Factors which may have an influence over propensity and exposure are
here understood as “the causes of the causes.” More specifically, we
formerly identified them as 1) poor social integration, 2) subjective
alienation, and 3) perceived discrimination.
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9.9.1. Level of violence acceptance
We observed a difference in the degree of violence acceptance. Three
scenarios were presented in the interviews, and in a transversal
manner:
– Exclusion: violence is not accepted under any circumstances.
– Instrumentalization: violence is a way “as good as any” to achieve a
goal.
– Resignation: violence is the only alternative when all other non-violent
means fail to achieve a goal.
Resignation and instrumentalization differ from exclusion in the fact
that they actually use violence, and they both strive to achieve a goal,
which is defined as essential. This consideration starts from the
requirement that the abandonment of the cause is not an option.
9.9.1.1. Exclusion
Violence is not seen as an action alternative because it does not conform
to the values of the individual and because “the end does not justify the
means.” This happens especially when moral discomfort is low or
absent (see below).
“You have to realize that it has no use to always stir up trouble and
break things. It is possible to stir things up without causing damage to
anyone else.” (LEF8)
9.9.1.2. Instrumentalization
There is no moral imperative that prohibits the use of violence. It is
simply a means to an end. There are several possible explanations:
a. Thrill seeking behavior. The need to show force, the importance of
impact, and the excitement provided by the reprehensible actions
take over. One of our RWE respondents raised this issue as a part
of his willingness to engage: he calls it being part of the “bad
ones.” He spoke of this as a “romantic” attraction to be part of the
“bad ones” and not of the “care bears.”
“But well,… when I started I was only 17 years old, and there was an
atmosphere eum,… Already the media portrayed people like me as… As
being part of evil, the big Satan, as they said. And I, I was only 17, so….
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There was this romantic side of the whole thing, like ‘So, ok, I’m part of
the bad guys but that’s alright, at least they are an efficient group of anti-
communists.” (RLM4)
This “thrill seeking” behavior seems to be boosted by the way the
group is perceived and defined by society. In other words, the
more a group is considered “dangerous,” the more it becomes
attractive to some individuals. We cannot exclude the scenario of
an individual making use of violence “just to use violence.” That
said, this case does not appear in our data mainly because this fea-
ture is not specific to extremist political commitment. An indivi-
dual focused on violence will justify its use in a movement or else-
where. This is not a cause of violent radicalization, but rather an
attribute.
b. The penalization of actions is not a problem for the individual
(punishment is not a deterrent) because the consequences are not
seen as an excess of disadvantages compared to the benefits of not
being penalized.
“The goal is to defy them, provoke them, make them mad and drive them
crazy! A good Muslim is either a dead or imprisoned Muslim, or a future
prisoner. There are only 3 pathways in life to choose from. There is no
third option. “ (MIM2)
c. The individual has not benefited from learning moral rules, accor-
ding to which “the use of violence is not acceptable.”
9.9.1.3. Resignation
At first, violence is not a morally acceptable action alternative, but can
become a last resort when non-violent alternatives have been depleted.
These non-violent alternatives are conventional orders: petitions,
demonstrations, organized political actions, involvement in a political
party to defend ideas, etc. When these conventional alternatives have
been depleted, the individuals may resign themselves to use violence,
but this requires that moral barriers fall.
As we will see later on, this will happen only after finding that the
conventional means used to achieve a primary goal are not enough to
achieve the goal; the individual finds himself in an unbearable tension
between the impossibility of reaching its goal and the urge to reach it.
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The more pressing this tension becomes, the more the risk of
weakening and breaking down moral barriers becomes eminent.
Ultimately this tension can lead to the perception of violence as a
legitimate possibility. As we shall see, this tension is increased by
negative experiences that will increase the frustration felt by the
individual who relied on conventional means to meet its goals (e.g.,
disappointment in a traditional political party, disappointment
compared to expectations of the police, etc.). (see below: Experiences).
As table 19 shows these three forms of violence acceptance differ in the
presence or absence of moral barriers (see below: Moral barriers) and
the presence or absence of more or less moral discomfort (see below:
Moral discomfort).
“(You say violence always has to be avoided but that sometimes it
is necessary. Has this always been your opinion?) No, I don’t think
so. I used to adhere to the opinion of my mother and grandmother. Don’t
act out and everything will be all right. So when something happens,
keep your head down and pretend as if nothing is wrong. (What made
you change your mind?) Reading, but mostly the film ‘V for
Vendetta’. And also the live of Gandhi, and his live and philosophy.
(Didn’t Gandhi oppose to the use of violence?) He was completely
against the use of violence, but he also said… He also said that some-
times violence is really is necessary to achieve peace. (Have you ever
been in a specific situation that confirmed this?) Not me myself, but
if someone in power, a suppressor, if he starts to put people in an inferior
position, and starts to do inhuman things to them, than it is… Of
course, first you have to try by reasoning, but in that case violence can
be necessary. But first try to boycott and only then use violence. (Can
you give me examples of specific events that made you use
violence?) To use violence myself, absolutely not. (To support
violence in certain situations?) Yes, police violence, that makes me…
For example, my friend was standing at the head of the march but was
not allowed to continue and then the police starts beating him with their
batons, which is completely out of line. Of course, they are allowed to
use batons, but that’s an ethical question! But in that case I completely
understand, in the moment, they are using violence against me, so I will
use violence against them. I completely understand.”(LEM10)
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As described in the above table, LWE respondents mentioned mostly
exclusion of using violence (although resignation is also mentioned),
and RWE and RE respondents mentioned resignation and instrumen-
talization. This is therefore not specific to a particular ideological orien-
tation. The case of “resignation” is particularly interesting in that it
reflects a trend that can be explained by the particular experiences of an
individual. These may influence moral barriers of the individual or his
moral discomfort and may therefore have an influence on the degree of
acceptance of the use of violence.
9.9.2. Moral barriers
Moral barriers prohibiting the use of (political) violence are obtained
through an individual learning process. If such learning does not take
place, or alternative, violent, moral values are learned, the moral imper-
ative will not be able, by definition, to hinder the use of violence
(instrumentalization). If such a learning process takes place, the indi-
vidual will not resort to violence (exclusion) or violence will be
perceived as a resource under certain conditions (resignation).
The main context of learning is provided by the family (immediate
environment) and, in a broader sense, by society as a whole (large envi-
ronment). A society or community excluding the use of violence and
condemning wrongdoing creates an environment favorable to this
moral imperative. This is, however, not sufficient. The close environ-
ment of the individual should also help establish this moral imperative
for the individual.
In case of resignation, we see that the moral imperative can be
circumvented. Indeed, if the individual finds that the conventional
means used to achieve a primary goal are not enough, the individual
finds himself/herself in an uncomfortable tension between the
impossibility of achieving his/her goal and needs. This is amplified by
Table 19: Features of the different levels of violence acceptance
Moral barriers Moral discomfort
Exclusion  
Instrumentalization  
Resignation  
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negative experiences perceived as discriminatory: that is to say, when
the individual is the subject of a perceived unfair or illegitimate
discrimination. This uncomfortable tension is understood as “moral
discomfort.”
9.9.3. Moral discomfort
Moral discomfort may be defined as the tension between the status quo
or life situation as it is and basic needs or the life situation that the
individual wishes to have. The goal of the individual will therefore be
to change the balance of power so that it is more favorable to him and
his group. This tension will cause reaction mechanisms likely to change
the balance of power to meet the interests of an individual or group,
thus alleviating this tension. These basic needs differ from one
individual to another or from one community to another, but are often
related to the needs of recognition and appreciation. For LWE, it is to
continue the enhancement of human interest (equal distribution of
wealth); for RWE, it is in the interest of “deserving” versus “profiteers”
(unequal distribution of wealth and rights); and for RE, it is sometimes
recognition of the rights of Muslims (equal rights) and sometimes the
imposition of an interpretation of Islam without concessions.
The tension in the balance of power relates to different reference
groups based on ideological trends: LWE relates to a wide reference
group (human beings), unlike RWE (national deservings) and RE
(Muslim community). The more various this tension is, the less the
need to achieve its objective will be seen as a prime necessity. When this
moral discomfort is too high, change of the status quo becomes a
necessity for the individual or the community. It is precisely this need
for change that may weaken the moral barriers and push individuals to
“resign” for the use of political violence in order to achieve their goal.
“But you see, in the past, islamophobia, I would have accepted to discuss
this but if I had needed to create the organization, I would have said ‘no,
because it would be perceived as an communitarian organization etc. I
thought change had to occur through the engagement of militants as
members of political parties. But today, I say to myself ‘no’. One has the
impression that some pressure is needed in society, to create a more
favorable balance of power in social debates. (Yes.) And this is violent,
since in some way, we have been forced to engage in politics. If we would
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have had equal rights, I would have put my energy in other things. But
today, I realize that I have needed to put a large part of my engagement
into politics because this gave me the keys to understand societal chal-
lenges and information, contacts with those who take the decisions, and
suddenly I saw all these inconsistencies. Sometimes it is really just busi-
ness: I give you this, if you give me that, and then you ask yourself, why
shouldn’t we do the same for our own issues? The issues that are impor-
tant to us?” (MLM1)
Moral discomfort is primarily shaped by the experiences of individuals,
particularly perceived negative experiences (see below). We found
direct negative experiences, mainly in RWE and RE respondents.
Indeed, LWE respondents mentioned rather indirect experiences illus-
trating perceived discrimination against the broad reference group
with which they identify. As far as RWE and RE respondents are con-
cerned, the perceived tension can be increased as a result of discrimina-
tory experiences creating a sense of injustice and inequality between
the group membership of the individual and the group he/she sees as
an “adversary” (see below Ideological adversaries).
It is the outline of these two dimensions (learning moral barriers
against the use of violence and the imperious need to change the
balance of power to be more favorable) that may lead to violent radical-
ization. The more the balance of power will be perceived as negative by
an individual or a group, the more the moral barriers of an individual
or a group on the use of violence will be undermined.
9.9.4. Experiences
As mentioned above, the experiences recounted by respondents during
interviews have an impact on the process of radicalization. These expe-
riences are of different types: direct or indirect, positive or negative.
In case of direct experiences (events experienced firsthand by the indi-
vidual), the way these are perceived and defined by the individual will
be decisive whether or not the event will contribute to a feeling of
moral discomfort. For example, in case of a violent assault perpetrated
by an individual of foreign descent, whether the victim make an asso-
ciation between elements of “foreign descent” and “violent aggression”
or not will have an impact on the perception of the event, on the indi-
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vidual beliefs, and subsequently on the definition of the status quo. If
such an association is not made, beliefs will be affected differently.
“(…) before, well, I was attacked on a regular basis, one time, two times,
three times, always North Africans. You tell yourself maybe there is a
problem with them after all. Next, you hear; North Africans, security
problems, immigration etc. You listen to the media, mostly radio, televi-
sion etc. So I already had a vague idea of what the FN stood for, or not,
in general: against immigration (…). And further, violent attacks, you
can no longer go out in the evening, drugs etc. So evidently, this
provokes feelings of resentment against the population of North-African
descent so I found myself already in an ideal context, so to say.
(Hmm.)It was inevitable, I would say, I would end up in that kind of
setting (the FN).” (RSM3)
In the event of indirect experiences, they can also have different but
well established influences on the development of beliefs, especially if
the subject in question is a significant other of the interviewee (for
example, negative experiences of a parent with an immigrant) or
belongs to a wider reference group to which the individual can relate to
(e.g., inequalities between human beings, discrimination against the
Muslim community). Negative experiences by a broad, general, refer-
ence group (e.g., “males”, “youth”, “immigrants”) will be less likely to
cause tension in the moral discomfort of an individual, because the
perceived injustices or discrimination will be more diffuse.
“Some months ago, my father was the victim of yet another theft by an
intern/assistant of Turkish origin. Each time, she took several banknotes
from the cash register, to buy clothes, magazines etc. during her lunch
break. About 2000 euros have disappeared that way. Eventually she
could be busted by the police by using marked banknotes. My father
asked to pay back 500 euros, in which case he would drop charges. She
never did, and we never heard back.” (RIM6).
The interviews revealed mostly negative experiences to explain the
nature of the beliefs, reactions, behavior as a result, etc. More precisely,
these experiences evoked various situations of discrimination that have
a direct impact on individuals. In this regard, it is important to
remember that this is a matter of perception: whatever the true nature
of the facts may be, it is the perception of the individual that matters
and determines the impact of an experience. In other words, it is useless
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to try to influence the factual nature of an experience while it is the
perception of an individual, with all subjectivity it entails, which will
come into play.
It should also be noted that some experiences have been evoked to
explain the emergence of beliefs of individuals and others to explain
the evolution of the radical beliefs of individuals. It is clear that
experiences explaining the origin of convictions are rare and often
“redefined” afterward in order to “stick” with one’s beliefs in a
consistent manner. Those experiences therefore have an impact on the
degree of extremism, but a lesser impact on the nature of the
convictions of the individual.
The impact of those experiences on an individual’s beliefs contributes
to a disillusioned, disenchanted worldview, where he/she has a wrong
idea of the standards. The tension between the status quo and basic
needs (recognition and appreciation) may increase as these experiences
destabilize the individual. As mentioned above, weakening of moral
barriers may then be a consequence of those negative experiences,
which could adversely lead an individual to use violence to achieve his/
her ends.
9.9.4.1. Ideological adversaries
In order to better understand why experiences have an impact on
individuals, it is necessary to understand the actors involved in those
experiences. In other words, what are the ideological adversaries listed
in the various ideological trends in the study?
For LWE respondents, the adversary to fight is the “Great Capital”
accountable for all inequalities that determine an unacceptable status
quo. The authorities here are not accomplices, since they are the enemy
to fight. The confrontation is therefore logical or conventional (see
below).
For RWE respondents, the adversary is the one who is held responsible
for the discomfort felt by the individual. In this case, not only the
immigrants who take unfair advantages of the system but also the
authorities that allow such a situation, either because they implement
those advantages that cause frustration or because they do not favor
national “deservings” versus immigrant “profiteers.” These accomplice
authorities therefore also generate frustration.
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For RE respondents, their different profiles revealed different
ideological adversaries: Islamophobic people and authorities that
“allow” injustice (e.g., unaddressed complaint) and/or individuals and
authorities who do not defend the same interests as literalist Muslims
who want to impose Islam and Shariah uncompromisingly.
Therefore, experiences featuring these adversaries are most likely to
have a significant impact on the perception of the status quo, and
therefore on the moral discomfort, and finally on the degree of
radicalism. More specifically, negative experiences with different forms
of authority are particularly interesting to understand the mechanisms
of radicalization of an individual.
9.9.4.2. Subjective alienation
According to Procedural Justice Theory of Tyler “public trust depends
on perception of procedural fairness and justice (authorities’
performance or effectiveness)”.
a) Perceived procedural justice
Several RWE and RE respondents referred to experiences with different
forms of authority (e.g., police, justice, traditional political parties,
media) during which they felt they had been treated unfairly.
According to them, it is this lack of consideration that would have
caused a shift to a greater level of violent extremism in their speech
and/or their actions. RWE and RE respondents evoke direct negative
experiences with the police, justice, and the traditional political parties
(see below Conflicting confrontation). They mention unfair treatment or
“double standards” toward them and/or their community. This
perceived injustice is indeed a driving force of radicalization.
Respondent DSH3 illustrates this as follows.
“My doubts have been confirmed when the District Attorney decided to
enforce legal mediation on me, resulting in me, being obliged to compen-
sate the leader of my attackers, the agitator of the gang, who had to wear
glasses, or so he claimed, as a consequence of the effects of the pepper
spray I used. Knowing that, according to our justice system, I had
attacked, on my own, 10 young Turks, in broad daylight, in City 2, only
500 meters from my secondary school, and thus should be considered as
the aggressive perpetrator and my attackers as the victims, I have really
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perceived the Belgian justice system as dysfunctional This has greatly
motived me to join the Front National.” (RSM3) 
In fact, the respondent mentions not only the aggression as a
motivation to join the FN but also the perception of a “great failure in
the Belgian judicial system.” The same goes for an RE respondent:
discrimination and breach of trust in the political party he was involved
in led him to radicalize his engagement in order to defend interests
considered as fundamental (the recognition of Muslims rights and
equality of rights).
As explained above, LWE respondents essentially mention experiences
with the police in their role of maintaining order during demonstra-
tions (see below Conventional confrontation). Such experiences, when
negative, do have consequences: they question the police legitimacy as
their role does not correspond to the expectations of individuals. Those
experiences have no direct impact on the degree of violent extremism
or on the political involvement of LWE respondents.
b) Perceived legitimacy of authorities
The perceived legitimacy of the authorities is questioned throughout
our interviews, mainly when a breach of “duty” is observed. Respond-
ents forged their opinion on roles and tasks of the authorities, before
any encounters, and they question the legitimacy of those authorities if
reality does not support the prior definition they made of it. The
respondents’ first reaction to this ‘disappointment’ is not to question
their expectations but to question the legitimacy of the authorities. If, for
example, an individual believes that the police “don’t do their jobs”, he
will first question the legitimacy of the police before questioning what
he thinks police’s job is. Questions were asked about several forms of
authority during the interviews: the police, the judiciary, and the tradi-
tional political parties. However, there are two types of confrontation:
conventional confrontation and conflicting confrontation.
• Conventional confrontation corresponds to friction between indivi-
duals and authority within an agreed framework (demonstrations,
for example). LWE respondents who questioned the role of the
police and potential overtopping discussed situations of conventio-
nal confrontation that tends to make them perceive the police as
doing their job even if they disagree with the methods used.
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• Conflicting confrontation is different in that it puts an individual
in conflict with a form of authority that does not act in accordance
with the definition that the individual has of its role: police injus-
tice, a judicial decision perceived as unfair, etc. Or the individual
does not recognize authorities as legitimate from the outset. RWE
and RE respondents mentioned experiences of conflicting confron-
tations with different forms of authority.
“It’s simple: Islam as a lifestyle. From the moment you wake up in the
morning to the moment you go to bed at night. (Yes, but you are also a
Belgian citizen. And being a Belgian citizen, what can you do in
that case?) Forget these boundaries, forget national flags. My nationa-
lity? Muslim, I am a Muslim, that’s my nationality. I only follow Sharia
law, and all others things, I don’t care about all other laws. It’s like this
(…) Can you change a system, using the laws of that same system? No?
So what do you do? For starters, total rejection, that’s the first step.”
(MLM2)
Expectations that individuals have of the authorities are of various
kinds: people expect the police to protect them, justice to protect their
interests in a fair way, political parties to allow the exercise of
democracy, etc. When these expectations perceived as legitimate are not
met, individuals face disillusionment and loss of confidence. However,
more importantly, if the expectation was required to achieve a primary
goal (to mitigate moral discomfort), the fact that this expectation is not
met will force the individual to turn to other options to achieve his/her
goal.
9.9.4.3. Perceived discrimination
a) Perceived personal discrimination
Personal discrimination seems to be relevant only if it can be reclaimed
in a discourse reflecting a broader discrimination. For example, a
Muslim discriminated because of his religion will retrieve that
discrimination for the cause of the group (the Muslim community).
This is particularly observed among RWE and RE respondents. Indeed,
LWE respondents did not report personal discrimination but mainly
perceived injustice to a wider group.
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b) Perceived group discrimination
Regarding discrimination against a specific community, it is primarily
for RWE and RE respondents that this dimension is of importance
because the reference group is identified and identifiable (as opposed
to a diffuse model group of LWE respondents).
Regarding RWE respondents, the reference community consists of
“deserving” natives who suffer from (perceived) discrimination by
their various “adversaries”: immigrant “profiteers” and accomplices (in
this situation, authorities).
For RE respondents, the religious community is affected by discrimina-
tion by the experiences of the individuals who compose it (headscarf,
etc.). However, as we have seen, several scenarios were shown: individ-
uals evolving within the system and trying to fight discrimination with
system tools (and thus do not qualify as extremists), and those who
consider themselves outside the system and its rules. For this second
category of individuals, perceived discrimination is rather sought by
provocation in order to establish their marginality and position them-
selves permanently in opposition to the authority: no willingness to
integrate.
In addition to perceived discrimination, respondents demonstrated a
need for recognition and consideration for their beliefs (especially,
RWE and RE). Disrespect for radical beliefs defended by individuals
contributes to marginalize this group of individuals and can lead to
further (violent) radicalization of the group. Of all the experiences,
those reflecting (perceived) discrimination are the ones who had the
greatest impact on the degree of radicalness, increasing moral
discomfort.
9.9.5. Exposure
Exposure to extremist content takes place on multiple moments: during
the formation of beliefs, during the engagement (making contact), and
throughout the further process of violent radicalisation.
a. During the formation of beliefs, searching for information is one
way to enhance, refine by comparison, and validate beliefs in a
dynamic process.
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b. During the period of involvement, information is practical and can
help an individual to get in touch with an organized movement
(e.g., to learn about the beliefs defended by an organized move-
ment and/or to look for the coordinates of an organized move-
ment).
c. During the period of involvement in a movement, the individual
may continue to learn, based on the framework provided by the
extremist movement and then producing an enhancing effect nou-
rished back and forth between beliefs and information
An important aspect to be noted is that the boundary between a sponta-
neous search for information and an induced access to information is
sometimes blurred. Both modes seem to intersect in a “snowball effect”
(e.g., a student following a history lesson on communism—induced
access—and then learning more by himself on the internet—sponta-
neous research). However, we observe in the interviews that the search
for extremist information is initiated only if the individual is already in
a process of forming (violent extremist) beliefs.
Several information sources are used by the interviewees: school,
family, and friends (lessons, discussions) traditional “official” media
(press, television, radio), the internet (Wikipedia, etc.), social media
(Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Following the history of technology develop-
ment, we see that the media currently most often used to search for
alternative information is the internet (either websites found via search
engine or discussion forums, or social media like Facebook). This can
be explained, according to the interviewees, by a concern for critical
information, and the mistrust developed against traditional media and
“mainstream” information. Our data shows that even when faced with
uncertainty about the reliability of information on the internet, it seems
nevertheless preferable for interviewees to use this information to
compare and criticize the “official” information.
9.9.5.1. Active exposure
a) Online communication
The importance of active exposure to violent extremist content is
supported by our data, and we have seen that respondents deliberately
sought out violent extremist content online and less frequently offline.
This active exposure is facilitated by the quick, easy, and anonymous
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access to online content on violent extremist websites, forums,
Facebook pages, etc.
The online communication related to political activity is of different
types:
• The individual seeks information but does not want to chat with other
people. Several factors may explain why an individual would not
want to chat with other people: protection of his/her privacy and
anonymity; the fear of having to undergo some adverse conse-
quences of posts that he/she would have posted; the comfort not to
get personally involved (no registration to a forum, but just con-
sulting it), and the satisfaction of having what he/she wanted.
• The individual seeks information and wants to exchange ideas with other
people: the need to be in a “like-minded” environment (this is the
case when the individual is not yet in this kind of environment).
Both cases were observed among respondents in the three ideological
trends. Learning logics show relative similarities regarding the use of
the internet and NSM. We also note that individuals actively seeking
online communication with other people who share similar ideas are
those who do not perceive the opportunity to meet this need in their
offline environment (see below Social setting).
b) Searching for extremist contact
Regarding the search for extremist contacts, some respondents have
actively searched to communicate online with others who share the
same ideas. When the goal is to join an organised group, the Internet
and NSM are useful to find an organized group, regardless whether the
person has access to a strong offline like-minded environment or not.
The use of the internet and NSM is a quick and easy way, in this case, a
“gateway.” However, the internet and NSM are not particularly
privileged means to that end: other respondents said that they were in
contact by means other than the internet (meetings, events, by word of
mouth, etc.). In the first stage of making contact with a group,
individuals have no preference between the use of online or offline
access. However, when it comes to joining and actively being involved
in a group, this requires an offline meeting. The respondents said that
the offline meeting is a guarantee of trust and good faith that the
Internet does not provide.
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c) Self-selection
In the search for information (online or offline), individuals select
information of interest for themselves. This does not mean that the
selected information will defend their viewpoint. Some respondents
claim to have looked for information on ideological trends other than
their own. That being said, a self-selection (or targeting) from the
individual will inevitably tighten the fields of accessible information.
This concerns LWE, RWE, and RE respondents.
It is particularly difficult to determine what information is likely to
bring about a change in the beliefs of an individual. However, we did
not observe a case in which the respondent made a dramatic volte-face
of his opinions after any “counter-speech” information. This, together
with the process of self-selection as a whole, leads us to think that the
emergence of violent extremist beliefs is a prerequisite for more
advanced information search and commitment in a group (which
does not subsequently prevent that beliefs evolve within this group).
This self-selection creates dynamics of considerable “restriction” both
within and outside an organized group (in case of an isolated
individual, the formation of beliefs will be mainly fueled by
independently searched information). It works by amplifying effect
(echo effect): the various dimensions will influence each other
exponentially (as long as they concur). This echo effect is then
accompanied by a homogenizing effect (e.g., by rejecting other beliefs
qualified as invalid, an individual confirms his/her convictions and
differentiates the “ingroup” from the “outgroup”.
• Beliefs will thus be validated by the group and nourished through
data processing.
• Extremist speech echoes the beliefs and allows them to get in a
structured and organized frame, also giving them a recognized
and accepted value.
The processing of information occurs here as “water to the mill,”
feeding the dynamics. The more information is provided, the more
contrast occurs in the individual’s beliefs, either in a logical opposition
(our beliefs/their beliefs) or in a reflective process on the beliefs of the
group. Figure 17 illustrates the dynamics that will gradually lead to a
homogeneity between the beliefs of an individual, the speech of the
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group in which it engages (if applicable), and the focus of his/her
search for information.
In the event of an individual engaged in a group, if the different dimen-
sions, with the exception of information processing, do not agree, then
we could get into confrontational rather than exponential dynamics,
forcing the individual to take a stand. For example, if the affective envi-
ronment contradicts the beliefs and/or actions of the individual, the
latter will either consider the elements of the environment as elements
going from the ingroup to the outgroup or change the nature of his
beliefs and/or actions. He/she will choose, depending on his/her degree
of moral discomfort, the situation that will disadvantage the individual
the least. Another example: if the individual can no longer agree with
the beliefs and/or actions of the movement, he/she will seek to reduce
this discomfort either by modifying his/her definitions or by taking
distance with this movement.
9.9.5.2. Passive exposure
Some respondents said that they had been accidently in contact with
people defending extremist ideas at events or meetings. These
moments are an opportunity to be passively submitted to extremist
speech, possibly more extremist in nature than the initial attitudes of
Figure 17: Homogenization of beliefs (closure of speech)—reinforcement dynamics
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the individual. The individual will have opportunities to compare
different environments and possibly choose an environment that will
better satisfy the need to mitigate moral discomfort.
None of the respondents testified that he/she was passively subjected to
extremist speech without any voluntary initiative prior to this situation.
We cannot support the hypothesis that a non-predisposed person exposed
to online extremist content would be influenced by the content. For the
extremist content to have an impact on an individual, this content must
be supported by the extremist propensity of the individual.
We have not distinguished differences between the three ideological
trends regarding the use of the internet and NSM. These are used for
the purposes explained above, regardless of ideological orientation. In
addition, given the interviews, we cannot support the hypothesis that
the internet and NSM would be a triggering element of violent
extremism (at most a facilitator, as a privileged means of communica-
tion and exchange of information)84.
9.9.6. Moral rules from the environment
We found that some respondents who did not have the satisfaction of
being in a like-minded ideological environment have preferred to
search a new, better matching environment. That said, this does not
concern correspondence of moral rules but rather ideological
convictions.
Concerning moral rules of the environment, an individual evolving in
an environment where moral rules are shared will not seek another
more extremist environment unless the individual himself/herself is in
tension with the primary environment. This raises the question
whether an individual approaches an environment sharing the same
moral rules by affinity, or if the connection with the environment will
84 An interesting question should be raised about the impact of the internet and NSM use as part of
the search for political information. As we see, the ease and speed of use makes the internet
almost unavoidable as a means of communication. But another use of the internet is raised here.
The possibility to (quick and easy) get in touch with other like-minded individuals acts as a safety
valve and allows individuals to diffuse frustration due to the feeling of being misunderstood or
isolated. This does not mean that individuals meeting other “like-minded” people could prevent
a violent radicalization process, but this area of expression the internet provides is an opportu-
nity to offload some frustration. To much censorship is likely to increase frustration.
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build this affinity. Once again, it is the moral discomfort that will be
driving this dynamics. The higher the moral discomfort of an indi-
vidual, the more moral barriers (use of violence) will be weakened and
the more the individual will be inclined to turn to an environment with
low moral barriers. When the moral discomfort is low or non-existent
(as we observe in LWE respondents), the individual will seek a satisfac-
tory environment rather than a homogeneous one.
In the case of an individual living at first in an environment with differ-
ent moral rules of his own, he/she will try to find an environment with
moral rules closer to his/her own (as well as for ideological convic-
tions).
As far as RE respondents are concerned, a very important core of defi-
nitions determined by the religion is the moral discourse that may
influence beliefs and/or involvement of these respondents. More pre-
cisely, it is not the substance of this moral discourse that matters here,
but the recognition of the existence of this moral discourse.
9.9.7. Social setting
9.9.7.1. Social integration
Social integration is based on participation in prosocial activities
(leisure, activities, etc.), integration within the family sphere, integra-
tion within a group of friends, and integration in a conventional institu-
tion (studies, work, etc.). These factors are evaluated at different
degrees of importance and are not necessarily compartmentalized.
The data tell us that social anchorage does not influence the
likelihood of an individual to engage in an extremist movement. In
addition, the social isolation of an individual can be an incentive to join
a movement. This obviously requires that the convictions of one and
the discourse of the other have common bases (ideological recognition).
Profiles of our interviewees are very diverse. However, we did not
identify any particularly isolated case (absence of social ties), except for
an RWE respondent who expressed a link between social isolation and
his engagement process. He said that being part of an excluded group
was a kind of response to his personal feeling of exclusion:
“It is because I, ever since I was little, don’t abide society or other chil-
dren or adolescents anymore, that I didn’t had any worries about my
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social image when engaging in this sort of political party. Even worse, I
found the image that the FN reflected, as an anti-system party, a public
enemy, matched perfectly the image society itself had of me.” (RSM3).
Nevertheless, we observed people with strong or weak social ties in
each of our group’s diversification. We cannot support the hypothesis
that low social integration leads to violent extremism or that a strong
social integration prevents violent extremism.
9.9.7.2. Social diversity
That being said, criticism regarding the theoretical model should be
noted: social integration cannot be understood here too restrictively.
Indeed, we found that “socially integrated” individuals nevertheless
followed a process of radicalization into violent extremism. It should be
noted that theoretical variables must be nuanced by another dimension
of “social diversity.” In fact, although an individual can claim to be
socially integrated, it does not specify if he is integrated in a highly
homogeneous community or not. And a strong homogeneity of moral
discourse within the social environment can affect the learning of moral
barriers and have homogeneous beliefs as a consequence.
We have observed through the data that, in some cases, the circle of
friends and the organized group could partially overlap in a more or
less intense way. This has the effect of reducing the scope and
standardizing the definitions of the status quo by an effect of
compliance. What individuals perceive as a big picture in this case is
actually defined by certain comprehension keys passed on in an almost
closed circuit by the members of the group.
Figure 18: Homogenization of people—Overlapping dynamics
 
AFFECTIVE SPHERE ORGANIZED GROUP 
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Concerning the family sphere, its impact can be of three types: either it
agrees with the beliefs and then provides positive reinforcement of
their validity, or it places itself in opposition and can also enhance the
validity of convictions by a reaction effect85 or it positions itself in a
neutral way without much impact on the nature of beliefs (e.g., when
parents only care to know that the person will have no trouble relating
to his activist engagement).
The ideological base then refers to the possibility for an individual to
meet with others who share similar beliefs. As we said above, the
collected data suggest to distinguish the ideological base of the social
base to nuance the mechanisms and avoid simplistic determinism. See
figure 18 for this. Thus, an individual deeply socially rooted in an
environment carrying homogeneous beliefs can evolve differently from
an individual who is also deeply socially rooted in a heterogeneous
environment. A degree of ideological anchorage is of importance in this
process, and not necessarily associated with a social anchorage (and
vice versa).
One of the issues with a strong ideological anchorage in a movement is
that the individual risks to reduce the number of times and places
where he can confront his beliefs to other frameworks, worldviews,
and different discourses. This homogenization has an impact on the
evolution of one individual’s beliefs.
9.9.7.3. Political engagement of the environment
As suggested by the interviews, the family circle plays an important
role in the construction of beliefs. Several scenarios are offered to us in
the interviews and are transversal to the different trends:
• The family environment conveys an engaged opinion, but is not
politically engaged. The individual is positioned in line or in oppo-
sition. When an individual evolves in a family environment that
promotes an engaged discourse, the environment can influence the
beliefs of the individual. However, it does not necessarily mean
that the environment defends the same ideas. The case of an LWE
respondent who grew up in an RWE family environment tells us
85 It is understood that a person not taking a reactive attitude to his parents’ opinion then enters
the first category of “positive reinforcement,” because convictions would then de facto be from
the same register.
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that other learning referents can influence an individual’s beliefs.
In his case, it was school. This does not explain why this individual
was more sensitive to LWE speeches in school rather than RWE
speeches within the family. Part of the answer lies in the feeling of
not having, according to him, the opportunity to question the
father’s opinion and to express his own ideas.
a. The family environment conveys an engaged opinion and is politi-
cally engaged. The majority of respondents are consistent with the
ideas of their family environment.
9.10. Conclusion
In summary, we have seen a central element on which the process of
violent radicalization is based: the moral discomfort experienced and/
or perceived by an individual. This moral discomfort may collide with
the moral barriers of the individual, creating an excess of unfavorable
definitions toward respect of moral rules in relation to favorable
definitions, which could lead to political violence.
Moral discomfort occurs when a person experiences too great a differ-
ence between what he considers to be a “satisfactory balance” between
his basic needs (social and professional integration, recognition of self
and/or community, respect for individual freedoms, fair and equal
treatment, etc.) and the life he actually lives and/or the perception of it.
Each individual defines for himself what his basic needs are. They can
be of personal order (need for recognition, promotion, respect) and/or
of group order (need for recognition, promotion, respect). Non-compli-
ance with these basic needs crystallizes in the experiences of perceived
discrimination and (perceived) injustice that amplify the moral discom-
fort perceived by the individual, especially in the case of RWE and RE
respondents). Discrimination or injustices perpetrated against an indi-
vidual by a form of authority will be experienced more strongly by the
individuals who have a high esteem of these forms of authority (cf.
Legitimacy of Authorities).
The main difference we can observe between the three ideological
trends is that this moral discomfort does not seem prominent among
the LWE respondents, unlike the RWE and RE ones. In terms of group
of belonging, the LWE respondents identify with a very diffuse
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community, unlike the RWE and RE respondents. Similarly, the main
adversary identified by LWE respondents is diffuse (“Great Capital”),
while it is identifiable for the RWE (“non-native”) and RE ones (“non-
Muslims”). That being said, we see individuals with low moral
discomfort and others with a high moral discomfort within the three
ideological trends; this means that the elements that could lead to a
process of radicalization are not specific to an ideological trend but rely
on broader structural causes (causes of causes).
Although the internet and NSM facilitate the exchange of information
and making contact, the internet and social media are not the starting
point of the violent radicalization process. They serve as a facilitator
that will be involved when the radicalization process has already
begun. In addition, their use, although easy and fast, has limitations in
terms of confidentiality and reliability of exchanges. Let us add that the
possibility to discuss political (extremist) beliefs online may also have a
positive side because it provides an area for expressing frustrations,
without leading to an actual radicalization process.
The perception of authorities as legitimate is crucial. Discriminant
experiences (direct or indirect) perpetrated by the authorities toward
an individual and/or a community have a very important impact on the
perception of individuals. In this regard, it should be noted that a
significant element that we observed for both RE and RWE respondents
is the idea of the adversary that crystallizes into an injustice to fight
against (for RWE, “immigrants who abuse the system and solidarity to
their advantage”; for RE, “Islamophobic persons who discriminate
Muslims”). In addition, a crucial aspect to be noted is that it is not the
direct opponent that will have an impact on the degree of violent
extremism, but the feeling that the authorities maintain a situation of
injustice between the individual and his adversary. In other words,
“facing an adversary is not perceived as a problematic situation, what
is problematic and frustrating is that the authorities are perceived as
not allowing a fair and equitable fight against this adversary.” The
extremist group is then a response to this failure of the authorities, as
they claim to provide the means to restore a more equitable balance of
force into this struggle.
Furthermore, we must make a distinction between individuals who
confront with the authorities while respecting the “rules of the game”
of the existing system, and individuals who do not recognize the
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legitimacy of the authorities or even the system itself. It is useless to put
a sustainable and preventive fight within the frame of the system
against individuals who do not recognize this very system.
Finally, we have seen that the social environment of violent extremist
individuals can help define the moral rules of an individual. They will
leave this environment if their fundamental needs require the adoption
of another set of moral rules. More than social integration, it seems
more effective to focus on meeting those basic needs, rather than trying
to influence the social environment of an individual. In this context, a
counter narrative approach would be relevant only if they aim to
provide an alternative to meet those needs and not just an alternative
deconstructing discourse (cf. Recommendations).
This analysis is based on interviews with respondents who defend
radical or extremist convictions, with various degrees of violence
acceptance. Given the above elements explaining why some people
follow the path of violent extremism, we believe it is the moral
discomfort that is the most appropriate to act on in order to reduce the
propensity to (violent) radicalization.
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10. GENERAL CONCLUSION
Early on in our research, it was clear that extremists are not mentally
insane or delusional when committing acts of political violence. On the
contrary, during the interviews it became clear that violence was
perceived and used as an efficient (and often last) resource to achieve a,
in their eyes, reasonable and necessary goal. By acting and reacting to a
situation that is perceived as highly problematic, extremists are able to
resolve a tension between the current (problematic) political and social
situation and what they perceive is needed to fulfill some essential and
fundamental needs. The more urgent and prominent this tension is, the
more likely these individuals will resort to political violence, as an
immediate and effective means to an end. This implies that violent
extremism and political violence can better be understood as a part of a
deliberate strategy to reach a goal toward one is strongly morally
engaged (Braeckman, 2006). This idea is backed up by Wikström and
his Situational Action Theory (Bouhana and Wikström, 2008) which
clearly states that actions, including political violence, are ultimately
the outcome of a perception-choice process, where an individual
perceives certain action alternatives (based on the setting he or she is in
and the own propensity) and then chooses, deliberately or out of habit,
one of those alternatives, taking both moral rules and social controls
into account.
It also became clear that there are numerous motives and reasons that
supposedly tell us why a certain act of political violence is committed
and that at the same time are used to justify and legitimize these acts
for those that commit them. These motives are mostly ideological or
religious in nature. For example political violence can be committed to
install the Sharia in Europe, to establish a white nationalist state, to
overthrow the capitalist elite, to demand equal rights, to liberate test
animals, to save unborn children, to get rid of immigrants, to safeguard
the own culture, etc. Such justifications cannot be causes of political
violence because they are provided after the facts. Still, motives like
these are often central in media reports on acts of violent extremism,
especially in the case of religious (Muslim) extremism, contributing to
an image of irrational and mentally ill perpetrators. Even some scholars
and terrorism and violent extremism experts place ideology and reli-
gion central in their assessment of political violence and explanation of
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why some individuals radicalize into violent extremism. This is prob-
lematic because motives are not and cannot be causes of political
violence. Motives explain why it is important to reach a certain goal but
they do not explain why a specific action, out of several possibilities is
chosen to achieve this goal. They are necessary but insufficient condi-
tions to explain action (Davidson, 1963). What is needed for extremist
motives to become causes is the contributing role of situational expo-
sure and violent extremist propensity. The literature review already
indicated that ideology is fully learned and incorporated only after
joining an extremist group and thus is not a primary factor leading to
radicalization into violent extremism.
Instead of focusing on motivations and ideology, attention should go to
structural issues, group processes and perceived individual strains as
the breeding ground of violent radicalization. The real (compelling)
reasons (Davidson, 1963) to join extremist groups are often social in
nature and based on feelings of indignation and being lost (Bjørgo,
2002). Especially individuals searching for social inclusion, searching
for identity/meaning and experiencing injustice are susceptible for
violent extremism. Extremist groups offer individuals a simple, logical,
and hands-on answer to their grievances. More specific, extremist
groups answer to the individual’s need by offering them 1) a strong
sense of identity, 2) a political activist answer to injustice and 3) a warm
home and sense of belonging (Fermin, 2009). If these things can be
found in the rest of society (or society fails to offer them) extremist
groups can become very attractive to the individual. The fact that this
has, initially, nothing to do with ideology is also indicated by research
that shows that in areas where individuals have easy access to organ-
ized crime, offering them the same things, violent extremism is absent
(Roy, 2008).
A huge problem in the research on violent extremism and political
violence is the excess of risk factors, and confusions about which of
these factors can be seen as causal and which one are mere correlates.
To address this problem, an integrated theory based model for the
explanation of violent extremism (political violence) was developed
based on Wikström’s (2014) SAT, by building on key elements from
theories explaining (youth) offending in general as causes of the causes.
This was possible because, similar to general acts of crime, political
violence can be defined as ‘the breaching of moral rules as defined in
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law’ (Bouhana & Wikström, 2008). This definition circumvents concep-
tual discussions and makes it possible to reach a general explanation of
political violence by applying the logic of SAT to the explanation of
political violence. Our analysis confirmed the applicability of this
model on the explanation of violent extremism (political violence). This
means that
1. a difference has to be made between the direct causes of political violence
and the causes of the causes (emergence) and
2. individual extremist propensity and exposure to extremist settings form
the direct causes of political violence in interaction with each other.
Given the focus of our study we mainly studied exposure to extremist
content through NSM. It appeared to be fundamental to make a distinc-
tion between active exposure, or deliberately searching for certain infor-
mation and communication, and passive exposure, or encountering
certain content by accident while doing other things online. The result
of the qualitative interviews clearly showed that extremists do not
simply refer to NSM as causes. NSM are mainly used as a useful
resource or instrumental tool to pursue offline developed interests
online by looking for information and communication with like-minded
individuals. They are used to stay up-to-date with the movement and to
organize networks. It is very unlikely that an individual will radicalize
only by using NSM. Further, our results clearly showed that the
“danger” that lies not only online but also in offline exposure to violent
extremism must be taken into account. Especially exposure to delin-
quent and or extremist peers can influence the radicalization process.
On the other hand, our analysis did show that the active use of NSM for
extremist goals does have a major impact on the likelihood of commit-
ting political violence. Individuals deliberately seeking out other
extremist groups and individuals for communication are indeed at
higher risk of violent extremism and in the end using political violence.
This effect is amplified by propensity. It was very clear that those
adolescents having a high propensity toward violent extremism were
influenced the most by ENSM. The effects, and subsequently, the
danger of exposure, even active exposure, for individuals with only
low propensities toward violent extremism are negligible. This means
that the danger lies not with NSM themselves, but in adolescents
wanting to visit certain sites and wanting to communicate with extrem-
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ists. In other words, in the prevention of violent radicalization, it is
crucial to prevent adolescents to become interested in violent
extremism. To do this attention should be paid to the structural causes
of violent extremism or, in other words, those factors determining
exposure and propensity, the causes of the causes.
According to SAT, some by research and literature identified risk
factors are in fact (elements of) causes of the causes. In this regard, our
analysis identified several elements of perceived strain/injustice that
contribute to the breeding ground for violent extremism. This indicates
that more attention should go to elements of perceived injustice and
strain instead of to relative deprivation and poverty as structural root
causes in the explanation of violent extremism and political violence. In
studies addressing general offending this is already recognized. So far,
the latter has received a lot of attention without much result. Research
trying to discover socio-demographic profiles of extremists only found
mixed and contradicting results. Some individuals come from a
wealthy background, while others are poor and some are highly
educated, while others are illiterate. Focusing on perceived injustice
can put these results in perspective. Feelings of injustice can be present
among all social groups and layers of society and hold strong explana-
tory power when addressing political violence. When developing
prevention policies this should be kept in mind and efforts should be
made to address the (structural) problems that are at the base of these
perceptions.
Elements of perceived injustice can be found in different aspects of
individual lives. Potential elements of perceived injustice can be found
in the own personal situation (eg. family situation, career opportunities
etc.), regarding general social, political and economic aspects of life (eg.
discrimination on the house or job market, being refused a loan at the
bank etc.) and when coming in contact with the authorities (eg. feeling
singled out during police controls etc.). More specifically our research
identified poor social integration, elements of perceived discrimination
and elements of procedural justice as elements of injustice that form the
causes of the causes, influencing extremist propensity and exposure.
Our results cleary showed that elements of 1) poor social integration, 2)
both perceived group discrimination and perceived personal discrimi-
nation and 3) the perception of the authorities as being unjust and
subsequently illegitimate greatly contribute to political violence.
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Zooming in one of these elements, perceived procedural justice, the
results clearly show the importance of trust for the authorities in the
prevention of violent extremism and subsequently the need to restore
this trust among the at risk populations86. All respondents clearly indi-
cated having negative perceptions of the authorities and the police and
not perceiving them as legitimate. Further, measures of procedural
justice are clearly related to political violence, even controlling for other
risk factors. Perceived alienation (including measures of perceived
injustice) was found to be a ground cause of violent extremism, influ-
encing individual extremist propensity and extremist exposure. This is
problematic, not only because perceived injustice forms a ground for
violent extremism but also because cooperation of populations at risk is
necessary to identify extremist groups and prevent radicalization. This
means that strict enforcement of the law without attention to cultural
and local sensitivities and/or harsh actions by the police may, in fact,
increase the risk of violent extremism because it creates cynicism
regarding the law among the singled out minority groups. The same is
true for polices and specific measures focussing on a particular group
(eg. a ban on headscarves instead of a ban of all religious symbols). This
undermines the willingness to cooperate with the police and partici-
pate in civic actions aimed at reducing deviant behavior. Consequently,
policy should pay attention to this problem and work on enhancing
general perceptions of trust and legitimacy of the authorities and, more
specifically address (perceptions of) unjust and biased police actions.
86 Previous research already showed that minorities attach the same importance to procedural
justice and use the same criteria for its assessment as majority groups do (Tyler, 1994, 2001).
Both in the UK and the US (Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010)
empirical research has shown that the perceived fairness of the criminal justice system, and
especially the police, police intervention and manners highly predict legitimacy and coopera-
tion. However, research also showed that minorities have the most negative image of the
authorities as unjust and unfair. They feel singled out by authorities based on prejudice and
stereotypes (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). This is confirmed by our study.
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11. RECOMMENDATIONS
General remarks
Based on the results of both the quantitative and qualitative research
and the conclusions linked to them, some recommendations can be
made regarding the prevention of violent radicalization among adoles-
cents and, more specifically, the prevention of violent extremism.
Before lining out our recommendations, it is important to stress four
remarks.
(1) It has to be kept in mind what it is one wants to achieve. There is a
difference between measures aiming at the prevention of violent
extremism and political violence and strategies aiming at deradicaliza-
tion. They each address a different population and they each ask for a
specific approach. Our study only allows to make recommendations
regarding the prevention of radicalization. In order to do so for deradi-
calization, further research is needed.
(2) Also the position of the government has to be taken into account.
This is challenging because two different and conflicting signals have to
be given. First it must be clear that violent extremism will not be toler-
ated. Second it is crucial not to push movements and individuals
underground. With this in mind policy makers have to be careful not to
develop strategies that contribute to the problem. In this regard it is
problematic that so far, only a few projects are scientifically evaluated.
However, research into projects aimed at reducing youth violence in
general show that only those projects starting with prevention from a
very early stage, are effective on the long term (see also Christmann,
2012).
(3) The main concern of practitioners and field workers is on how to
recognize individuals at risk in order to focus prevention. We like to
stress that general structural problems are at the base of radicalization
and violent extremism. This can be seen a “bad news” because it makes
it difficult to aim prevention strategies specifically at violent
extremism. On the other hand, it also means that we can learn from
what is already known from the prevention of youth offending as well
as general resilience and youth programs. Although it is difficult and
not always possible to solve structural problems, where possible they
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have to be addressed in order to prevent violent extremism in the long
term. Structural problems can influence the perceptions of individuals,
possibly guiding them towards certain extremist settings and in the end
political violence. Whether or not these perceptions are one hundred
percent objectively justified, they are at least partially based on prob-
lems of inequality and discrimination (causes of the causes). On the
short term, youth can be made more resilient to violent extremism by
training on how to deal with problems and difficult situations. Resil-
ience-training addresses first of all propensity as the direct cause of
extremism by learning youth how to control their impulses and
develop positive non-violent attitudes. Second, this will also reduce the
need for (active) extremist exposure. These kinds of strategies can be
useful for a broad range of groups and do not need to be aimed specifi-
cally at youth at risk of radicalization. By addressing general groups
and offering positive skills, individuals at risk are also reached out
without stigmatizing and at the same time benefitting youth in general.
(4) In order to put our recommendations into practice it should be clear
who should take on which responsibility. However, although theoreti-
cally relatively easy to answer, in practice this is a difficult task, espe-
cially since we are dealing with federal, regional and local levels of
gevornment. Inevitably, there will be overlapping action domains and
shared responsibilities. The mains issue is coordination. When not
accurately coordinated this could cause certain issues to be overlooked
or ignored while others will be addressed by different actors, leading to
confusion. Based on these concerns and on the need for information
present in the field, we repeat our suggestion for the formation of a
knowledge and information centre on radicalization and extremism,
grouping relevant actors and knowledge and supported by research
(see Noppe et al., 2011). Several actors are concerned about violent radi-
calization into violent extremism on both the short and the long term.
Several actors also already take initiatives to tackle this (violent) radi-
calization. What is missing, is a central and neutral partner that can
bring existing knowledge together, advise in the development of an
integrated prevention policy, coordinate responsibilities, give concrete
information on how to recognize and tackle radicalization and support
and evaluate existing initiatives. All of our porposed recommendations
could be organized by or would benefit from such a centre.
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Specific recommendations
Following the recommendations made by Noppe et al. (2011) we main-
tain that it is important to develop a prevention policy based on two
axes. First existing social policy and initiatives should be reinforced,
especially in the domains of education, employment and integration.
Our results showed that poor social integration and perceived discrimi-
nation and perceived injustice are important elements of the breeding
ground for violent extremism. It is important that structural grounds
for these strains are tackled. Second, regional and local work packages
have to be developed. Extremism is often tied to personal experiences
and local circumstances and can thus best be recognized and addressed
on this local level. Our recommendations refer to these local initiatives.
First, in the prevention of online radicalization into violent extremism,
the virtual lifestyle of adolescents must be taken into account. The kind
of websites adolescents visit, differ in frequency, nature and persuasive-
ness of extremist messages. As already explained there are different
virtual settings giving access to extremist content but not all of them
pose the same danger for violent radicalization. Although extremism
might be present on passive mainstream virtual settings87, these settings
are not extremist in nature causing possible extremist comments and
narratives to be countered by other users. This can result in discussions
on different social and political issues and how to interpret them. In
other words, passive virtual settings can give rise to a bottom-up and
pluralistic discourse and offer alternatives to the extremist narratives.
Youth in the prephase of radicalization might visit these websites in
search for answers, before ending up in more active extremist virtual
settings. The alternatives they encounter here might put the extremist
discourse in another perspective and keep them from further radical-
izing. Our results further indicate that for some adolescents being able
to ventilate on these websites fulfills an important social function,
keeping them from further radicalizing into violent extremism. If this
possibility would be taken, it is likely that these adolescents will end up
in active extremist virtual settings being at risk of further violent radi-
calization into violent extremism. Finally, the interactions on these
87 Mainstream passive virtual settings refer to websites and fora that are not extremist in nature
but that do aim at a target audience that also can be attractive for extremist groups. So extremist
will be present on these websites, trying to recruit new members.
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websites and forums reflect interaction in real life. Thus, censuring and
controlling them would be a waste of time and resources. As already
noted, peers and offline social contacts remain crucial in the process of
radicalization.
Therefore we recommend to support these kind of websites and forums
instead of censuring them and closing them down. This can be done by
helping these websites to ensure their continuation (financially or logis-
tically) and/or make them more effective in recognizing and countering
extremist propaganda and recognizing and responding to individuals at
risk of violent extremism. Most of these websites do not welcome
extremist content but do not know how to react. So a possibility would
be to offer support and training to existing moderators of these websites.
Furthermore, this does not exclude, and even provides further oppor-
tunities for the monitoring of these websites. The presence of extremist
and their activities and networks can provide valuable information for
police and security services. Concerning active extremist settings88 or
genuine extremist websites and forums, the only option might be to
close them down. However, it is questionable whether the closing
down of these websites would be very effective since they most likely
will reappear under another name or format. Still, consequently closing
them down could form a clear signal that such content is not acceptable
and will not be tolerated. However, it is unlikely that youth will repeat-
edly end up on these websites by accident, implying a more dangerous
active exposure. Furthermore, adolescents visiting these websites are
expected to already have a certain propensity toward violent
extremism. Therefore, prevention strategies targeting these websites
are probably not effective since their audience has already bypassed the
preface or radicalization and entered the process of radicalization. This
means that de-radicalization rather than prevention would be needed.
Previous studies showed that deradicalization strategies are only effec-
tive when personal and face to face; therefore, it is unlikely that the
necessary bonds of trust can be established through these websites. As
already mentioned, further research on deradicalization is needed, both
in terms of understanding the processes of deradicalization in general
and to determine the role of the internet and NSM in this process. NSM
can provide unique opportunities to reach extremists and facilitate
88 Active extremist virtual settings are websites and forums that are extremist in nature and inten-
tion.
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deradicalization, but on the other hand, elements of online influence
and online social ties can prevent deradicalization. Further research is
needed to address this question.
Second, there has been a lot of debate about the use of counter narra-
tives for the prevention of online radicalization (see also Leuprecht,
Hataley, Moskalenko, & McCauley, 2010a, 2010b). We think counter
narratives can only be useful in a passive virtual setting. In these
settings, individuals with a low or medium propensity to violent
extremism can be found to be still looking for “the right answer” on the
questions they are struggling with. It could be useful to offer clear and
positive messages that counter the narrative of the extremist groups.
However, one has to be careful not to elapse into an ideological battle
for the one and only right answer. The most effective would be to freely
offer some strong and positive arguments (Weilnböck, 2005). Often this
is already done by the other non-extremist members of these websites
and forums. For active virtual settings, it is unlikely that counter narra-
tives would have any effect. Individuals active in these settings already
have found their (extremist) answer and would not be open for counter
arguments. It is more likely that counter narrative attempts will be
interpreted as confirming the extremist narrative of a deceiving and
untrustworthy government. As already said, what is needed here is not
prevention but deradicalization.
Third, actions should be taken to restore the trust in the authorities.
This is not an easy task. What is expected from the authorities differs
for different groups and these visions can contradict each other. For
example what the politically right orientated population expects from
the government on the subject of immigration is probably not the same
as what people of foreign descent will expect. Further, the objective
situation and treatment by the authorities might not respond to the
perception among the population or the individuals involved. We
believe that the most effective way is to sensibilize public servants and
especially the police.
Thus we recommend that they are made aware of the existence of
perceptions of distrust and injustice, how their actions contribute to
these perceptions and how best to react in certain situations. Research
already showed that it is not so much the outcome of interactions with
the police that determines whether are not they are trusted and seen as
legitimate. On the contrary it has repeatedly been shown that the
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perception of being treated fairly and respectfully by a neutral police
during encounters more strongly contributes to the perception of the
police as being legitimate, even in case of negative personal outcome
(Tyler, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2001; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Lind, 1992).
With this in mind it is also important that police are trained in how to
interact with different populations, to recognize possible sensitive situ-
ations, and how best to handle these. It is important for police to stay
neutral in their daily encounters with populations at risk and not let
their actions be guided by political sentiments (Deflem, 2004a). We
expect this to be equally true for other public servants.
We do repeat that perceptions of injustice are not only a consequence of
encounters with the authorities, but can also be a consequence of the
personal situation (poor social integration) and more general social,
economic and political situations (perceived discrimination). Our focus
on strengthening trust in the authorities does not mean that other
elements leading to feelings of injustice should be disregarded.
Fourth it is crucial to avoid youth joining extremist groups. Therefore
youth have to be made more resilient to extremist thoughts and hate
discourses and made more adept in coping with difficult situations. As
part of this, youth must be educated on what exactly constitutes a hate
discourse, how it can be recognized, and what alternatives are
available. Especially, minors might not always have the necessary social
knowledge on politics and social issues to accurately judge the content
of certain propaganda. In other words, more attention should go to
critical reflection (Braeckman, 2006). Second, youth have to be educated
into confident and intellectual autonomous individuals with a strong
democratic consciousness. There should be more focus on the
acquisition of values related to respectful and peaceful coexistence.
From a young age this can already be, partially, achieved by showing
them how to work together, solve problems together, communicate,
reach compromises and handle differences in daily live. Third,
knowledge and understanding of our political system and how society
works should be increased. Often, youth have no idea of how the
political decision making process works, what the historical roots are of
certain trends or laws in our society (eg. migration, devision state and
religion etc.) or how to understand different cultural, political and
social attitudes in society. This can also help youth in recognizing
injustice and learn them how to react and change their situation.
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Fourth, there should be more focus on internet literacy. It is often
difficult to recognize legitimate form false information on the internet,
especially in case of wel designed websites. Here can lie an important
task for schools, youth workers and other youth organizations. It is
important for youth to feel included and valued in society. Once again
it has to be kept in mind that extremist exposure does not only occur
online but can also, and sometimes mainly, occur offline through peers
and other offline social ties.
Following the two previous remarks, it is important to note that inter-
national research (PIDOP-project) has shown that the place were youth
feel the most treated unfairly is the school environment. This can be by
teachers, but also by other personal, other students, perceived opportu-
nities etc. This confirms the importance of the two previous recommen-
dations and the important role schools play. After all, youth spend 35
hours a week in the school environment. In case of increasing resilience
towards extremism, it is also important to start at an early age because
1) extremist groups target individuals as young as 13 or 14 years old
and 2) individuals at risk are more likely to drop out of school after a
certain age. Further, teachers, but also other professionals in the field
like youth workers, social workers etc. often do not know how to recog-
nize radicalization, when it becomes a problem and how to handle it.
However, because of their close contact with youth they are extremely
valuable for prevention. So, a specific training improving their skills
regarding radicalization and extremism could be very useful.
Finally, when developing a prevention strategy, it should be kept in
mind that friends and family have to be made aware that they are
essential for prevention and deradicalization. Social support and
contact are crucial in keeping youth from radicalizing into extremism.
It does mean that radicalizing persons are in need of extra support from
their environments, especially when they want to leave. Lack of social
ties and having no place to go often inhibit youth to return on their
steps. (Bjørgo, 2002) In this regard, families have to be given the right
information and tools to handle situations of radicalization and to facil-
itate prevention and deradicalization. In that regard, it is also impor-
tant to keep communicating and talking with both the individuals at
risk and extremists. Open communication can be an important tool in
preventing violence.
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APPENDIX
The following appendixes can be found on the website of Belspo more
specifically on the project-Radimed webpage.
Appendix 1: French survey
Appendix 2: Dutch survey
Appendix 3: Measurement of constructs
Appendix 4: Frequency tables and bar charts
Appendix 5: Crosstabs
Appendix 6: Regression analysis
Appendix 7: Interaction-effects
Appendix 8: Correlation matrix
Appendix 9: Categories qualitative analysis
Appendix 10: Interview extracts
Appendix 11: Topic list interviews
Appendix 12: Original interview extracts chapter 9
exposure.social.media.book  Page 205  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
exposure.social.media.book  Page 206  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
207
REFERENCES
Abbas, T. (2007). Islamic political radicalism: A European perspective. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Adams, J., & Roscigno, V. J. (2005). White supremacists, oppositional culture
and the world wide web. Social Forces, 84(2), 759–778.
ADL. (2005). Ecoterrorism: Extremism in the Animal Rights and Environmen-
talist Movements. Retrieved from http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/
Ecoterrorism.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_
in_America&xpicked=4&item=eco.
Agnew, R. (1993). Why do they do it? An examination of the intervening mech-
anisms between “social control” variables and delinquency. Journal of
research in crime and delinquency, 30(3), 245–266.
Agnew, R. (2002). Experienced, vicarious and anticipated strain: An explora-
tory study focusing on physical victimization and delinquency. Justice
Quarterly, 19(4), 603–632.
Agnew, R. (2004). A general strain theory approach to violence. In M. Zahn, H.
Brownstein & S. Jackson (Eds.), Violence: From theory to research (pp. 37–50).
Dayton, OH: Anderson Publishing.
Agnew, R. (2006). Pressured into crime: An overview of general strain theory. USA:
Oxford University Press, USA.
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting
interactions. Sage
AIVD. (2006). De gewelddadige Jihad in Nederland. Den Haag: Algemene
Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst.
AIVD. (2007). Jaarverslag. Den Haag: Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheids-
dienst.
AIVD. (2012). Het Jihadistisch internet: Kraamkamer van de hedendaagse Jihad. Den
Haag: Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst.
Akers, R. L. (1964). Socio–economic status and delinquent behavior: A retest.
Journal of research in crime and delinquency, 1(1), 38–46.
Akers, R. L. (1998). Social Learning and Social Structure: A General Theory of Crime
and Deviance. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Akers, R. L., & Silverman, A. (2004). Toward a social learning model of
violence and terrorism. In M.A. Zahn, H. H. Brownstein & S. L. Jackson
(eds.), Violence: From theory to research (pp. 19-30). Dayton, OH: Anderson
Publishing
exposure.social.media.book  Page 207  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
208
Akinson, R. (1998). The life story interview. London: Sage.
Al-Lami, M., & O’Loughlin, B. (2009, 12 januari). Jihadis try to make friends on
Facebook. The Guardian. Retrieved 17 februari, 2012, from http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/12/facebook-jihadis
Aly, A. (2009). The Terrorists’ Audience: A Model of Internet Radicalisation.
Journal of Australian Professional Intelligence Officers, 17(1), 3–19.
Aly, A. (2010). The Internet as Ideological Battleground. Paper presented at the
Australian Counter terrorism Conference, Perth, Australia.
Anderson, A., Shibuya, A., Ihori, N., Swing, E., L., Bushman, B., J., Sakamoto,
A., Saleem, M. (2010). Violent video game effects on aggression, empathy,
and prosocial behavior in eastern and western countries: a meta-analytic
review. Psychological Bulletin, 136(2), 151–173.
Anderson, C. A., Berkowitz, L., Donnerstein, E., Huesmann, L. R., Johnson, J.
D., Linz, D., Wartella, E. (2003). The influence of media violence on youth.
Psychological science in the public interest, 4(3), 81–110.
Anderson, C. A., Gentile, D. A., & Buckley, K. E. (2007). Violent Video Game
Effects on Children and Adolescents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Art, R. J., & Richardson, L. (eds.). (2007). Democracy and counterterrorism:
Lessons from the past. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Arts, L., & Butter, E. (2009). Radicaal, orthodox, of extremist? Achtergrondinfor-
matie over radicalisering en polarisatie. Amsterdam: ABC Kenniscentrum voor
Emancipatie en Participatie.
Atran, S. (2008). Who becomes a terrorist today? Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(5).
Atran, S. (2010). Pathways to and from violent extremism: The case for science-based
field research. Retrieved from http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/atran10/
atran10_index.html.
Baker, S. (2010). Skating on stilts: Why we aren’t stopping tomorrow’s terrorism.
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Bandura, A. (1962). Social learning through imitation. In J., R., Marshall (Ed),
(1962). Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1962. (pp. 211-274). Oxford,
England: Univer. Nebraska Press.
Bandura, A. (1977). Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A. (2001a). Social cognitive theory of mass commuinication. Media
Psychology, 3(3), 265–298.
Bandura, A. (2001b). Social Cognitive Theory: an agentive perspective. Annual
Review of Psychology, 52(1), 1–26.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 208  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
209
Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through
imitation of aggressive models. The Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 63(3), 575.
Bartlett, J., & Littler, M. (2011). Inside the EDL. Populist politics in a digital age.
Report. London: Demos.
Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2010). The power of unreason: Conspiracy theories,
extremism and counter-terrorism. Retrieved from 
http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thepowerofunreason
Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). The edge of violence: Towards telling the differ-
ence between violent and non-violent radicalization. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 24 (1), 1–21.
Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., & King, M. (2010). The edge of violence: A radical
apporach to extremism. Retrieved from http://www.demos.co.uk/publica-
tions/theedgeofviolence
Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., & Littler, M. (2011). “The rise of populism in Europe
can be traced through online behaviour...” The new face of digital
populism. London: Demos.
Bashar, I. (2012). The Facebook Jihad. RSIS Commentaries.
Benschop, A. (2006). Virtuele Jihad en de cultuur van de grote bekken. In S.
Harchaoui (Ed.), Hedendaags radicalisme. Verklaringen en aanpak. (pp.
140–179). Apeldoorn: Het Spinhuis.
Bentivegna, S. (2002). Politics and new media. In L. Lievrouw & S. Livingstone
(Eds.), The handbook of new media. (pp. 50–61). London: Sage. Retrieved
from http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=sR5bwG_tFyMC&oi=
fnd&pg=PR9&dq=the+handbook+of+new+media&ots=VbyEdSDWSD&
sig=z6RlBeIi4HEXK5cuYBsEgTKan9c#v=onepage&q=the%20handbook%
20of%20new%20media&f=false.
Beski-Chafiq, C. (2010). Youth and Islamist radicalisation: Lille, France.
Aarhus: Centre for the Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation, Aarhus
University.
Bittner, E. (1963). Radicalism and the organization of radical movements.
American Sociological Review, 28 (6), 928–940.
Bjørgo, T. (1997). Racist and right-wing violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, perpetra-
tors, and responses. Oslo: Aschehoug.
Bjørgo, T. (2002). Exit Neo-Nazism. Reducing recruitment and promoting
disengagement from racist groups. NUPI working paper 627. Oslo: Norwe-
gian Institute of International Affairs.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 209  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
210
Bjørgo, T. (2012). Processes of disengagement from different types of extremist and
criminal groups. Paper presented at the Exit conference. Leaving extremist
and criminal groups: Scandinavian experiences on disengagement and
reintegration into society. Stockholm.
Blazak, R. (2001). White boys to terrorist men: Target recruitment of Nazi Skin-
heads. American Behavioral Scientist, 44(6), 982–1000.
Bloor, M. (ed.). (2000). Focus groups in social research. London: Sage.
Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social
science theories. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 7–36.
Borum, R. (2011). Rethinking radicalization. Journal of Strategic Security, 4 (4).
Bouhana, N., & Wikström, P. H. (2008). Theorizing terrorism: Terrorism as
moral action. A scoping study. London: University College London.
Bouhana, N., & Wikström, P. H. (2011). Al Qa’ida-influenced radicalisation: A
rapid evidence asessment guided by Situational Action Theory. Occasional
Paper 97. London: Home Office.
Bowman-Grieve, L. (2011). The internet and terrorism. Pathways towards
terrorism and counter-terrorism. In A. Silke (Ed.), The psychology of counter-
terrorism. London: Routledge.
Boyd, D. M. (2008). Why youth love social network sites: The role of
networked publics in teenage social life. In D. Buckingham (Ed.), Youth,
identity and digital media. (pp. 119–142). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Boyd, D. M., & Ellison, N. B. (2008). Social network sites: definition, history
and scholarship. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 13(1),
210–230.
Brady, H. E., Schlozman, K. L., & Verba, S. (1999). Prospecting for participants:
Rational expectations and the recruitment of political activists. American
Political Science Review, 93(1), 153–168.
Braeckman, J. (2006). Nucleair terrorisme: enkele sociaal-psychologische
bedenkingen. In G. Cornelis & G. Eggermont (Eds.), Nucleaire terreur: reflec-
teren over voorzorg en ethiek (pp. 107–115). Gent: Academia Press.
Brown, D., & Silke, A. (2011). The impact of the media on terrorism and
counter-terrorism. In A. Silke (Ed.), The psychology of counter-terrorism.
London: Routledge.
Browne, K. D., & Hamilton-Giachritsis, C. (2005). The influence of violent
media on children and adolescents: A public-health approach. The Lancet,
365(9460), 702–710.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 210  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
211
Bruinsma, G. (1991). De test-hertest betrouwbaarheid van de selfreport
methode. Tijdschrift voor criminologie., 245–255.
Bruinsma, G. (1994). De test-hertest betrouwbaarheid van het meten van
jeugdcriminaliteit. Tijdschrift voor criminologie, 3, 218–235.
Bryman, A. (2006). ‘Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it
done?’ Qualitative research, Vol.6, No. 1, (pp. 97–113), London: Sage.
Buijs, F. J., Demant, F., & Hamdy, A. (2006). Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en
democratische Moslims in Nederland. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press.
Bushman, B. J., Rothstein, H. R., & Anderson, C. A. (2010). Much ado about
something: Violent video game effects and a school of red herring: Reply to
Ferguson and Kilburn (2010). Psychological Bulletin, 136(2), 182–187.
Caldwell, C. H., Kohn-Wood, L. P., Schmeelk-Cone, K. H., Chavous, T. M., &
Zimmerman, M. A. (2004). Racial discrimination and racial identity as risk
or protective factors for violent behaviors in African American young
adults. American journal of community psychology, 33(1–2), 91–105.
Canna, S. (ed.) (2011). Countering violent extremism: Scientific methods & strate-
gies. Washington, DC: NSI.
Carlisle, R. P. (2005). The Encyclopedia of Politics: The Left and the Right, Volume 2:
The Right. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Change Institute. (2008). Studies into violent radicalization. Lot 2: The beliefs ideol-
ogies and narratives. London.
Chen, M.-J., Miller, B. A., Grube, J. W., & Waiters, E. D. (2006). Music,
substance use, and aggression. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 67(3),
373.
Christmann, K. (2012). Preventing religious radicalisation and violent
extremism. A systematic review of the resarch evidence. Report. Youth
Justice Board for England and Wales.
Cilluffo, F., Cozzens, J. B., & Ranstorp, M. (2010). Foreign fighters: Trends,
trajectories and conflict zones. Washington: Homeland Security Policy Insi-
titute.
Clark, J. P., & Wenninger, E. P. (1962). Socioeconomic class and area as corre-
lates of illegal behavior among juveniles. American Sociological Review, 28,
826–834.
Cohen, A. K., & Short, J. F. (1961). Juvenile delinquency. In R. K. Merton & R.
A. Nisbet (Eds.), Contemporary social problems. New York: Hartcourt Brace &
World.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 211  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
212
Conings, C., & Van Linthout, P. (2012). Sociale media. Een nieuwe uitdaging
voor politie en justitie. Panopticon: Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, Criminologie en
Forensisch Welzijnswerk(3), 205–230.
Conway, M. (2012). From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The emergence of the
internet as a new form of violent radical milieu. Combating Terrorism
Exchange, 2(4), 12–22.
Conway, M., & McInerney, L. (2008). Jihadi video and auto-radicalisation:
evidence from an exploratory YouTube study Intelligence and Security Infor-
matics (pp. 108–118): Springer.
Coolsaet, R. (2005a). Al-Qaeda, the Myth: The Root Causes of International
Terrorism and how to Tackle Them. Gent: Academia Press.
Coolsaet, R. (2005b). Het Islamitisch terrorisme. Percepties wieden en kweek-
vijvers dreggen. Justiële verkenningen, 31(2).
Corens, S. (2008). Op zoek naar een betere wereld: Islamitisch gefundeerde
radicalisering binnen een Europese context. Een psychosociale analyse.
MENARG Working paper n°4. Gent: Middle East and North Africa Research
Group.
COT. (2008). Radicalisation, recruitment and the EU counter-radicalisation
strategy. The Hague: COT, 17.
Couldry, N., Livingstone, S., & Markham, T. (2006). Media Consumption and
the Future of Public Connection Report march 2006. London: The London
School of Economics and Political Science.
Dahlgren, P., & Olsson, T. (2007). Young activists, political horizons and the
internet. Adapting the net to one’s purposes. In B. D. Loader (Ed.), Young
citizens in the digital age. Political engagement, young people and new media. (pp.
68–81). London and New York: Routledge.
Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2008). Studying violent radicalisation in Europe Part I.
The potential contribution of social movement theory. DIIS Working paper
no 2008/2. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know
and what we do not know. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33, 797–814.
Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (March 2008). Studying violent radicalization in Europe.
Part II. The potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological
approaches. DIIS Working Paper, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Interna-
tional Studies.
Daniels, J. (2008). Race, civil rights, and hate speech in the digital era. In A.
Everett (Ed.), Learning race and ethnicity: Youth and digital media. Cambridge:
The MIT Press.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 212  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
213
Daniels, J. (2009). Cyber racism: White supremacy online and the new attack
on civil rights. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=
qT4AfMLJPY0C&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=white+supremacy+internet+use&
ots=-1H6IawTg6&sig=I4M8pAwlUcbb32g_N89Q4x-b5io#v=onepage&q=
white%20supremacy%20internet%20use&f=false
Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. The Journal of Philosophy,
60(23), 685–700.
De Graaf, B. (2011). Evaluating counterterrorism performance: A comparative study.
New York: Routledge.
De Koning, M. (2008). Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ Islam. Geloofsbeleving en identi-
teitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse Moslims. Amsterdam: Uitge-
verij Bert Bakker.
De Koster, W., & Houtman, D. (2006). Toevluchtsoord voor een bedreigde
soort. Over virtuele gemeenschapsvorming door rechts-extremisten. Socio-
logie, 2(3), 232–254.
De Stoop, C. (2010). Vrede zij met u, zuster: het verhaal van een westerse zelfmoord-
terroriste: De Bezige Bij.
De Waele, M. (2013). Flemish youth and right-wing extremist groups. Status
quaestionis. In A. Crawford, J. de Maillard, J. Shapland, A. Verhage & P.
Ponsaers (Eds.), Crime, violence, justice and social order. Monitoring Contempo-
rary Security Issues. Antwerpen/Apeldoorn/Portland: Maklu.
De Waele, M., & Pauwels, L. (2014). Right-wing extremism and the use of
violence. What is the role of perceived injustice and moral support? In
Lieven Pauwels & G. Vermeulen (Eds.), Update in de Criminologie VII?:
actuele ontwikkelingen inzake EU-justitiebeleid, cannabisbeleid, misdaad en straf,
jongeren en jeugdzorg, internationale vrede, veiligheid en gerechtigheid, geweld-
dadig extremisme & private veiligheid en zelfregulering (pp. 364–392).
Antwerpen: Maklu.
Dean, G., Bell, P., & Newman, J. (2012). The dark side of social media: review
of online terrorism. Pakistan Journal of Criminology, 3(3), 103–122.
Deflem, M. (2004a). Social control and the policing of terrorism: Foundations
for a sociology of counterterrorism. The American Sociologist, 35(2), 75–92.
Deflem, M. (2004b). Terrorism and counter-terrorism: Criminological perspectives
(Vol. 5). Oxford: Elsevier.
Della Porta, D. (1995). Social movements, political violence and the state: A
comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. Retrieved from http://
books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=S_llSY4uWOAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&
exposure.social.media.book  Page 213  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
214
ots=6UO6RxIYSv&sig=1rTqzL9KHUgRmdT8aswptpEu6Oo#v=onepage&
q&f=true
Della Porta, D. (2009). Social movement studies and political violence.
Retrieved 23/04/2012, from http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/32769489/H_fte_
4_Donatella.pdf
Demant, F., & De Graaf, B. (2010). How to counter radical narratives: Dutch
deradicalisation policy in the case of Moluccan and Islamic radicals. Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, 33 (5), 408–428.
Dentler, R. A., & Monroe, L. J. (1961). Social correlates of early adolescent theft.
American Sociological Review, 26, 733–743.
Doosje, B., Loseman, A., & Van den Bos, K. (2009). Determinants of the radical-
ization process of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: Personal uncertainty,
perceived injustice, and perceived group threat. Manuscript in preparation.
Doosje, B., Van den Bos, K., Loseman, A., Feddes, A. R., & Mann, L. (2012).
“My In-group is Superior!”: Susceptibility for Radical Right-wing Attitudes
and Behaviors in Dutch Youth. Negotiation and Conflict Management
Research, 5(3), 253–268.
Dunkel, F., & Gengn, B. (2003). Experiences of violence, social organisations
and risk factors among juveniles in the hanseatic city of Greifswald,
1998–2002. Findingds of an empirical longitudinal stuy about the condi-
tions of life and delinquency of juveniles. In F. Dunkel & K. Derkhahn
(Eds.), Youth violence: New patterns and local responses; Experiences in East and
West (pp. 825–315). Mönchengladbach: Forum Verlag Gotesburg.
Elliott, D. S., Ageton, S. S., & Canter, R. J. (1979). An integrated theoretical
perspective on delinquent behavior. Journal of research in crime and delin-
quency, 16(1), 3–27.
Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The benefits of Facebook
“friends”: Social capital and college students’ use of online social network
sites. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 12(4), 1143–1168.
Elster, J. (1989). Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge University
Press.
Erickson, M., & Empey, L. T. (1963). Court records, undetected delinquency,
and decision-making. Journal of criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science,
54(456–469).
European Commission’s Expert Group. (2011). Radicalisation processes
leading to acts of terrorism. In R. Coolsaet (Ed.), Jihadi terrorism and the radi-
calization challenge: European and American Experiences. Aldershot, England;
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 269–288.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 214  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
215
Europol. (2011). TE-SAT 2011. EU Terrorisme Situation and Trend Report. Den
Haag: European Police office.
Europol. (2012). TE-SAT 2012. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Den
Haag: European Police Office.
Evans, S. M., & Boyte, H. C. (1992). Free spaces: The sources of democratic change
in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Farrington, D. P. (1992). Criminal career research in the United Kingdom.
Britisch Journal of Criminology, 32, 521.
Farrington, D. P. (2007). Childhood risk factors and risk-focused prevention.
The Oxford handbook of criminology, 4, 602–640.
Farrington, D. P., Loeber, R., Stouthamer-Loeber, M., Kammen, W. B., &
Schmidt, L. (1996). Self-reported delinquency and a combined delinquency
seriousness scale based on boys, mothers and teachers: Concurrent and
predictive validity for african-americans and caucasians. Criminology, 34(4),
493-517. 
Ferguson, C. J. (2007). Evidence for publication bias in video game violence
effects literature: A meta-analytic review. Aggression and violent behavior,
12(4), 470–482.
Ferguson, C. J., & Kilburn, J. (2010). Much ado about nothing: The misestima-
tion and overinterpretation of violent video game effects in eastern and
western nations: comment on Anderson et al.(2010). Psychological Bulletin,
136(2), 174–178.
Ferguson, C. J., Rueda, S. M., Cruz, A. M., Ferguson, D. E., Fritz, S., & Smith, S.
M. (2008). Violent Video Games and Aggression Causal Relationship or
Byproduct of Family Violence and Intrinsic Violence Motivation? Criminal
Justice and Behavior, 35(3), 311–332.
Ferguson, C. J., San Miguel, C., & Hartley, R. D. (2009). A multivariate analysis
of youth violence and aggression: The influence of family, peers, depres-
sion, and media violence. The Journal of pediatrics, 155(6), 904–908.
Fermin, A. (2009). Islamitisch en extreem-rechtse radicaliseirng in Nederland.
Een vergelijkend literatuuronderzoek. Rotterdam: Risbo Research Training
Consultancy.
Flick, U (2002). An introduction to qualitative research. London: Sage.
Flick, U. (ed.). (2007). The Sage qualitative research kit. Vol 1 – 8, London: Sage.
Forest, J. J. F. (Ed.). (2006). The making of a terrorist: Recruitment, training, and root
causes. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 215  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
216
Freedman, J. L. (2002). Media violence and its effects on aggression: Assessing the
scientific evidence. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Ganor, B. (Ed.). (2007). Hypermedia seduction for terrorist recruiting. Amsterdam:
IOS Press.
Gavray, C., Fournier, B., & Born, M. (2012). Nonconventional/illigal political
participation of male and female youths. Human Affairs, 22(3), 405–418.
Geelhoed, F. (2012). Purification and Resistance: Glocal Meanings of Islamic Funda-
mentalism in the Netherlands. Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Geeraerts, S. (2012). Digital radicalization of youth. Social Cosmos, 3(1), 25–32.
Gentile, D. A., Lynch, P. J., Linder, J. R., & Walsh, D. A. (2004). The effects of
violent video game habits on adolescent hostility, aggressive behaviors,
and school performance. Journal of adolescence, 27(1), 5–22.
Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M., & Signorielli, N. (2002). Growing up with
television: The cultivation perspective. In J. Bryant & D. Zillmann (Eds.),
Media effects: advances in theory and research. (pp. 17–40). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
Gerstenfeld, P. B., Grant, D. R., & Chiang, C. (2003). Hate online: A content
analysis of extremist internet sites. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy.,
3(1), 29–44.
Gibbons, F. X., Gerrard, M., Cleveland, M. J., Wills, T. A., & Brody, G. (2004).
Perceived discrimination and substance use in African American parents
and their children: A panel study. Journal of personality and social psychology,
86(4), 517.
Gifford, S. (1996). Qualitative Research: The Soft Option? Health Promotion
Journal of Australia, 6(1), 58–61.
Githens-Mazer, J. (2010, 4 november). Radicalisation via Youtube? It’s not so
simple. The Guardian. Retrieved 4 februari, 2012, from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/04/youtube-radicali-
sation-roshonara-choudhry
Glaser, B.J. & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago:
Aldine.
Glees, A. & Pope, C. (2005). When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist
Activity on British Campuses. London: Social Affairs Unit.
Goodall Jr, H. L. (2010). Counter-narrative: How progressive academics can chal-
lenge extremists and promote social justice. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast
Press.
Goodwin, M., & Evans, J. (2012). From voting to violence? Far right extremism
in Britain. London: Hope not hate.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 216  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
217
Gottfredson, M., R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford:
Standford University Press.
Grasmick, H. G., Tittle, C. R., Bursik, R. J., & Arneklev, B. J. (1993). Testing the
core empirical implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of
crime. Journal of research in crime and delinquency, 30(1), 5–29.
Greenlaw, C., & Brown-Welty, S. (2009). A comparison of web-based and
paper-based survey methods testing assumptions of survey mode and
response cost. Evaluation Review, 33(5), 464–480.
Griffin, L. & Ragin, C. C. (1994). Some Observations on Formal Methods of
Qualitative Analysis. Sociological Methods & Research, 23 (2), 4 -21. London:
Sage.
Gubrium J. F. & Holstein, J.. A. (eds.). (2002). Handbook of Interview Research,
London: Sage.
Harchaoui, S. (2006). Radicalism als insluitingsprobleem. In S. Harchaoui
(Ed.), Hedendaags radicalisme. Verklaring en aanpak. (pp. 1–16). Apeldoorn:
Het Spinhuis.
Hedström, P. (2005). Dissecting the social: On the principles of analytical sociology:
Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
Helfstein, S. (2012). Edges of radicalization: Individuals, networks and ideas in
violent extremism. West Point, New York: The Combating Terrorism Center.
Helmus, T. C. (2009). Why and how some people become terrorists. In P. K.
Davis, & K. Cragin (Eds.), Social science for counterterrorism: Putting the pieces
together. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.
Hesse-Biber, Sharlene N. & Leavy, P. (2006). The Practice of Qualitative Research,
London: Sage.
Hessing, D. J., & Elffers, H. (1995). De validiteit van de self-report methode in
onderzoek naar regelovertredend gedrag. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie,
55–70.
Hinds, L., & Murphy, K. (2007). Public satisfaction with police: Using proce-
dural justice to improve police legitimacy. The Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Criminology, 40(1), 27–42.
Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Hirschi, T. (1979). Separate and unequal is better. Journal of research in crime and
delinquency, 16(1), 34–38.
Horgan, J. (2004). The psychology of terrorism: Routledge.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 217  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
218
Horgan, J. (2008). From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives
from psychology on radicalisation into terrorism. The Annals. Philadelphia:
The American Academy of Political and Social Science.
Hoskins, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Awan, A. (2009). Legitimising the discourses of
radicalisation: Political violence in the new media ecology. ESRC End of
reward report. Swindon: The Economic and Social Research Council.
Hosmer, D. W., & Lemeshow, S. (2000). Model-Building Strategies and
Methods for Logistic Regression. In D.W. Hosmer, S. Lemeshow, R.X. Stur-
divant (Eds.), Applied Logistic Regression, Second Edition. (pp. 91-142). Hobo-
ken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Hough, M., Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Myhill, A., & Quinton, P. (2010). Proce-
dural justice, trust and institutional legitimacy. Policing, 4(3), 203–210.
Huband, M. (2009). Radicalization and recruitment in Europe: The UK case. In
M. Ranstorp (Ed.), Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist
movements in Europe. Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis Group.
Huesmann, L. R. (2007). The impact of electronic media violence: Scientific
theory and research. Journal of Adolescent Health, 41(6), 6–13.
Hui, J. Y. (2010). The Internet in Indonesia: Development and impact of radical
websites. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(2), 171–191.
Huizinga, D., & Elliott, D. S. (1986). Reassessing the reliability and validity of
self-report delinquency measures. Journal of quantitative criminology, 2(4),
293–327.
Huq, A. Z., Tyler, T. R., & Schulhofer, S. J. (2011). Mechanisms for eliciting
cooperation in counter-terrorism policing. Evidence from the United
Kingdom. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 8(4), 728–783.
ICT. (2012). In the depths of Jihadist web forums: Understanding a key compo-
nent of the propaganda of Jihad. Insights. Herzliya: International Institute
for Counterterrorism.
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.
(2009). Countering online radicalisation: A strategy for action. London,
England: ICSR, King’s College London.
ISD. (2012a). The new radical right: Violent and non-violent movements in
Europe. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
ISD. (2012b). Radicalisation: The role of the internet. A working paper of the
PPN. Report. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
ISD. (2012c). Using social media to tackle intolerance. Literature review.
London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 218  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
219
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Myhill, A., Quinton, P., & Tyler, T. R.
(2012). Why do people comply with the law? Legitimacy and the influence
of legal institutions. British Journal of Criminology, 52(6), 1051–1071.
Jewkes, Y. (2010). Much ado about nothing? Representations and realities of
online soliciting of children. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 16(1), 5–18.
Junger-Tas, J. (1990). Delinquency and ethnicity: An investigation on social
factors relating to delinquency among Maroccan; Turkish, Surinamese and
Dutch boys.: Brill Archive.
Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges
and opportunities of social media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59–68.
Katz, E., & Lazersfeld, P. F. (1955). Personal influence: the part pleyed by people in
the flow of mass communication. Glencoe: Free Press.
Kempf, K. L. (1993). The empirical status of Hirschi’s control theory. New direc-
tions in criminological theory: Advances in criminological theory, 4, 143–185.
Kiernan, N. E., Kiernan, M., Oyler, M. A., & Gilles, C. (2005). Is a web survey as
effective as a mail survey? A field experiment among computer users.
American Journal of Evaluation, 26(2), 245–252.
King, M., & Taylor, D., M. (2011). The radicaliszation of homegrown Jihadists:
A review of theoretical models and social psychological evidence. Terrorism
and Political Violence., 23(4), 602–622.
Klandermans, B., & Mayer, N. (2010). Right wing activism as a social move-
ment. In B. Klandermans & N. Mayer (Eds.), Extreme right activists in Europe:
Trough the magnifying glass. (pp. 3–15). London/New York: Routledge.
Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=thYyXUXw-
fckC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=Klandermans+en+mayer&ots=sLp4TXfrxe&
sig=3j5pkQsov0HssPmqVvJb-exTVFA#v=onepage&q=Klandermans%
20en%20mayer&f=false.
Klein, A. (2009a). A space for hate: The white power movement’s adaption into cyber-
space. Washington: Howard University.
Klein, A. (2009b). A space for hate: The white power movement’s adaption into
cyberspace. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=S_
llSY4uWOAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=6UO6RxIYSv&sig=1rTqzL9KHU-
gRmdT8aswptpEu6Oo#v=onepage&q&f=true
Kohlman, E. F. (2006). The real online terrorist treat. Foreign Affairs, 85(5),
115–124.
Konijn, E. A., Oegema, D., Schneider, I., De Vos, B., Krijt, M., & Prins, J. (2010).
Jong en multimediaal. Mediagebruik en meningsvorming onder jongeren,
exposure.social.media.book  Page 219  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
220
in het bijzonder Moslimjongeren. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam.
Koomen, W., & Van der Pligt, J. (2009). Achtergronden en determinanten van
radicalisering en terrorisme. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 51(4), 345–359.
Kraut, R., Kiesler, S., Boneva, B., Cummings, J., helgeson, V., & Crawford, A.
(2002). Internet paradox revisited. Journal of Social Issues, 58(1), 49–74.
Krueger, A. B. (2008). What makes a terrorist: Economics and the roots of terrorism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kundnani, A. (2012). Radicalisation: the journey of a concept. Race & Class,
54(2), 3–25.
Laperriere, A. (1997). La théorisation ancrée (grounded theory): Démarche analyt-
ique et comparaison avec d’autres approches apparentées in J. Poupart et al., La
recherche qualitative. Enjeux épistémologiques et méthodologiques, Montréal:
Gaëtan Morin Editeur.
Lazersfeld, P. F., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. (1949). The people’s choice: How the
voter makes up his mind in an presedantial campaign. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Lee, L., & Leets, L. (2002). Persuasive storrytelling by hate groups online:
Examining its effects on adolescents. American Behavioral Scientist, 45(6),
927–957.
Lemeshow, S., & Hosmer, D. (2000). Applied Logistic Regression. Second edition.
John Wiley & Sons.
Leuprecht, C., & Hall, K. (2014). Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How
Structure Relates to Function. In A.J. Masys (Ed.) Networks and Network
Analysis for Defence and Security. (pp. 83–120). Springer.
Leuprecht, C., Hataley, T., Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2010a). Containing
the narrative: Strategy and tactics in countering the storyline of global
jihad. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 5(1), 42–57.
Leuprecht, C., Hataley, T., Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2010b). Winning
the battle but losing the war? Narrative and counter-narratives strategy.
Perspectives on Terrorism, 3(2).
Levine, P., & Lopez, H. (2004). Young people and political campaigning on the
internet. Circle Fact Sheet. The Centre for Information and Research on Civic
Learning and Engagement.
Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New
York: Plenum Press.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 220  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
221
Livingstone, S. (2005). Critical debates in internet studies: Reflections on an
emerging field. In J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (Eds.), Mass Media and Society
(4 ed.). London: Hodder Arnold Publishing.
Livingstone, S., Bober, M., & Helsper, E. (2005). Active participation or just
more information? Young people’s take up of opportunities to act and
interact on the internet. Information, Communication and Society., 8(3),
287–314.
Livingstone, S., Couldry, N., & Markham, T. (2007). Youthful steps towards
civic partcipation. Does the internet help? In B. D. Loader (Ed.), Young citi-
zens in the digital age. Political engagement, young people and new media. (pp.
21–34). London and New York: Routledge.
Loeber, R., & Farrington, D. P. (1998). Serious and violent juvenile offenders: Risk
factors and successful interventions. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Lucia, S., Herrmann, L., & Killias, M. (2007). How important are interview
methods and questionnaire designs in research on self-reported juvenile
delinquency? An experimental comparison of Internet vs paper-and-pencil
questionnaires and different definitions of the reference period. Journal of
Experimental Criminology, 3(1), 39–64.
MASON, M.(2010). Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative
Interviews. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 11(3), Art. 8, http://nbn-
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs100387.
May, T. (2001). Social research: issues, methods and process: Open University Press.
Mc Cauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicaliza-
tion: Pathways to terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415–433.
McCabe, S. E., Boyd, C. J., Young, A., Crawford, S., & Pope, D. (2005). Mode
effects for collecting alcohol and tobacco data among 3rd and 4th grade
students: A randomized pilot study of Web-form versus paper-form
surveys. Addictive Behaviors, 30(4), 663–671.
McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2011). Friction: How radicalization happens to
them and us. New York: Oxford University Press.
McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda setting function of mass
media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(3), 176–187.
Mcmillan, S. J., & Morrison, M. (2006). Coming of age with the internet: A
qualitative exploration of how the internet has become an integral part of
young people’s lives. New Media Society, 8(1), 73–95.
Mellis, C. (2007). Amsterdam and radicalization: The municipal approach.
Report Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties & Ministerie van
Justitie. Den Haag: NCTb.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 221  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
222
Miedema, S., Bruinsma, G. J. N., & Hoogerwerf, A. (1998). Over theoretische
integratie in de criminologie. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 40, 113–128.
Miller, E. T., Neal, D. J., Roberts, L. J., Baer, J. S., Cressler, S. O., Metrik, J., &
Marlatt, G. A. (2002). Test-retest reliability of alcohol measures: Is there a
difference between internet-based assessment and traditional methods?
Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 16(1), 56.
Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: A psychological explora-
tion. American Psychologist, 60(2), 234–256.
Moniquet, C. (2005). The radicalisation of Muslim youth in Europe: The reality and
scale of the threat. Washington, D.C.: The US Committee on International
Relations.
Montgomery, K., Gottlieb-Robles, B., & Larson, G. O. (2004). Youth as E-citi-
zens: Engaging the digital generation. Washington: Centre for Social
Media.
Moors, J. A., & Van den Reek Vermeulen, E. (2010). Voedingsbodem voor radi-
calisering bij kleine etnische groepen in Nederland. Een verkennend onder-
zoek in Somalische, Pakistaanse, Koerdische en Molukse gemeenschappen.
Deelrapport literatuurstudie. Tilburg: IVA. Beleidsonderzoek en advies.
Morash, M., & Moon, B. (2007). Gender differences in the effects of strain on
the delinquency of South Korean youth. Youth & Society, 38(3), 300–321.
Morris, A. (2000). Reflections on social movement theory: Criticisms and
proposals. Contemporary Sociology, 29(3), 445–454.
Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring political mobilization: The
distinction between activism and radicalism. Terrorism and Political Violence,
21(2), 239–260.
Murer, J. F. (2011). Listening to radicals: Attitudes and motivations of young
people engaged in political and social movements outside of the main-
stream in Central and Nordic Europe. The European Study of Youth Mobilisa-
tion Report. London: Britisch Council.
Murphy, K. (2003). Peocedural justice and tax compliance. Australian Journal of
Social Issues, 23(3), 379–407.
Nawaz, M. (2012). Radical: My Journey from Islamist Extremism to a Democratic
Awakening. WH Allen.
NCTb. (2010). Jihadisten en het Internet Update 2009. Den Haag: Nationaal
Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.
Neuman, W. (2007). Basics of social research: qualitative and quantitative
approaches.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 222  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
223
Neumann, P. R. (2011). Preventing violent radicalization in America. (Policy
Report). Washington, D.C.: Bipartisan Policy Center.
Neumann, P. R., & Rogers, B. (2007). Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Isla-
mist Militant Movement in Europe. London: The International Centre for
the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.
Neumann, P. R., Nawaz, M., & Levitt, M. (2011). Combatting violent extre-
mism: The counter radicalization debate in 2011. Special Policy Forum Report
No. 1738. Policy Watch.
Neumann, P.R., Stoil, J., & Esfandiary, D. (2008). Perspectives on radicalization
and political violence: papers from the first International Conference on
Radicalisation and Political Violence. London: ICSR.
Newburn, T. (2007). Criminology. Devon: Willan Publishing.
Noppe, J., Ponsaers, P., Verhage, A., De Ruyver, B., & Easton, M. (2011).
Preventie en radicalisering in België. Antwerpen: Maklu.
Nulty, D. D. (2008). The adequacy of response rates to online and paper
surveys: what can be done? Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education,
33(3), 301–314.
Odén, N. (2008). Skolmaterial: I demokratins tjänst. Stockholm: Exit, Fryhuset.
Oegema, D., Kleinnijenhuis, J., Anderson, K., & Van Hoof, A. (2008). Flaming
and blaming: The influence of mass media content on interactions in on-
line discussions. In E. A. Konijn, M. Tanis, S. Utz & S. B. Barnes (Eds.), Medi-
ated interpersonal communication. (pp. 331–358). London and New York:
Routledge.
Olesen, T. (2009). Social movement theory and radical Islamic activism.
Aarhus: Centre for Studies in Islamism and radicalisation, Aarhus Univer-
sity.
Opp, K.-D. (2009). Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisci-
plinary introduction, critique, and synthesis: Routledge.
Pantucci, R. (2011). A typology of lone wolves: Preliminary analysis of lone
Islamist terrorists. Developments in radicalisation and political violence.
London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Polit-
ical Violence.
Pauwels, L. J. R., & Svensson, R. (2011). Exploring the relationship between
offending and victimization: What is the role of risky lifestyles and low
self-control? A test in two urban samples. European journal on criminal policy
and research, 17(3), 163–177.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 223  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
224
Pauwels, L. J. R., & Svensson, R. (2013). Violent youth group involvement, self-
reported offending and victimisation: An empirical assessment of an inte-
grated informal control/lifestyle model. European journal on criminal policy
and research, 19(4), 369–386.
Pauwels, L., & De Waele, M. (in press). Youth Involvement in Politically Moti-
vated Violence: Why Do Social integration, Perceived Legitimacy, and
Perceived Discrimination Matter? International Journal of Conflict and
Violence.
Pauwels, L., Ponsaers, P., & Svensson, R. (2010). An analytical perspective on
the study of crime at multiple levels. In L. Pauwels, W. Hardyns & M. Van
de Velde (Eds.), Social disorganisation, offending, fear and victimisation.
Findings from Belgian studies on the urban context of crime (pp. (pp. 199–215)).
The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers.
Pauwels, L., Weerman, F., Bernasco, W., & Volker, B. (2012). Ruimtelijke crimi-
nologie. Tijdschrift voor criminologie, 54(4).
Phillips, N. & Hardy, C. (2002). Discourse analysis: investigating process of social
construction, London: Sage.
Plaisir, S., & Konijn, E. A. (2013). Rejected by peers. Attracted to antisocial edia
content: Rejection-based anger impairs moral jugdment among adoles-
cents. Developmental Psychology, 49(6), 1165–1173.
Ponsaers, P., & Pauwels, L. (2003). De onderzoekbaarheid van jeugddelin-
quentie – Over de self-report study. Jongeren en criminaliteit, 45–69.
Porterfield, A. L. (1943). Delinquency and outcome in court and college. Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 49, 199–208.
Porterfield, A. L. (1946). Youth in trouble. Fort Worth: Leo Potishman Founda-
tion.
Precht, T. (2007). Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe.
From conversion to terrorism. Kopenhagen: Danish Ministry of Justice.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American commu-
nity: Simon and Schuster.
Qualyle, E., & Taylor, M. (2011). Social networking as a nexus for engagement
and exploitation of young people. Information Security Technical Report,
16(2), 44–50.
Ramsay, G. (2009). Relocating the virtual war. Defence Against Terrorism Review,
2(1), 31–50.
Ranstorp, M. (2009). Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Terrorism. Stock-
holm: Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 224  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
225
Rapley, T. J. (2001). The art(fullness) of open ended-interviewing: some considerati-
ons on analysing interviews. Qualitative research, 1 (3), 303-323. London: Sage.
Raynes-Goldie, K., & Walker, L. (2008). Our space: Online civic engagement
tools for youth. In W. L. Bennet (Ed.), Civic life online: Learning how digital
media can engage youth. (pp. 161–188). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Regan, P., & Steeves, V. (2010). Kids R Us: Online social networking and the
potential for empowerment. Surveillance & Society, 8(2), 151–165.
Reid, E., & Chen, H. (2007). Internet-savvy US and Middle Eastern extremist
groups. Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review, 12(2), 177–192.
Reisig, M. D., Bratton, J., & Gertz, M. G. (2007). The construct validity and
refinement of process-based policing measures. Criminal Justice and Baha-
vior, 34(8), 1005–1028.
Rice, R. E. (2002). Primary issues in internet use: Access, civic and communicty
involvement, and social interaction and expression. In L. Lievrouw & S.
Livingstone (Eds.), The handbook of new media. (pp. 105–129). London: Sage
Publications.
Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and
outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 10(4), 336–353.
Ritchie, J.; Lewis, J. & Elam, G. (2003). Designing and selecting samples. In Jane
Ritchie & Jane Lewis (Eds.), Qualitative research practice. A guide for social
science students and researchers (pp.77–108) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Rogers, M. B., Loewenthal, K. M., Lewis, C. A., Amlôt, R., Cinnirella, M., &
Ansari, H. (2007). The role of religious fandamentalism in terrorist violence:
A social psychological analysis. International Review of Psychiatry, 19(3),
253–262.
Roy, O. (2008). Al Qaeda in the West as a youth movement: the power of a
narrative. CEPS Policy Briefs(1–12), 1.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (2009). Radicalization: A guide for the perplexed.
Ottawa: RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (2011). Démystifier la radicalisation. Ottawa:
Gendarmerie Royale du Canada.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (2011). Les jeunes en ligne et à risque internet un
outil de radicalisation. Ottawa, Ont.: Gendarmerie Royale du Canada.
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 225  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
226
Säkerhetspolisen, B. r. (2009). Valdsam politisk extremism: Antidemokratiska
grupperingar pa yttersta höger – och vänsterkanten. Stockholm: Säkerhets-
polisen.
Säkerhetspolisen. (2010). “Våldsbejakande islamistisk extremism i Sverige.
Stockholm.
Sampson, R. J., & Laub, J. H. (2003). Desistance from crime over the life course.
Handbook of the life course, 295–309.
Savage, J., & Yancey, C. (2008). The Effects of Media Violence Exposure On
Criminal Aggression A Meta-Analysis. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35(6),
772–791.
Schiffauer, W. (1999). Islamism in the Diaspora. The fascination of political
Islam among second generation German Turks. Frankfurt: Lehrstuhl
Vergleichende Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie. Europa-Universität Viad-
rina.
Schils, N., & Pauwels, L. (2014). Differential online exposure to extremist
content and political violence. Testing the relative strength of social
learning and competing perspectives. Terrorism and Political Violence,
forthcoming.
Schils, N., Dewaele, M., & Pauwels, L. (forthcoming). How invariant is the
interaction between extremist propensity and expoure to extremist moral
settings in sub groups by gender and immigrant background? Testing a
leading hypothesis of SAT.
Schmid, A. P. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisa-
tion: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review ICCC research paper.
The Hague: International Centre for Counter Terrorism.
Sherry, J. L. (2001). The effects of violent video games on aggression. Human
communication research, 27(3), 409–431.
Shih, T.-H., & Fan, X. (2008). Comparing response rates from web and mail
surveys: A meta-analysis. Field methods, 20(3), 249–271.
Short, J. F., & Nye, F. I. (1958). Extent of unrecorded juvenile delinquency:
Tentative conclusions. Law and Criminology, 49(296–302).
Silber, M. D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat.
New York: NYPD Intelligence Division.
Silke, A. (2008). Holy wars: Exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi
radicalisation. European Journal of Criminology, 5(1), 99–123.
Silke, A. (Ed.). (2011). The psychology of counter-terrorism. New York: Routledge.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 226  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
227
Silverman, D. (2005). Doing qualitative research: a practical handbook (2nd
edition), London: Sage.
Simi, P., & Futrell, R. (2006). Cyberculture and the endurance of white power
activism. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 34(1), 115–142.
Simons, R. L., Chen, Y.-F., Stewart, E. A., & Brody, G. H. (2003). Incidents of
discrimination and risk for delinquency: A longitudinal test of strain theory
with an African American sample. Justice Quarterly, 20(4), 827–854.
Singer, J. A. (2009). Innovative survey methodologies for the study of attitudes
towards terrorism and counterterrorism strategies: Institute for homeland
security solutions.
Skillicorn, D. B., Leuprecht, C., & Winn, C. (2012). Homegrown Islamist Radi-
calization in Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey. Canadian
Journal of Political Science, 45(04), 929–956.
Slocum, W. L., & Stone, C. L. (1963). Family culture patterns and delinquent-
type behavior. Marriage and Family Living, 25, 202–208.
Slootman, M., & Tillie, J. (2006a). Processen van radicalisering. Waarom
sommige Amsterdamse moslims radicaal worden. Amsterdam: Instituut
voor Migratie- en Etnische Studies.
Slootman, M., & Tillie, J. (2006b). Processes of radicalisation: Why some
Amsterdam Muslims become radicals. Amsterdam: Institute for Migration
and Ethnic Studies.
SOU. (2010). Kriminella grupperingar: Motverka rekrytering och underlätta
avhopp. Stockholm: Stantens Offlentliga Utredingar.
Soudijn, M., & Monsma, E. (2012). Virtuele ontmoetingsruimtes voor cybercri-
minelen. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie(4).
Srole, L. (1956). Social integration and certain corollaries: An exploratory
study. American sociological review, 21(6), 709–716.
Stenersen, A. (2008). The internet: A virtual training camp? Terrorism and Polit-
ical Violence, 20(2), 215–233.
Sternberg, R. J. (2003). A duplex theory of hate: Development and application
to terrorism, massacres, and genocide. Review of General Psychology, 7(3),
299.
Stevens, T., & Neumann, P. R. (2009). Countering online radicalisation. A strategy
for action. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
and Political Violence.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 227  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
228
Stevens, T., & Neumann, P. R. (2009). Countering online radicalization: a strategy
for action. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and
Political Violence.
Stewart, E. A., & Simons, R. L. (2006). Structure and culture in African Amer-
ican adolescent violence: A partial test of the “code of the street” thesis.
Justice Quarterly, 23(1), 1–33.
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1991). Basic of qualitative research: Grounded theory,
procedures and techniques, Newbury Park: Sage.
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1993). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory,
procedures and techniques. London: Sage.
Subrahmanyam, K., Reich, S. M., Waechter, N., & Espinoza, G. (2008). Online
and offline social networks: use of social networking sites by emerging
adults. Journal of applied developmental psychology, 29(6), 420–433.
Sunier, T. (2006). Radicalisme als politieke stijl. In S. Harchaoui (Ed.),
Hedendaags radicalisme. Verklaring en aanpak. (pp. 61–80). Apeldoorn: Het
Spinhuis.
Sutherland, E. H. (1947). The principles of criminology. Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincot Company.
Svensson, R., & Pauwels, L. (2010). Does the effect of self-control on adolescent
offendinf vary by level of morality? A test in three countries. Criminal
Justice and Bahavior, 37(6), 732.
Svensson, R., Pauwels, L., & Weerman, F. M. (2010). Does the effect of self-
control on adolescent offending vary by level of morality? A test in three
countries. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 37(6), 732–743.
Taylor, S. J. (1998). Introduction to qualitative research methods: a guidebook and
resource. Wiley.
Thomas, Paul. (2012) Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism. London:
Bloomsbury Academic.
Thompson, G. (2009). Recruitment and radicalization of school-aged youth by inter-
national terrorist groups. Final Report. US: Homeland Security Institute.
Thompson, R. (2011). Radicalization and the use of Social Media. Journal of
Strategic Security, 4(4), 167–190.
Thornberry, T. P., & Krohn, M. D. (2000). The self-report method for measuring
delinquency and crime. Criminal justice, 4(1), 33–83.
Tops, P., & Zouridis, S. (2012). Sociale media: Vehikels voor collectieve wijs-
heid of sociale verstoring? Panopticon, 33(3), 246–257.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 228  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
229
Torok, R. (2010). Make a bomb in your mums kitchen: Cyber recruiting and socialisa-
tion of ‘White Moors’ and ‘Home Grown Jihadists’. Paper presented at the
Australian Counter Terrorism Conference., Pert Western Australia.
Tourangeau, R., & Smith, T. W. (1996). Asking sensitive questions the impact of
data collection mode, question format, and question context. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 60(2), 275–304.
Trend, D. (2007). The myth of media violence. A critical introduction. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing.
Trivedi, R.N. (2009). Radicalization and escalation of modern terrorism. New Delhi:
MD Publications Pvt Ltd.
Tyler, T. R. (1994). Governing amid diversity: The effect of fair decisionmaking
procedures on the legitimacy of government. Law and Society Review, 28(4),
809–831.
Tyler, T. R. (1997). The psychology of legitimacy: A relationaal perspective on
voluntary deference to authorities. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
1(4), 323–345.
Tyler, T. R. (2000). Social Justice: Outcome and procedure. International Journal
of Psychology, 35(2), 117–125.
Tyler, T. R. (2001). Public trust and conficende in legal authorities: What do
majority and minority group members want from the law and legal institu-
tions? Behavioral Science and the Law, 19(2), 245–235.
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why people obey the law. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Tyler, T. R., & Fagan, J. (2008). Legitimacy and cooperation: Why do people
help the police fight crime in their communities? Journal of Criminal Law,
6(1), 231–275.
Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. J. (2002). Trust in the law. Encouraging public cooperation
with the police and courts. New York: The Russel Sage Foundation.
Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. In
M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology 25 (pp.
151–191). New York: Academy Press. Retrieved from 
£http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=z9vHEy0osBAC&oi=fnd&
pg=PA115&ots=Pfqsk4n-fB&sig=CNJW2lbu7-yFDaaRmY-KVfjpZG8#v=
onepage&q&f=false
Tyler, T. R., & Sunshine, J. (2003). Moral solidarity, identification with the
community, and the importance of procedural justice: The police as proto-
typical representatives of a group’s moral values. Social Psychology Quar-
terly, 66(2), 153–165.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 229  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
230
Tyler, T. R., & Wakslak, C. J. (2004). Profiling and police legitimacy: Procedural
justice, attributions of motive, and acceptance of police autority. Crimi-
nology, 42(2), 253–281.
Tyler, T. R., Schulhofer, S., & Huq, A. Z. (2010). Legitimacy and deterrence
effects in counterterrorism policing: A study of Muslim Americans. Law and
Society Review, 44(2), 365–402.
United States Congress. (2010). Using the web as a weapon: The Internet as a tool
for violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism. Washington: Bibliogov.
Van Damme, A., & Pauwels, L. (2013). Naleving Van De Wet En Medewerking
Van Burgers Met Politie: (alleen) Een Kwestie Van Procedurele Rechtvaar-
digheid? Panopticon, 182–203.
Van de Linde, E., & Rademaker, P. (2010). Een toekomstverkenning van de invloed
van brede maatschappelijke trends op radicaliseringsprocessen. Den Haag:
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum.
Van den Bos, K., Loseman, A., & Doosje, B. (2009). Waarom jongeren radicali-
seren en sympathie krijgen voor terrorisme: Onrechtvaardigheid, onzeker-
heid en bedreigde groepen. Den Haag: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en
Documentatiecentrum.
Van der Pligt, J., & Koomen, W. (2009). Achtergronden en determinanten van
radicaliseirng en terrorisme. Den Haag: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en
Documentatiecentrum.
Van der Valk, I. (2010). Islamitisch extremisme in Nederland. In P. R. Rodri-
gues & J. Donselaar (Eds.), Monitor racisme en extremisme: Negende rapportage
(pp. 58–108). Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting/Universiteit Leiden.
Van der Valk, I., & Wagenaar, W. (2010). In en uit extreemrechts. Monitor
racisme en extremisme. Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting.
van Gemert, F. (2008). Marginaliseren en radicaliseren van Marokkaanse
jongemannen in strainperspectief. In I. Weijers & C. Eliaerts (Eds.), Jeugd-
criminologie. Achtergronden van jeugdcriminaliteit. Den Haag: Boom Juridi-
sche Uitgevers.
Van Kerckvoorde, J. (1995). Een maat voor het kwaad? Over de meting van crimina-
liteit met behulp van officiële statistieken en door middel van enquêtes. Leuven:
Universitaire Pers.
Van Leeuwen, M. (2005). Ronselen in Europa voor de heilige oorlog. Justiële
Verkenningen, 31(2), 84–94.
Van Manen, M. (2010). The pedagogy of momus technologies: facebook,
privacy and online intimacy. Qualitative Health Research, 20(8), 1023–1032.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 230  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
231
van San, M. (2013). ‘Als Allah mij kiest’ Rechtvaardigingen voor martelaar-
schap en geweld op Facebook. Tijdschrift voor criminologie, 55(2), 139–154.
van Stekelenburg, J., Oegema, D., & Klandermans, B. (2008). No Radicalization
without Identification: How Ethnic Dutch and Dutch Mulsim Web Forums
Radicalize over Time. In A. E. Azzi, X. Chryssochoou, B. Klandermans & B.
Simon (Eds.), Identity and Participation in culturally Diverse Societies: A Multi-
disciplinary Perspective. Chichestor: Wiley-Blakwell.
Vaz, E. W. (1966). Self-reported juvenile delinquency and social status. Cana-
dian Journal of Corrections, 8(20), 27.
Veldhuis, B., & Bakker, E. (2007). Causale factoren van radicalisering en hun
onderlinge samenhang. Vrede en Veiligheid, 36(4), 447–470.
Venhaus, J. (2010). Why Youth Join al-Qaeda. Retrieved from http://
dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/28901/1/Why%20Youth%
20Join%20al-Qaeda.pdf?1
Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psycho-
logical approaches. The Journal of Conflict Resolution., 49(1), 3–42.
Vidino, L. (2011). Radicalisation, linkage and diversity: Current trends in Terrorism
in Europe. Santa Monica: RAND.
Vissers, S., Hooghe, M., & Mareas, M. (2009). De relatie tussen internetgebruik
en de politieke participatie in Vlaanderen. Brussel: Studiedienst van de
Vlaamse regering.
Vold, G., Bernhard, T., & Snipes, J. (2002). Theoretical criminology (4 ed.). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Völker, B., Baerveldt, C., & Driessen, F. (2008). Vriendschap en criminaliteit bij
jongeren. In I. Weijers & C. Eliaerts (Eds.), Jeugdcriminologie: Achtergronden
van jeugdcriminaliteit. Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers.
von Behr, I., Reding, A., Edwards, C., & Gribbon, L. (2013). Radicalisation on
the digital era. The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and
extremism. RAND Europe.
Voss, H. L. (1966). Socio-economic status and reported delinquent behavior.
Social Problems, 13(314–324).
Wagenaar, W. (2010). Extreemrechtse formaties. In P. R. Rodrigues & J. Donse-
laar (Eds.), Monitor Racisme en Extremisme: Negende rapportage. (pp. 37–62).
Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting/Universiteit Leiden.
Waleed, A. (2007). Liquid terror: The dynamics of homegrown radicalisation.
Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 231  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE TO NEW SOCIAL MEDIA ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM
232
Wallerstein, J. S., & Wylie, C. J. (1947). Our law-abiding law-breakers. Proba-
tion, 25, 107–112.
Wang, Y.-C., Lee, C.-M., Lew-Ting, C.-Y., Hsiao, C. K., Chen, D.-R., & Chen, W.
J. (2005). Survey of substance use among high school students in Taipei:
web-based questionnaire versus paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Journal of
Adolescent Health, 37(4), 289–295.
Weatherby, G. A., & Scoggins, B. (2005). A content analysis of persuasion tech-
niques used on white supremacist websites. Journal of Hate Studies, 4(1),
9–31.
Weerman, F. M. (1998). Het belang van bindingen. De bindingstheorie als verklaring
van verschillen en veranderingen in deliquent gedrag. Groningen: Rijksuniversi-
teit.
Weilnböck, H. (2005). Psychotrauma, Narration in the Media, and the Literary
Public—and the Difficulties of Becoming Interdisciplinary1. Narratology
Beyond Literary Criticism: Mediality, Disciplinarity, 6, 239.
Weimann, G. (2004). Www.terror.net: How modern terrorism uses the internet.
Washington: United States Unstitute of Peace.
Weimann, G. (2010). Terror on facebook, Twitter, and Youtube. Brown Journal of
World Affairs, 16(2), 45–54.
Weimann, G., & Tsfati, Y. (2002). Www.terrorisme.com: Terror on the internet.
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25(5), 317–332.
Weir, G. R. S., Toolan, F., & Smeed, D. (2011). The treats of social networking:
Old wine in new bottles? Information Security Technical Report, 16, 38–43.
Wengraf, T. (2001). Qualitative research interviewing: biographic narrative and
semi-structured methods, London: Sage.
Wikström, P. H. (2003). Crime as alternative. Towards a cross-level situational
action theory of crime causation. In J. McCord (Ed.), Beyond empiricism:
institutions and intentions in the study of crime. New Burnswick: Transaction.
Wikström, P. H. (2004). Crime as alternative: Towardz a cross-level situational
action theory of crime causation. In J. Mc Coard (Ed.), beyond empiricism:
Institutions and intenetions in the study of crime. (pp. 1–37). New Burnswick:
Transaction.
Wikström, P. H. (2007). In search of the causes and explanations of crime. In R.
D. W. King, E. (Ed.), Doing research on crime and justice. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Wikström, P. H. (2010). Explaining crime as moral actions Handbook of the
Sociology of Morality (pp. 211–239): Springer.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 232  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
REFERENCES
233
Wikström, P. H. (2011). Does everything matter? adressing the problem of
causation and explanation in the study of crime. In J. M. Mc Gloin, C. J.
Sullivan & L. W. Kennedy (Eds.), When crime appears: The role of emergence:
Routledge.
Wikström, P. H. (2014). Why crime happens: A situational action theory. In G.
Manzo (Ed.), Analytical sociology: actions and networks: John Wiley & Sons.
Wikström, P. H., & Butterworth, D. H. (2006). Adolescent crime: Individual differ-
ences and lifestyles.: Willan Publishing.
Wikström, P. H., & Sampson, R. J. (2006). The explanation of crime: Context, mech-
anisms, and development: Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
Wikström, P. H., & Treiber, K. (2007). The Role of Self-Control in Crime Causa-
tion Beyond Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime. European
Journal of Criminology, 4(2), 237–264.
Wikström, P. H., Oberwittler, D., Treiber, K., & Hardie, B. (2012). Breaking rules:
The social and situational dynamics of young people’s urban crime. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). Joining the cause: Al-Muhajiroun and radical Islam. Paper
presented at the The roots of Islamic radicalism conference, Yale.
Wojcieszak, M. (2010a). “Carrying online participation offline” – Mobilization
by radical online groups and politically dissimilar offline ties. Journal of
Communication, 59, 564–586.
Wojcieszak, M. (2010b). Don’t talk to me: effects of ideologically homogeneous
online groups and poltically dissimilar offline ties on extremism. New
Media Society, 12(4), 637–655.
Wood, W., Wong, F. Y., & Chachere, J. G. (1991). Effects of media violence on
viewers’ aggression in unconstrained social interaction. Psychological
bulletin, 109(3), 371.
Woolley, J. K., Limperos, A. M., & Oliver, M. B. (2010). The 2008 presidential
election, 2.0: A content analysis of user-generated political Facebook
groups. Mass Communication and Society, 13(5), 631–652.
Woshinsky, O., H. (2008), Explaining Politics: Culture, Institutions, and Political
Behavior. New York, USA: Routledge.
Yetter, G., & Capaccioli, K. (2010). Differences in responses to Web and paper
surveys among school professionals. Behavior Research Methods, 42(1),
266–272.
Zhou, Y., Reid, E., Qin, J., Chen, H., & Lai, G. (2005). US domestic extremist
groups on the web: Link and content analysis. IEEE Intelligent Systems,
20(4), 44–51.
exposure.social.media.book  Page 233  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
exposure.social.media.book  Page 234  Thursday, August 21, 2014  5:35 PM
